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Detecting Financial Statement Fraud: Three Essays on Fraud Predictors,
Multi-Classifier Combination and Fraud Detection Using Data mining
Johan L. Perols
ABSTRACT
The goal of this dissertation is to improve financial statement fraud detection using a crossfunctional research approach. The efficacy of financial statement fraud detection depends on the
classification algorithms and the fraud predictors used and how they are combined. Essay I
introduces IMF, a novel combiner method classification algorithm. The results show that IMF
performs well relative to existing combiner methods over a wide range of domains. This research
contributes to combiner method research and, thereby, to the broader research stream of
ensemble-based classification and to classification algorithm research in general. Essay II
develops three novel fraud predictors: total discretionary accruals, meeting or beating analyst
forecasts and unexpected employee productivity. The results show that the three variables are
significant predictors of fraud. Hence Essay II provides insights into (1) conditions under which
fraud is more likely to occur (total discretionary accruals is high), (2) incentives for fraud (firms
desire to meet or beat analyst forecasts), and (3) how fraud is committed and can be detected
(revenue fraud detection using unexpected employee productivity). This essay contributes to
confirmatory fraud predictor research, which is a sub-stream of research that focuses on
developing and testing financial statement fraud predictors. Essay III compares the utility of
artifacts developed in the broader research streams to which the first two essays contribute, i.e.,
classification algorithm and fraud predictor research in detecting financial statement fraud. The
results show that logistic regression and SVM perform well, and that out of 41 variables found to
be good predictors in prior fraud research, only six variables are selected by three or more
classifiers: auditor turnover, Big 4 auditor, accounts receivable and the three variables introduced
in Essay II. Together, the results from Essay I and Essay III show that IMF performs better than
existing combiner methods in a wide range of domains and better than stacking, an ensemblebased classification algorithm, in fraud detection. The results from Essay II and Essay III show

viii

that the three predictors created in Essay II are significant predictors of fraud and, when evaluated
together with 38 other predictors, provide utility to classification algorithms.

ix

Chapter 1.

Dissertation Overview

The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE 2006) estimates that occupational fraud
totals $652 billion per year in the U.S. or about 5% of total revenues. A national survey
conducted by KPMG in 2003 reported that 75% of organizations had experienced fraud in the
three months leading up to the study (KPMG 2003). The potential benefit of fraud reduction is
staggering; a 33% reduction in fraud would result in a 26% increase in average profits of
American organizations. Detecting fraud is, however, difficult and according to ACFE (2006)
25% of discovered fraud is detected by accident as compared to proactive measures such as
internal audits (20%), internal controls (19%) or external audits (12%).
1.1. Research Framework
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to improve financial statement fraud detection.
Figure 1.1 shows how the three essays are related and how they contribute to the goal of
improving financial statement fraud prediction. The efficacy of the detection depends on the
classification algorithms and the fraud predictors used and how they are combined. Essay III,
Financial Statement Fraud Detection: An Analysis of Statistical and Machine Learning
Algorithms, evaluates the utility of different classification algorithms and fraud predictors for
predicting financial statement fraud. This research pushes the research frontier in data mining
fraud detection research in the functional area of accounting information systems. Essay I,
Information Market Based Decision Fusion, introduces a new classification algorithm and
contributes to classification algorithm research in the functional area of information systems.
Three new fraud predictors are developed in Essay II, The Effect of Discretionary Accruals,
Earnings Expectations and Unexpected Productivity on Financial Statement Fraud. This research
adds to fraud predictor research in the functional area of accounting. Thus, I use a crossfunctional research approach focusing on two functional areas, accounting and information
systems, and their confluence, accounting information systems, to improve financial statement
fraud detection.
In the classification algorithm essay (Essay I) and the fraud predictor essay (Essay II) I
approach specific research sub-streams with the intention of moving each sub-stream forward.
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Figure 1.1: Research Framework
Essay I focuses on multi-classifier combination combiner method research, which is a research
sub-stream within multi-classifier combination research that, in turn, is a sub-stream of the
broader research stream of classification algorithms. Essay II extends confirmatory fraud
predictor research within the broader research stream of financial statement fraud predictors. The
third essay represents the nexus of the first two essays, and brings the two broader research
streams together with the sole objective of improving fraud detection. This essay examines the
utility of different combinations of classification algorithms and fraud predictors. Thus, the first
two essays can be seen as contributing to the basic research needed for the third essay to
accomplish its objective of improving financial statement fraud detection. Note, however, that the
goal of the third essay is not to test the utility of the algorithm developed in the first essay or to
test the efficacy of the predictors developed in the second essay in detecting financial statement
fraud. Rather, the third essay takes findings from the broader research streams to which the first
two essays contribute, i.e., classification algorithms and fraud predictors, and examines the
efficacy of various artifacts developed within these research streams in detecting financial
statement fraud. Of course, the algorithm developed in the first essay and the predictors
developed in the second essay are part of these research streams, and are, thus, included in the
examination in the third essay. This might seem like a subtle difference but it is important. By not
focusing on the artifacts developed in the first two essays, the third essay is not tied to these
artifacts. This allows me to choose among a larger number of artifacts and does not limit my
2

evaluation to the efficacy of the artifacts developed in the first two essays. Furthermore, this
allows Essay I to develop an artifact that contributes to combiner method research without being
tied to a specific domain. Similarly, by focusing on the confirmatory fraud research stream, Essay
II can make a more theoretical contribution by developing artifacts that contribute to our
understanding of conditions and incentives related to financial statement fraud, as opposed to
focusing on developing artifacts that outperform existing predictors. It is also important to note
that the contributions of the three essays are primarily dependent on the results reported in the
respective essays. For example, the contribution of the multi-classifier combination combiner
method developed in Essay I is determined based on an evaluation in Essay I of the performance
of the proposed combiner method to combiner methods developed in prior research. This
evaluation does not focus specifically on the fraud domain and instead evaluates the contribution
of the combiner method across multiple domains.
In addition to my dissertation being cross-functional, I also use two paradigms to accomplish
my research objective of improving financial statement fraud detection. Essay II is confirmatory
hypotheses testing grounded in positivism, while Essays I and III follow the design science
paradigm. I design and evaluate a novel IT artifact in Essay I, and in Essay III, I evaluate the
utility of multiple classification algorithm and fraud predictor artifacts in the financial statement
fraud domain.
1.2. Overview of the Three Essays
Essay I is titled: Information Market Based Decision Fusion. In this essay, I design a novel
combiner method based on theoretical and empirical findings in information market research to
improve the performance over existing combiner methods. Combiner methods are used in multiclassifier combination to improve the classification performance of individual classifiers by
combining the decisions of many individual classifiers, like artificial neural networks (ANN),
logistic regression and decision trees (Kittler and Roli 2000). I show through extensive
experiments that when the true classes of objects are only revealed for objects classified as
positive, IMF outperforms three benchmark combiner methods, Majority, Average and Weighted
Average when the positive ratio is low, and outperforms Majority and performs on par with
Average and Weighted Average, when the positive ratio is high. When the true classes of all
objects are revealed, IMF outperforms Weighted Average and Majority, and at marginal level of
significance, outperforms Average.
Essay II is titled: The Effect of Discretionary Accruals, Earnings Expectations and
Unexpected Productivity on Financial Statement Fraud. The research objective in this essay is to
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improve our understanding of conditions and incentives behind financial statement fraud. I
hypothesize that (1) earnings management in prior years is positively related to financial
statement fraud; (2) firms that meet or exceed analyst forecasts are more likely to have committed
fraud than firms that fail to meet analyst forecasts; and (3) unexpected productivity is positively
related to financial statement fraud. I use an archival research approach to compare a set of fraud
firms, hand-collected from SEC enforcement actions, to a set of matched non-fraud firms. The
empirical results show support for all three hypotheses.
Essay III is titled: Financial Statement Fraud Detection: An Analysis of Statistical and
Machine Learning Algorithms. The research objective in this essay is to compare the utility of a
fairly comprehensive set of classification algorithms and fraud predictors in financial statement
fraud prediction. With this objective in mind I pose two specific research questions. (1) What
classification algorithm provides the most utility given different assumptions about prior
probabilities and costs of false positive and false negative classification errors? (2) What
predictors are useful to these algorithms for detecting financial statement fraud? I find that
logistic regression and support vector machines (SVM) perform well relative to C4.5 (a decision
tree), MultilayerPerceptron (a backpropagation neural network), stacking (an ensemble method),
bagging (also an ensemble method) and IMF (an ensemble method combiner method), while
stacking and C4.5 consistently perform relatively poorly, where performance is measured using
estimated relative cost. Furthermore, logistic regression and SVM provide the best performance
under what is believed to be the most relevant prior probability and relative cost estimates. The
results also show that out of 41 variables that have been found to be good predictors in prior fraud
research, only six variables are selected by three or more classifiers: auditor turnover, total
discretionary accruals, Big 4 auditor, accounts receivable, meeting or beating analyst forecasts,
and unexpected employee productivity.
The reminder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 contain the three
essays, Essay I, Essay II and Essay III, respectively. Each essay is written as a stand alone paper,
thus the three essays can be read in any order. Chapter 5 recaps the primary findings in the three
essays and concludes with a discussion of how these results fit together.
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Chapter 2.

Information Market Based Decision Fusion

2.1. Introduction
In many decision-making scenarios, decisions of multiple human experts or classifiers are
fused to determine the overall decision. Examples include: a group of accounting experts and
classifiers making going-concern decisions and an ensemble of classifiers in a fraud detection
application making decisions on whether a transaction is fraudulent. Multi-classifier combination
(MCC) is a technique that can be used to improve the classification performance in various
classification problems by combining the decisions of multiple individual classifiers (Suen and
Lam 2000). In MCC, individual classifiers, commonly referred to as base-classifiers, classify
objects based on inputs consisting of object feature vectors (see Figure 2.1). These classifications
or decisions are then combined using a combiner method into a single decision about the object’s
class label.
The basic premise behind MCC is that different classifiers in an ensemble have different
strengths and weaknesses, and therefore provide complementary information (referred to as
diversity in MCC) about the classification problem. These differences can be leveraged to
improve classification performance by combining base-classifiers’ decisions (Kittler et al. 1998).
Different combiner methods have been proposed and examined in the literature, and can be

Figure 2.1: Generic Classifier Combiner Architecture
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categorized based on whether they require training data. For example, Naive Bayes, Decision
Templates and Weighted Average (WAVG) require training data, while Average (AVG),
Majority (MAJ) and Product do not require training data. Existing combiner methods that require
training data have limitations including the requirement for training data, and restrictive
assumptions such as: 1) constant ensemble base-classifier composition; and 2) training data
performance being a good proxy for subsequent actual performance. Experimental results
generally indicate that MCC provides performance benefits, and that the performance of MAJ and
AVG methods are comparable or superior to that of methods requiring training (Duin and Tax
2000).
To improve performance while overcoming these limitations, I propose an information market
based fusion approach for multi-classifier combination that 1) has superior performance, 2) does
not require training data, and 3) can adapt to changes in ensemble composition and base-classifier
performance. In evaluating the effectiveness of the proposed approach, I compare IMF against
three combiner methods, AVG, MAJ and WAVG. These methods have performed relatively well
in prior research (Duin and Tax 2000) and have been used as benchmarks in recent MCC
research1. For example, Zheng and Padmanabhan (2007) use AVG, which they refer to as
Unweighted Average, and a version of WAVG where the weights are variance based, which they
refer to as Variance Based Weighting. The experimental evaluation was performed using
computational experiments with 17 datasets that were obtained from the UCI Machine Learning
Repository (Newman et al. 1998) and 22 different base-classifiers from Weka (Witten and Frank
2005).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I provide a review of related
research. IMF is introduced in Section 2.3 along with an overview of information markets. I then
present details on the computational experiments and results in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 respectively.
In Section 2.6, I discuss these results and conclude in Section 2.7 with a review of my
contributions and suggestions for future research.

1

In Duin and Tax (2000), AVG is referred to as Mean and MAJ is referred to as Majority; eight additional

combiner methods are evaluated: Bayes Rule (two different implementations), Nearest Mean, Nearest
Neighbor, Maximum, Median, Minimum and Product. When combining the decisions of different baseclassifiers trained using the same feature set, which is comparable to the MCC architecture that I use, their
results (p. 23) show that Majority and Mean perform on par with or better than the other combiner methods.
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2.2. Related Research
A classifier is a model that makes decisions about an object’s class membership based on the
object’s feature set. Examples of classifiers include neural networks, logistic regression, decision
trees and Bayesian classifiers (Witten and Frank 2005). Classifier performance is typically
dependent on the problem domain as well as on the calibration of the classifier. Multiple
classifiers are therefore typically tested in order to identify the best classifier for a given problem
domain. However, it is generally difficult to determine which classifier(s) will perform well in
subsequent classifications. Furthermore, classification for certain cases may even be improved by
an “inferior” classifier (Kittler et al. 1998). Thus, by combining the decisions of diverse
classifiers, it is possible to improve the overall performance.
Prior MCC research has primarily focused on one of two areas: (1) training and selection of
ensemble base-classifiers; or (2) combination of base-classifier decisions. Methods such as
bagging, boosting and stacking fall into the first category (Witten and Frank 2005), while
combiner methods such as MAJ, AVG and WAVG fall into the second category. Recent research
within the former stream has used ROC analysis to select dominant classifiers (Provost and
Fawcett 2001), and Data Envelopment Analysis to select efficient classifiers (Zheng and
Padmanabhan 2007) under various cost and class distributions, and then combine these
classifiers’ decisions. Zhao and Ram (2004) have investigated the appropriate cascading depth in
cascade generalization, a variation of stacking, where classifiers are trained sequentially using the
original input data and lower level classifiers’ decisions. This essay does not focus on classifier
selection and training; but on the combiner methods. Prior research within the combiner method
research stream has found that methods that use measurement data are typically more accurate
than methods that handle unique labels; methods that require training data typically outperform
methods that do not require training (Jain et al. 2000), but that MAJ and AVG, which do not
require training, perform either at the same level or significantly better than more complex
methods Duin and Tax (2000).
Another important, but largely overlooked aspect of combiner methods is how well they fit
with different system architectures. Software agents offer a new paradigm to support decisionmaking (Nissen and Sengupta 2006) where human-driven or autonomous software agents
embodying classifiers and other intelligent algorithms can leverage their individual strengths to
make collective decisions. The base-classifiers, combiner method and providers of object features
in a MCC can be implemented as software agents in multi-agent systems. Research in data
mining has implemented MCC agent systems for credit card fraud detection (Stolfo et al. 1997)
and network intrusion detection (Lee et al. 2000).
7

In MCC multi-agent systems that are implemented in dynamic real world settings, the relative
performance of base-classifiers and the ensemble composition can change over time as agents are
retired, added or temporarily unavailable. Existing combiner methods that require training do not
take this into consideration, and assume that the ensemble composition is static, and that
individual classifier performance does not change subsequent to training and validation. I next
introduce IMF, a combiner method that takes these issues into consideration.
2.3. Information Market Based Fusion
IMF is theoretically grounded in information markets. More specifically, the IMF aggregation
mechanism used in this essay is based on pari-mutuel betting markets.
2.3.1

Information Markets

Information markets are markets specifically designed for the purpose of information
aggregation. Equilibrium prices, derived using conventional market mechanisms, provide
information based on private and public information maintained by the market participants about
a specific situation, future event or object of interest (Hanson 2003). Although the concept of
information markets is fairly recent, the underlying notion of markets being capable of
aggregating information is not new (Hayek 1945), and the efficient market hypothesis states that
all private and public information is reflected in equilibrium prices (Fama 1970). Empirical
research has found support for the efficient market hypothesis, and for information aggregation in
information markets in general (Berg and Rietz 2003), and pari-mutuel betting markets in
particular (Plott et al. 2003).
The combiner method presented in this essay is based on pari-mutuel betting, which originated
in horserace gambling in France in 1865, and since then has become a popular betting mechanism
in the horseracing world. Pari-mutuel means “wager mutual” and comes from the fact that in parimutuel betting, a winning wager (i.e., bet) receives a share of the total wagers (winning and
loosing bets less track commission) as a proportion of this winning wager to all winning wagers.
The final track odd for a given horse is the total amount bet on all the horses in the race divided
by the total amount bet on the given horse. The payout for a winning horse is the product of the
amount bet on it and its odd (less track commission). From a MCC perspective, the odd
associated with a horse is of great importance as it represents the aggregated market information
about the probability estimate of that horse winning the race. I use pari-mutuel betting over
mechanisms such as continuous double auctions since pari-mutuel betting does not suffer from
liquidity problems that could potentially impact continuous double auction markets when there
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are large bid-ask spreads or when bid-ask queues are empty (Pennock 2004). Hence pari-mutuel
mechanisms would work effectively, even when the ensemble of base classifiers is small.
Plott et al. (2003) experimentally examined information aggregation and different betting
behaviors in pari-mutuel betting markets using two private information models, Decision Theory
Private Information (DTPI) and Competitive Equilibrium Private Information (CEPI), and one
model with belief updating- Competitive Equilibrium Rational Expectations (CERI). Plott et al.
(2003) found that DTPI and CEPI best described the behavior of human participants in their
Probabilistic Information Condition experimental pari-mutuel betting market.
In DTPI, agents only consider their own private information and ignore market prices when
deciding on their bets and in forming beliefs. In CEPI, agents base their bets on the current
market price, although they do not update their beliefs based on market prices. In both models,
agents maximize their conditional expected utility given their private probability estimates and
constraints such as available funds. In both DTPI and CEPI, prices are assumed to be in
equilibrium; however, as each betting round starts without prices defined, the equilibrium must be
obtained before the agents can place their final bets. Assuming no track take, in equilibrium, all
potential payouts are equal to the total amount bet across all events.
2.3.2

Information Market Based Fusion

IMF is a multi-classifier combiner method based on a pari-mutuel betting information market
that can be used in any classification application domain. I present IMF in the context of a fraud
detection application. In this application, object t (i.e., transaction t) can be classified as
fraudulent (j=1) or non-fraudulent (j=2) by an ensemble E of agent classifiers. In this application,
the set J={1,2} is the index set of the two classes (i.e., fraudulent and non-fraudulent). The
ensemble E has m agents embodying different base-classifiers (referred to as agents) represented
by indices i in the index set D = {1,..,m}. While determining the class membership of object t,
agent i∈D uses the feature vector associated with t to determine the posterior probability estimate
pitj ∈ [0, 1] that t belongs to class j∈J. Agent i bets qitj that object t belongs to class j and is paid
according to the pari-mutuel mechanism based on four factors: (1) the agent’s bets, qitj; (2) the
total bets on class j, Qtj =

∑ i∈D qitj ; (3) the total bets on all classes, Qt = ∑ j∈J ∑i∈D qitj ; and

(4) the true class of object t. Ensemble E’s overall probability estimate that t belongs to j∈J is
given by 1/Otj ∈ [0,1], where Otj is the odd that t belongs to j∈J. The odd Otj, which is equal to
Qt/Qtj, is in equilibrium when the potential payouts QtjOtj for each j∈J and the total bets Qt are
equal (assuming no house commission), i.e., Otj is in equilibrium when QtjOtj = Qt.

9

Figure 2.2 provides an overview of IMF when the
true class of objects is only determined for objects
classified as positive. When all objects are investigated,

New Object
Section
3.2.1

Figure 2.2 is changed by eliminating the decision box,

Determine Final Odds
Update Odds

i.e., going straight from Classify Object to Distribute
Take Agent Bets

Payout. Investigations are however expensive, and in
the real world only objects classified as positive are

Section
3.2.2

typically investigated. Unless otherwise noted, I will

Classify Object

henceforth assume that only objects classified as
positive are investigated.

no

j=1

In Figure 2.2, for each new object t, IMF first
determines the final odds Oftj that are equilibrium or

Section
3.2.3

Distribute Payout

near-equilibrium odds. Establishing equilibrium odds is
a nontrivial task because of the recursive relationship

yes

Figure 2.2: IMF Flowchart

between Qtj and Otj, where odds are based on agent bets
and agents base their bets on odds. Therefore, multiple
rounds of betting are required to determine the final odds that can then be used by agents to make
their actual bets. In each round, odds are first updated based on all the agents’ prior bets and then
agents place new bets based on the current updated odds. After the final odds have been
established, ensemble E’s overall probability estimate 1/Oftj is compared to a threshold value Cj to
determine if t should be classified as belonging to class j. If object t is classified as fraudulent
(j=1) then the true class of t is determined and winnings are distributed to the agents.
In addition to establishing ensemble E’s probability estimate 1/Oftj, IMF facilitates the
redistribution of wealth among the agents based on the agents’ bets and winnings. From an MCC
perspective, IMF produces decisions that are wealth-weighted probability estimates of the
occurrence of event j. I next describe the components of IMF in detail as per the major steps
depicted in Figure 2.2.
2.3.2.1 Determining Final Odds
The problem to determine odds Otj for object t is given by P1.

∑ j∈J M j

P1:

Z1 = min Otj M j

S.T.

QtjOtj – Mj = Qt

∀j∈J

(2)

Mj ≥ 0 and Otj ≥ 1

∀j∈J

(3)

(1)
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The objective function Z1 minimizes dummy variables Mj that
represent the differences between the total bets by all agents and
the total payout for each outcome (2). At equilibrium, M1 and M2
are equal to zero.
Due to the recursive relationship between Qtj and Otj, I solve P1
using binary search (see Figure 2.3) to determine equilibrium or
near-equilibrium odds. Binary search starts with a lower bound
Pl=0 and an upper bound Pu=1 for the probability that object t
belongs to class j=1. Ot1 is then computed using: Ot1=2/(Pl+Pu). It
can be easily verified that Ot2 = Ot1/(Ot1-1) in the case of two class
problems. The agents then place bets that maximize their
individual utility, given their current wealth and probability
estimates, and the current odds (Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 describe

Set search space bounds
Pl = 0 and Pu = 1
set Ot1 = 2/(Pl + Pu)
Take agent bets
Do
If Qt1Ot1 > Qt then
set Pl = 1/Ot1
else if Qt1Ot1 < Qt then
set Pu = 1/Ot1
else if Qt1Ot1 = Qt then
set Pl and Pu to 1/Ot1
set Ot1 = 2/(Pl + Pu)
Take agent bets
Until (Pu - Pl ≤ ε)
Figure 2.3: Binary Search

the optimal bets).
The odds and bets are then used to evaluate whether the current odds are too high or too low.
If the potential payout for j=1, i.e., Qt1Ot1, is greater than the total bets Qt, then odd Ot1 is too
high, and the lower search space boundary Pl is raised to the reciprocal of Ot1, i.e., Pl=1/Ot1. On
the other hand, if the potential payout for j=1 is less than the total bets Qt, then the odd Ot1 is too
low and the upper search space boundary Pu is lowered to the reciprocal of Ot1, i.e., Pu=1/Ot1. If
the potential payouts for j=1 is the same as the total bets Qt, then the potential payouts for j=1 and
j=2 are equal, i.e., Qt1Ot1=Qt2Ot2, the odds are in equilibrium and the search space is set to this
single value Pl=Pu=1/Ot1. Ot1 is then set to the reciprocal of the mean of Pl and Pu and the agents
place bets based on these odds. The updating of odds and agent bets continues iteratively until the
search space is within tolerance ε, i.e., Pu-Pl ≤ ε. When binary search terminates, it is known that
the optimal odds are within bounds 1/Pu and 1/Pl.
Determining Agent Bets - Given the current market odds Otj, the agent’s probability
estimates pitj of object t being in class j, the agent’s current wealth wit plus the periodic
endowment m, and multiplier k that determines the house enforced maximum bet km, agent i
solves the expected utility maximization problem P2 to determine the amount qitj to bet on classes
j=1,2. The periodic endowment m is given to all the agents in order to prevent them from running
out of funds. Given the utility function Ui of agent i as a function of wealth, problem P2 can be
stated as follows:
P2:

Z2 = max q pit1Ui(wit+m - qit1 - qit2+qit1Ot1) + pit2Ui(wit+m - qit1 - qit2+qit2Ot2)
itj
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(4)

S.T.

wit + m if ( wit + m) ≤ km
qit1 + qit 2 = 
if ( wit + m) > km
km

(5)

qitj ≥ 0

(6)

The objective function in P2 represents the expected utility of agent i when it bets qitj ≥ 0 on
event j. Constraint (5) dictates that the total amount of bets placed by agent i on events j=1 and
j=2 equals the lower of the agents’ available funds m + wit and km, the house enforced maximum
bet. km limits the amount of influence the best performing agents in the ensemble could exert on
ensemble decision, due to the need to have all agents, not just the best performing agents,
contribute to improving the success of the ensemble (Kittler et al. 1998).
P2 is general enough to incorporate any utility function to model an agent’s risk aversion. I
utilize a natural logarithm (ln) utility function (hence forth simply referred to as log utility),
which has been widely used in prior research (Rubinstein 1976), for the following reasons: (1) log
utility enables agents to place bets that yield optimal long run growth rates (Kelly 1956); (2) it is
twice-differentiable and non-decreasing concave, leading to a decreasing absolute risk aversion
(Rubinstein 1976); and (3) depending on which betting constraint is binding (see Lemma 1 and 2
below), log utility bets are either increasing in pitj and wit + m but not a function of Otj, a betting
behavior corresponding to DTPI (Plott et al. 2003), or increasing in pitj, wit + m and Otj, a betting
behavior corresponding to CEPI (Plott et al. 2003).
Using log utility, problem P2 is transformed to either P3 or P4 depending on the binding
constraint in (5) for a given agent. If wit + m ≤ km then qit1 + qit2 = wit + m and wit + m - qit1 - qit2 =
0, leading to P3.
P3:

Z3 = maxqitj pit1ln(qit1Ot1) + pit2ln(qit2Ot2)

(7)

S.T.

q it1 + q it 2 = wit + m

(8)

qitj ≥ 0

(9)

Lemma 1:

The optimal bets of agent i in P3 while classifying t is:

qitj* = pitj(wit+m) ∀j∈J.
Proof: See the Appendix 1.
If wit + m > km then qit1 + qit2 = km and wit + m - qit1 - qit2 = wit + m - km, which I denote by
constant ait. Thus P2 can be transformed to P4.
P4:

Z4 = maxqitj pit1ln(ait + qit1Ot1) + pit2ln(ait + qit2Ot2)

(10)

S.T.

qit1 + qit2= km

(11)

qitj ≥ 0

(12)
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Lemma 2:

The optimal bets of agent i in P4 while classifying t is:

Solution a:

q it*1 = pit1 km + ait

p it1Ot1 - p it 2 Ot 2
and
Ot1Ot 2

q it* 2 = pit2 km + ait

p it 2 Ot 2 - pit1Ot1
, when
Ot1Ot 2

0 < pit1 km + ait

p it1Ot1 - p it 2 Ot 2
< km, and
Ot1Ot 2

0 < pit2 km + ait

p it 2 Ot 2 - pit1Ot1
< km;
Ot1Ot 2

Solution b:

q it*1 = km, and q it* 2 = 0, when km ≤ pit1 km + ait

p it1Ot1 - p it 2 Ot 2
; and
Ot1Ot 2

Solution c:

q it* 2 = km, and q it*1 = 0, when km ≤ pit2 km + ait

p it 2 Ot 2 - pit1Ot1
Ot1Ot 2

Proof: See Appendix 2.
Equilibrium Odds - The final odds Oftj, are equilibrium odds or near-equilibrium odds, where
near-equilibrium is defined as being within bounds 1/Pu and 1/Pl, and Pu-Pl is less than or equal to
tolerance ε. When binary search terminates, it is known that the optimal odds are within these
bounds. As described in binary search, the final odds Oftj are found for each object t by iteratively
updating the odds, and requiring agents to place bets using these odds until the odds provided to
the agents and their subsequent bets result in QtjOftj ≈Qt, at which time the market closes. The
following observations are made. First, bets placed in betting rounds before the final odds have
been established are only used for the purpose of updating the odds2. Second, if agent bets are
discontinuous over Otj then the existence of equilibrium odds cannot be guaranteed (Carlsson et
al. 2001). Lemma 3 show that in IMF, when agents i ∈ D1 bet as per Lemma 1, and agents
2

I make the assumption that agents do not act strategically by attempting to bluff about their private

information, i.e., placing bets that do not maximize their utility given the current odds. This assumption is
made to make the utility maximization problem more tractable. In defense of this assumption, the agents do
not know when the market closes, i.e., they never know if the current odds are the final odds, and strategic
behavior is therefore less likely even if allowed. Furthermore, Plott et al. (2003) found that strategic
behavior was negligible among their human subjects in the Probabilistic Information Condition experiment
even though the subjects knew that the market would stay open at least until an announced time.
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i ∈ D2a , i ∈ D2b and i ∈ D2c bet as per Lemma 2, solutions a, b and c, respectively, then
equilibrium exists. However, even when equilibrium odds do exist, IMF may not always find it
due to the recursive nature of Otj and Qtj. Binary search used in IMF, nevertheless, guarantees a
result that is at most ε (a tolerance parameter) from the optimal probability.
Lemma 3:

Given any combination of betting behaviors as per Lemma 1 and Lemma 2,
equilibrium exists, and the equilibrium odd for j=1 is:
Ot1 =

∑
∑

i∈D1U D 2 a
i∈D1U D 2 a

pit 2 ( wit + m) + ∑i∈D 2c (km)
p it1 ( wit + m) + ∑i∈D 2b (km)

+1

Proof: See Appendix 3. See Appendix 4 for an empirical evaluation of IMF when agent bets are
discontinuous over Otj and an empirical evaluation of the ability of IMF to find the equilibrium
odds when the agents bet as per Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
2.3.2.2 Classifying Objects
Once the final odds Oft1 and Oft2 are available, the decision rule in (13) can be used to classify3
object t.
If (1/Oft1 ≥ C1) then classify class of t as j=1; else classify class of t as j=2

(13)

In (13), if the reciprocal of final odd for j=1 is higher than the threshold C1 then object t is
classified as a member of the positive class, i.e., j=1 and agent i’s wealth is decreased by the
amount of i’s final bets:
wit = wit - ∑ j∈J qitj

(14)

The true class of t is then investigated, and agent i's wealth is updated with any potential
winnings (see Section 2.3.2.3 below). If the object is classified as a member of the negative class
i.e., j=2, then the verification of the object class is not pursued further as investigations are not
typically carried out for negative classifications. In this case, agent wealth is not updated with
bets or winnings.
2.3.2.3 Distributing Payout
Whenever object t is classified as belonging to the positive class, detailed investigations are
necessary to establish the true class of t. While final bets are deducted from the agents’ wealth
3

MCC users might prefer rankings or raw probabilities (Saar-Tsechansky and Provost 2004). In these

situations the generated ensemble probability estimates can be presented directly to the users.
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immediately, due to the time taken for
investigations, there is a time lag

v object classifications during which t΄ is investigated

corresponding to v elapsed object

time

classifications before winnings can be paid
out. This mechanism is similar to sports
betting (and other types of futures markets)
where bets are collected when bets are

t΄ classified

t classified
t΄ investigation completed

Figure 2.4: Payout Distribution Time Lag

placed and winnings are paid out after the game/race has been decided. In Figure 2.4, t is the
current object being classified, t΄ is the object for which the investigation has just been
completed, and v is the number of objects that have been classified since t΄ was classified. Based
on the investigation, if t΄ is found to be a positive, then agent i’s wealth is updated using (15), else
t’ is negative and agent i’s wealth is updated using (16). This is also followed when the true
classes of both positive and negative classifications are investigated.
wit = wit + (q it'1 / Qt'1 )Qt'

(15)

wit = wit + (q it' 2 / Qt' 2 )Qt'

(16)

2.4. Experimental Setup
2.4.1

Base-Classifiers and Data

Using Weka (version 3.3.6), 22
heterogeneous base-classifiers were created
using their default settings (see Table 2.1).
The base-classifiers were trained and
evaluated using 10-fold cross validation on
each of 17 datasets obtained from the UCI
Machine Learning Repository (see Table 2.2).
Datasets that included more than two classes
were modified by either creating multiple

Table 2.1
Base-Classifiers
ADTree
MultilayerPerceptron
BayesNet
NaiveBayes
ConjunctiveRule
NBTree
DecisionStump
Nnge
DecisionTable
OneR
Ibk
PART
J48
RandomForest
JRip
RBFNetwork
KStar
Ridor
LMT
SimpleLogistic
LWL
SMO

subsets with only two classes in each subset
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Table 2.2
Datasets
Dataset
Adult
Wisconsin Breast Cancer
Contraceptive Choice
Horse Colic
Covertype (class 1 & 2)
Covertype (class 3 & 4)
Covertype (class 5 & 6)
Australian Credit App.
German Credit Approval
Pima Indians Diabetes
Thyroid Disease
Labor
Mushrooms
Sick
Spambase
Splice-junction Gene Seq.
Waveform

Positive Ensemble
Instances Attributes
Rate Diversity
32,561
699
1,473
368
10,000
10,395
10,009
690
1,000
768
3,772
57
8,124
3,772
4,601
3,190
3,345

14
110
10
22
11
11
11
15
20
8
5
16
5
12
58
20
40

24.1%
34.5%
57.3%
37.0%
72.9%
6.8%
66.9%
55.5%
30.0%
34.9%
7.7%
64.9%
48.2%
6.9%
39.4%
51.9%
49.4%

0.847
0.894
0.698
0.868
0.883
0.954
0.906
0.857
0.778
0.842
0.994
0.487
0.775
0.956
0.708
0.498
0.790

Base-Classifier
Accuracy
Min Avg Max Std
75.9% 82.0% 86.0%
76.8% 94.0% 97.1%
60.0% 66.1% 71.0%
78.0% 81.7% 86.1%
78.9% 86.6% 92.1%
93.0% 95.2% 97.5%
89.9% 96.2% 99.7%
76.2% 83.7% 85.8%
63.7% 72.0% 75.7%
68.8% 73.5% 77.9%
89.1% 92.7% 93.4%
68.4% 80.0% 93.0%
77.0% 91.2% 96.6%
93.9% 96.8% 98.4%
78.9% 87.6% 94.2%
53.4% 62.3% 67.1%
77.6% 86.9% 92.7%

3.5%
4.2%
2.6%
2.3%
3.8%
1.6%
3.5%
2.6%
2.9%
2.5%
1.2%
7.4%
7.4%
1.2%
5.6%
3.7%
4.5%

or by combining classes. In order for computationally complex base-classifiers to complete the
classification using a reasonable amount of resources, datasets with a large number of observation
and/or attributes were filtered randomly based on records and/or attributes4.
With an average dataset size of 5,350 records, a total of 2,000,900 base-classifiers validation
decisions (5,350 records × 17 datasets × 22 base-classifiers) were generated from the 10-fold
cross validation. These decisions were imported into Microsoft Access where combiner methods,
implemented using Visual Basic, combined the data. Furthermore, since IMF, MAJ, AVG and
dynamic WAVG did not require training, I did not use n-fold cross-validation in the combiner
method experiments. Each dataset was combined 96 times as described in Section 2.4.2, for a

4

The number of attributes/instances to delete was determined iteratively by first deleting only a few

attributes/instances, running the most resource constraining base-classifier algorithm and then deleting
more attributed/instances if needed. Attributes/instances selected for deletion were determined by assigning
a random number to each attribute/instance using Microsoft Excel and then deleting the attributes/instances
assigned the lowest number.
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total of 8,745,888 (96 dataset combinations × 5,350 average dataset size × 17 datasets) ensemble
decisions.
2.4.2

Experimental Design and Factors

The primary purpose of the computational experiments was to compare the effectiveness of
IMF against MAJ, AVG and WAVG methods. As such, combiner method is the primary factor of
interest. The experiment also included six other independent variables, two factors (cost-tobenefit ratio and number of agents) and four covariates (dataset positive ratio, dataset size, dataset
average base-classifier accuracy and ensemble diversity), used to evaluate the sensitivity of the
results (see Table 2.3).
As only main effects and second order interactions were investigated, and only interactions
involving the combiner method factor, a full factorial design is not needed. Instead, two factorial
block designs (4 combiner methods × 11 sets of agents, and 4 combiner methods × 13 cost-tobenefit ratios) were used, for a total of 96 treatment groups. The cost-to-benefit ratio factor was
held constant at 1:10 in the 4×11 factorial design. The number of agents factor was held constant
at 10 in the 4×13 factorial design. Net benefit and the covariates were measured for each of the 17
datasets within each of the 96 treatment cells for a total of 1,632 observations (4×11×17 +
4×13×17).

Table 2.3
Experimental Variables
Variable
Net Benefit

Function

Description

DV

FN cost avoidance * number of TP investigation cost * (number of FP +
number of TP)
Combiner Method
Main IV
IMF, AVG, WAVG, MAJ
Number of Agents
Manipulated 2, 4, 6,… , 22 agents in the ensemble
Moderator
Cost-to-Benefit Ratio
Manipulated 1:100; 1:50, 1:25, 1:10, 1:7.5, 1:5, 1:4, 1:3,
Moderator
1:2, 1:1.5, 1:1, 1.5:1, and 2:1
Dataset Size
Measured
Number of dataset records
Moderator
Dataset Average Agent Accuracy Measured
Average dataset accuracy of the baseModerator
classifiers
Dataset Positive Ratio
Measured
Positive records/total number of records in
Moderator
dataset
Ensemble Diversity
Measured
Dataset average pair-wise diversity
Moderator
measured using Yule’s Q statistic
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2.4.2.1 Dependent Measure
Performance measures used in MCC combiner method research include hit-rate (TP/(TP+FN))
and accuracy ((TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN)). However, accuracy and hit-rate only provide
accurate measures of combiner method effectiveness under one specific scenario - when the
number of positive and negative instances is the same, and the cost of FP and FN is the same.
This is rarely true (Provost et al. 1998). More recently, Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curves and the associated measure Area Under the ROC curve (AUC) have gained popularity,
partially because they show how well algorithms handle the trade-off between true positive rate
(TP/(TP+FN)) and false positive rate (FP/(FP+TN)), i.e., benefits and costs, without having to
define a specific class distribution and cost assumption. ROC and AUC do not however allow for
easy comparisons of combiner methods under specific distribution and cost assumptions that I am
interested in. ROC also does not provide a single measure that allows us to assess the statistical
significance and sensitivity of the relative combiner method performance results to various
factors such as the number of base-classifiers in the ensemble, cost-to-benefit ratio, and dataset
size, average agent accuracy, positive ratio and diversity (Drummond and Holte 2006).
Furthermore, ROC curves are created using true positive rate and false positive rate, and therefore
cannot be used in situations where TN and FN are not identified, i.e., in domains where negative
classifications are not investigated.
Another common performance measure - misclassification cost, which is the total cost of FP
and FN classifications - overcomes many of these shortcomings (Lin et al. 2003). However, this
measure still requires knowing FN and ignores the costs associated with TP classifications, such
as investigation costs. Chan et al. (1999) use Cost Savings (CS), which takes into account costs
associated with TP, FP and FN, but still requires knowing FN. I use a measure very similar to
CS5 that I call net benefit (NB). NB, like CS allows us to overcome the problems described
earlier, and in contrast to CS, does not require knowing FN. NB is calculated as the benefit
derived from TP classifications (FN costs avoided) minus costs of investigating positive
classifications, see (17). Like ROC curves, NB captures the trade-off between true positive rate

5

It is shown in Appendix 5 that NB is equivalent to CS, given that Transaction Amount and Overhead

(Chan et al. 1999) is defined as being equivalent to FN Cost Avoidance and Investigation Cost,
respectively. Also note that my definition of cost-to-benefit ratio is based on the same idea used in Chan et
al.’s (1999) rule: only transactions with transaction amounts > overhead should be investigated.
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and false positive rate. To maximize NB, the classification threshold has to be selected so that it
strikes an appropriate balance between net benefit of TP and cost of FP classifications.
NB = FN cost avoidance*number of TP - investigation cost*(number of FP and TP)

(17)

The experiments compare the performance of various combiner methods using optimal
thresholds for each treatment in order to isolate the treatment effect from noise introduced by
using other mechanisms to determine the threshold. To determine the optimal thresholds, I run the
MCC experiment 101 times for each treatment using a different threshold level (0, 0.01, 0.02,…
1) for each run. The threshold from the run that generates the highest total net benefit is then
labeled as the optimal threshold for that specific treatment. By finding the best threshold for each
combiner method, dataset, ensemble and cost-benefit ratio combination, the combiner methods
are compared at optimal trade-off levels for that specific combination, which I believe is more
relevant than comparing the sensitivity, specificity, hit-rate, etc, of the combiner methods at other
sub-optimal levels. Furthermore, by comparing the combiner methods at a number of different
cost-to-benefit ratios the generalizability of the results to different domains that have different
cost-to-benefit ratios is improved.
2.4.2.2 Combiner Method Factor
Since the primary objective is to compare the performance of IMF to existing combiner
methods, combiner method is included as a factor that is manipulated at four levels, IMF, AVG,
MAJ and WAVG. IMF is compared to MAJ, AVG and WAVG since prior research indicates that
AVG and MAJ perform well compared to other existing combiner methods (Duin and Tax 2000).
WAVG is included primarily because of its similarity to IMF, since IMF generates a wealth
weighted average. In MAJ, each base-classifier casts a vote on the class for which the baseclassifier’s probability estimate is higher than the classification threshold. The class with the most
votes is then selected as the ensemble’s decision. In AVG the mean of all the base-classifiers
probability estimates is compared to the threshold and the class with a mean probability estimate
that is higher than the threshold is selected as the ensemble’s decision. In WAVG, different
weights are assigned to the different base-classifiers’ probability estimates when averaging these
estimates. In order to maintain uniformity while comparing IMF to WAVG, I implement a
dynamic version of WAVG where the weights are updated based on positive classifications only.
The weights are determined as the ratio of an individual classifier’s precision (TP/(TP+FP)) to the
total precision of all the classifiers in the ensemble. I also test two alternative weighting schemes
as detailed in Section 2.4.2.4.
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2.4.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Number of Agents – The number of agents factor is manipulated at 11 levels: 2, 4, 6,…, 22
agents. This manipulation is done since there is evidence from prior research that the number of
agents in an ensemble could impact ensemble classification performance (Lam 2000). The agents
are randomly selected at each of the treatment levels, but the selection process is cumulative in
nature. For ensembles consisting of two agents, the two agents are randomly selected from the 22
existing base-classifiers, for ensembles with four agents, two additional agents are randomly
selected from the remaining 20 base-classifiers and added to the existing ensemble, and so on. To
test the sensitivity of the combiner method performance to the number of agents, I examine if the
relative combiner method performance is moderated by the number of agents, while holding the
cost-to-benefit ratio constant at 1:10.
Cost-to-Benefit Ratio - The benefit derived from TP classifications (FN cost avoidance
minus investigation cost) and the cost of FP classifications (investigation cost) impact the net
benefit provided by any classification effort. As the cost-to-benefit ratio is domain specific, I use
a wide range of cost-to-benefit ratios, 13 in total, to explore the generalizability of the results:
1:100; 1:50, 1:25, 1:10, 1:7.5, 1:5, 1:4, 1:3, 1:2, 1:1.5, 1:1, 1.5:1, and 2:1. To clarify, the 1:100
ratio indicates that the net benefit of a TP classification (cost of fraud minus investigation costs of
detecting a fraud) is 100 times the cost of investigating a transaction (for example, cost of fraud =
$10,100 vs. cost of investigation = $100). Note that the range of cost-to-benefit ratios used
assumes that the net benefit of a TP is always positive, i.e., the FN cost avoided when making a
TP classification is always more than the investigation cost. To examine the sensitivity of the
combiner method performance to cost-to-benefit ratio, I investigate whether the relative combiner
method performance is moderated by cost-to-benefit ratio, holding the number of agents constant
at 10 agents.
Dataset Average Accuracy - Average base-classifier accuracy, measured as the percentage of
all objects classified correctly for each dataset, is included as a possible interaction term given the
possibility that relative combiner method performance could depend on the average accuracy of
the base-classifiers in a given dataset. Thus, this interaction tests if the relative combiner method
performance is moderated by the dataset average base-classifier accuracy.
Dataset Size - Dataset size refers to the number of records in the dataset, which varies from
57 to 32,561 records. Dataset size is included as a covariate primarily to examine the impact of
size on the relative performance of IMF and WAVG to the other combiner methods. For example,
if the data size is very small, the extent of adjustment of weights in WAVG and redistribution of
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wealth in IMF is small. I therefore evaluate if the relative combiner method performance is
moderated by the dataset size.
Dataset Positive Ratio - The positive ratio of the dataset refers to the number of positive class
objects divided by all objects in the dataset. Positive ratio is included as a covariate to test if the
relative combiner method performance depends on the dataset positive ratio. Theoretically, a
performance difference, if any among combiner methods should be evident in datasets with
positive ratios in the medium range, but not necessarily in datasets with very low (high) positive
ratios where any trivial classifier that always predicts the object as negative (positive) does well.
Thus, differences in performance among the combiner methods is only expected when the trivial
rule is ineffective. The range of dataset positive ratios over which the trivial rule is effective is,
furthermore impacted by the cost-to-benefit ratio level. The trivial rule that classifies everything
as positive is effective over a wider range of dataset positive ratios (i.e., medium and high rather
than just high dataset positive ratios) when the cost-to-benefit ratio is low (Witten and Frank
2005). Conversely, the trivial rule that classifies everything as negative is effective over a smaller
range of dataset positive ratios (i.e., just extremely low rather than low positive ratios) when the
cost-to-benefit ratio is low. Considering that the median of the experimental cost-to-benefit
manipulations is close to 1:5, i.e., in the low range, I expect combiner method performance
differences for low to medium dataset positive ratios, but not for medium to high dataset positive
ratios. I therefore evaluate if the relative combiner method performance is moderated by the
dataset positive ratio.
Ensemble Diversity - Base-classifier diversity describes the degree to which the ensemble
base-classifiers differ in the errors they make. Diversity among the base-classifiers is
incorporated in the experiment by using different learning algorithms for each base-classifier.
Diversity is measured using Yule’s Q statistic (Yule 1900) for each dataset. By measuring
diversity I can evaluate if the relative performance of combiner methods is impacted by the level
of complimentary information provided by the base-classifiers in the different datasets.
2.4.2.4 Investigating the True Class of All Objects
To evaluate the external validity of the result to domains where the true object class is
revealed for all objects I perform an experiment where the performances of combiner methods are
evaluated using both positive and negative classifications. In this experiment I examine a version
of WAVG where wealth is updated for both positive and negative classifications, as well as
aWAVG. In aWAVG, the weights are determined based on AdaBoost: ln((1-error rate)/error
rate), where error rate is equal to (FP+FN)/(FP+FN+TP+TN).
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2.4.3

Time Lag, IMF Parameters and Base-Classifier Cost-Benefit Retraining

IMF is a multi-classifier combiner method based on a pari-mutuel betting information market
2.4.3.1 Time Lag and Performance
In the main experiment the true class of t is given instantly after t is classified, but in reality, it
usually takes some time to determine the true class of t. In order to determine the performance
impacts of such time lags, I perform an experiment where wealth wit is not updated until v
additional objects have been classified. v is manipulated at six different levels: 0%, 1%, 5%, 10%,
25% and 50% of the size of the dataset, for each of the 17 datasets, while the main experiment
factors are held constant as follows: combiner method = IMF; number of agents = 10; and costto-benefit ratio = 1:10. Using these treatments I investigate if the net benefits from 0%-IMF (no
time lag) and the net benefits from 1%-IMF, 5%-IMF, 10%-IMF, 25%-IMF and 50%-IMF are
significantly different.
2.4.3.2 Selection of IMF Parameters
Binary Search Stopping Parameter ε - The tolerance value ε is used in binary search to
determine when to stop the search. To gain a better understanding of how to select an appropriate
value for ε and to investigate if this selection is domain dependent, I run an experiment where
different values of ε are tested. For a given value of ε (manipulated at 0.01, 0.001,…
0.00000000001), I run IMF on each of the datasets while holding other factors constant as
follows: number of agents = 10; and cost-to-benefit ratio = 1:10. I am interested in investigating
interactions between ε and the different dataset characteristics in order to assess whether ε is
domain dependent. Also, if no interactions exist, I am still interested in investigating the direct
impact of ε on net benefit.
Maximum Bet Multiplier k - To ensure that the ensemble is not completely dominated by a
minority of better performing agents, while at the same time weighing the inputs of better
performing agents more heavily, appropriate values of k are required to be used. For a given value
of k (manipulated at 1, 2, 5, 10, 25, 50, 75, 100, 125, 150, 200, 250, 350, 500, and 1000), I run
IMF on all datasets with the number of agents factor set at 10 and the cost-to-benefit ratio set at
1:10. I am also interested in investigating interactions between k and dataset characteristics to
determine whether the choice of k is domain specific.
2.4.3.3 Base-Classifier Cost-Benefit Retraining
The ensemble base-classifiers in the experiments are not trained using cost sensitive learning
and they are not retrained for each cost-to-benefit treatment level. The ensemble results are likely
to change if the base-classifiers are retrained for different cost-to-benefit ratios. However, since
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all four combiner methods are tested using the same base-classifiers, I do not believe that this will
systematically bias the relative performance of the combiner methods. Nevertheless, I perform an
experiment where the classification performances of various combiner methods are evaluated at
five different cost-to-benefit ratios using an ensemble of five crisp base-classifiers used in two
different modes: cost-to-benefit ratio retrained or not retrained. The retrained crisp baseclassifiers are obtained by hardening measurement level base-classifiers at optimal thresholds for
the different combinations of datasets and cost-benefit ratios. The base-classifiers that are not
retrained are obtained by hardening the same base-classifiers using a threshold of 0.5. Holding the
number of agents constant at five, I evaluate the effect of the interaction between base-classifier
mode and combiner method on combiner method performance.
2.5. Results
2.5.1

Relative Combiner Method Performance

2.5.1.1 Overview
Table 2.4 provides an overview of the result data organized by the three result datasets used in
the experiments. Two of the statistical analysis datasets are based on the 5×11 (combiner method
by number of agents) and the 5×13 (combiner method by cost-to-benefit) factorial designs, while
the third dataset is obtained by pooling the two statistical analysis datasets (possible as the
interactions are not significant, as discussed in 5.1.3). I report two-tailed p-statistics throughout
the chapter. For significance testing I use an alpha of 0.05, and 0.1 for marginal significance. To
retain an experimentwise error rate of 0.05, while balancing the risk of type II errors, I use a
modified Bonferroni procedure (Jaccard and Wan 1996).
2.5.1.2 Combiner Method Main Effect
The combiner method main effect is tested using the model shown in (18) and the pooled
result set described earlier. Note that for each combination of UCI dataset*number of agents and
UCI dataset*cost-to-benefit ratio, the same four combiner methods are tested. I therefore block
for the dataset, number of agents, cost-to-benefit ratio, dataset*number of agents and
dataset*cost-to-benefit ratio effects.
ln(net benefit) = β 0 + β1*combiner method + block

(18)

The combiner method main effect is significant (p<0.0001) and the post-hoc analysis show
that IMF significantly outperforms AVG (p=0.0042), WAVG (p=0.0229) and MAJ(p<0.0001).
See Table 2.5 for parameter estimates and standard errors.
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Table 2.4
Statistical Analysis Data

Low
High
Mean
Standard Deviation
Number of Treatments
N

Combiner Method x
Number of Agents
net
ln
benefit
(benefit)
350
2.54
71,274
4.85
18,748
3.82
24,471
0.68
44
748

Combiner Method x
Cost-to-Benefit Ratio
ln
net benefit
(benefit)
30
1.48
763,879
5.88
31,602
3.50
96,569
1.00
52
884

Combiner Method
net
benefit
30
763,879
25,946
74,323

ln
(benefit)
1.48
5.88
3.64
0.89

96
1,632

2.5.1.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity of the relative performance of the combiner methods to the number of agents in
the ensemble and the cost-to-benefit ratio are respectively tested using the model shown in (19)
for the 5×11 factorial design, and model (20) for the 5×13 factorial design. Thus each combiner
method is tested for all combinations of UCI dataset*number of agents and UCI dataset*cost-tobenefit ratio in the respective models. I therefore block for these interactions in the respective
models.
ln(net benefit) = β0 + β1combiner method + β2 number of agents +

(19)

β3combiner method*number of agents + block
ln(net benefit) = β0 + β1combiner method + β2cost-to-benefit ratio +

(20)

β3combiner method*cost-to-benefit ratio + block
The combiner method*number of agents (p=0.1407) and combiner method*cost-to-benefit
ratio (p=0.7552) interactions are insignificant. This indicates that the performance advantages of
IMF over AVG, WAVG and MAJ are not moderated by the number of agents in the ensemble or
by the domain dependent cost-to-benefit ratio. Because prior research has not evaluated AVG,
MAJ and WAVG under different cost assumptions, I perform further inspections of the
interaction results using scatter plots and find that the performance differences among the
combiner methods are stable over the different cost-to-benefit ratios tested. Thus, the earlier
conclusion based on the statistical results is corroborated.
The sensitivity of the combiner method performance result to dataset average agent accuracy,
size, positive ratio and ensemble diversity are tested using the same blocking factor and result set
used for (18):
ln(net benefit) = β0 + β1 combiner method + β2 dataset average agent
accuracy + β3 dataset size + β4 dataset positive ratio +
β5 ensemble diversity + β6 combiner method*dataset
24

(21)

average agent accuracy + β7 combiner method*dataset
size + β8combiner method*dataset positive ratio +
β9 combiner method*ensemble diversity + block
The results do not show that relative combiner method performance is sensitive to the dataset
size (p=0.7325) or dataset average agent accuracy (p=0.9803). I do however find that the
combiner method*dataset ensemble diversity (p=0.0342) and combiner method*dataset positive
ratio (p<0.0001) interactions are significant.
The interaction involving diversity appears to be driven by MAJ, as MAJ has a significant
parameter estimate for the interaction (p=0.0039), while AVG (p=0.6363) and IMF (p=0.3227)
are insignificant. This is verified by noting that the combiner method*diversity interaction is
insignificant (p=0.7813) when MAJ is excluded from the analysis. When only including MAJ and
IMF in the analysis the interaction is significant (p=0.0099). We, therefore, only perform a
detailed analysis of IMF vs. MAJ.
Based on visual comparison (Figure 2.5) it appeared that IMF outperforms MAJ at all
diversity levels, however, the performance difference is less at low diversity levels (high Yule Q).
However, even at low diversity levels (Q>75) IMF outperforms MAJ (p<0.0138). Thus, at all
diversity levels IMF outperformsMAJ as per this test, and AVG and WAVG as per the
insignificant interaction and significant main effect.
I explore the significant combiner method*positive ratio interaction (p=0.0342) by dividing
the datasets into two groups based on the dataset positive ratio, a high group with about half the
datasets, positive ratio (>40%) and a low group with the remaining datasets (<=40%). In each
group, a model with the combiner method factor and the blocking variables as in (18) are then
tested. IMF significantly outperforms AVG (p=0.0005), MAJ (p<0.0001) and WAVG (p=0.0021)
in the low group. In the high group, IMF significantly outperforms MAJ (p=0.0139), but the
performance advantage is insignificant with respect to AVG (p=0.3439) and WAVG (p=0.6023).
2.5.1.4 Investigating the True Class of All Objects
The results that are obtained when the true classes of both positive and negative classifications
are revealed are statistically equivalent to the results presented in Sections 2.5.1.2. and 2.5.1.3
with the following exceptions: 1) results are not sensitive to either diversity (p=0.4599) or
positive ratio (p=0.0847), 2) IMF still significantly outperforms MAJ (p=0.0078) and WAVG
(p=0.0767), and the performance advantage over AVG is now only marginally significant
(p=0.1264). Note, that the p-values are two-tailed. The results also show that IMF outperforms
aWAVG (p<0.0001). Table 2.5 summarizes these results.
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2.5.2

Time Lag, IMF Parameters and

log(Net Benefit)

Base-Classifier Cost-Benefit Retraining
IMF

Overview
The impact of time lag on net benefit is

MAJ

8.25

tested using the model shown in (22) and a
statistical analysis dataset derived from

8

holding the number of agents and cost-tobenefit ratio constant at 10 and 1:10
respectively. Since all UCI datasets are used

7.75

for all the treatments in the model I block for
the dataset effect.

7.5
0

ln(net benefit) = β0+β1v+block (22)

25

50
Yule’s Q

75

100

The lag-level main effect (p=0.9962) is
insignificant, thereby indicating that time lag

Figure 2.5:

Combiner Method (MAJ and
IMF) x Diversity Interaction

does not impact IMF performance.
Using the model shown in (23), I do not find any evidence that the value of the binary search
stopping parameter ε, within the tested range (0.01, 0.001,… 0.00000000001), impacts the
performance of IMF (p=0.5071). The impact of ε on the performance of IMF is also not domain
dependent. More specifically, while blocking for the dataset effect on net benefit, the ε*dataset
positive ratio (p=0.1248), ε*dataset size (p=0.1856), ε*dataset average agent accuracy (p=0.5989)
and ε*dataset diversity (p=0.8897) interactions are insignificant. Based on the results, in all
experiments ε is set to the middle value tested ε = 0.000001.
ln(net benefit) = β0 + β1ε + β2dataset average agent accuracy + β3dataset

(23)

positive ratio + β4dataset size + β5dataset diversity +
β6ε*dataset average agent accuracy + β7ε*dataset positive
ratio+β8ε*dataset size+β9ε*dataset diversity +block
In order to choose appropriate values for the maximum bet multiplier k, and to investigate if
the choice of k is domain dependent, I use the model shown in (24), where the block factor is
dataset:
ln(net benefit) = β0 + β1 k + β2dataset average agent accuracy + β3dataset
positive ratio + β4dataset size + β5dataset diversity +
β6k*dataset average agent accuracy + β7k*dataset positive
ratio + β8 k*dataset size + β9 k*dataset diversity + block

26

(24)

Table 2.5
Summary of Primary Results
Effects
Results
Siga.
Net Benefit (only true class Net BenefitIMF > Net BenefitAVG
p=0.0042
of objects classified as
Net BenefitIMF > Net BenefitWAVG
p=0.0229
positive known)
p<0.0001
Net BenefitIMF > Net BenefitMAJ
Parameter Estimates (standard errors)
AVG
-0.00101 (0.00154)
0.00621 (0.00154)
IMF
MAJ
-0.00568 (0.00154)
Sensitivity Analysis
Number of Agents
Not Sensitive
p=0.1407
Cost-to-Benefit Ratio
Not Sensitive
p=0.7552
Dataset Size
Not Sensitive
p=0.7325
Average Agent Accuracy
Not Sensitive
p=0.9803
Diversity*Method
> without MAJ
> without AVG/WAVG
Net Benefit: Low Diversity
Net Benefit: High Diversity

Not Sensitive
Sensitive
Net BenefitIMF > Net BenefitMAJ
Net BenefitIMF > Net BenefitMAJ

p=0.7813
p=0.0099
p=0.0138
p<0.0001

p=0.0005
Net BenefitIMF > Net BenefitAVG
Net BenefitIMF > Net BenefitWAVG
p=0.0021
p<0.0001
Net BenefitIMF > Net BenefitMAJ
Net Benefit: High Positive Net BenefitIMF > Net BenefitAVG
p=0.3439
Ratios
Net BenefitIMF > Net BenefitWAVG
p=0.6023
p=0.0139
Net BenefitIMF > Net BenefitMAJ
Parameter Estimates (standard errors)
AVG
-0.00210 (0.00180)
IMF
0.00799 (0.00180)
MAJ
-0.00509 (0.00180)
Net Benefit (true classes of Net BenefitIMF > Net BenefitAVG
p=0.1264
all objects known)
Net BenefitIMF > Net BenefitWAVG
p=0.0767
Net BenefitIMF > Net BenefitMAJ
p=0.0078
Net BenefitIMF > Net BenefitAWAVG
p<0.0001
Sensitivity Analysis
Number of Agents
Not Sensitive
p=0.9848
Cost-to-Benefit Ratio
Not Sensitive
p=0.9944
Dataset Size
Not Sensitive
p=0.8293
Positive Ratio
Not Sensitive
p=0.0847
Average Agent Accuracy
Not Sensitive
p=0.4030
Ensemble Diversity
Not Sensitive
p=0.4599
a
all p-values are two-tailed
Net Benefit: Low Positive
Ratios

The k*dataset average agent accuracy (p=0.0036) and k*dataset diversity (p=0.0012)
interactions are significant, while the k*dataset positive ratio (p=0.1581) and k *dataset size
(p=0.1812) interactions are insignificant. Scatter plots with trend lines and the raw data tables for
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the standardized log net benefit of the different datasets at the 15 different k values indicate that
the significant interactions are driven by extreme values of k. For low k values net benefit
decreases as the diversity decreases or the average agent accuracy increases, and vice versa for
high k values. However, k=50 consistently provides relatively good results, even when compared
to extreme k values at their best performance levels. Furthermore, k=25 and k=75 also perform
well. Results show that when only using k=25, k=50 and k=75, the k*dataset average agent
accuracy (p=0.5697) and k*dataset diversity (p=0.9212) interactions are no longer significant.
Based on these results, I set k=50 in all experiments.
Using the model shown in (25), the base-classifier cost-benefit retraining experiment results
show an insignificant (p=0.2037) base-classifier mode and combiner method interaction, blocking
for dataset, cost-to-benefit ratio and dataset*cost-to-benefit ratio effects. Thus, as expected I do
not find evidence of relative combiner method performance being moderated by base-classifier
mode6.
ln(net benefit) = β0+β1 combiner method +β2 base-classifier mode +

(25)

β3 combiner method*base-classifier mode + block
2.6. Discussion Overview
2.6.1

Combiner Method Performance

Based on the β coefficients and standard errors from the main effects test (Table 2.5), IMF on
average provides a 0.72, 1.19 and 0.55 percentage7 greater impact on Net Benefit than AVG,
MAJ and WAVG, respectively. These results are not sensitive to the number of agents in the
ensemble, cost-to-benefit ratio, dataset size, dataset average agent accuracy or ensemble diversity.
I however do find that the relationship between combiner method and net benefit is moderated by
the dataset positive ratio when assuming that the true class of objects is only revealed for objects
classified as positive. The results show that IMF outperforms the other combiner methods at low
to medium positive ratios, and that there is no significant difference at medium to high positive

6

Nevertheless, the reader should be aware that some of the crisp base-classifiers used in the experiments

under extreme cost-benefit ratios could reduce the benefits of MCC. The effect of this potential problem is
unknown, but based on the experiment just discussed it does not bias the relative performance results one
way or the other.
7

Based on estimation using β coefficients and standard errors of: -0.00101 and 0.00154 for AVG, 0.00621

and 0.00154 for IMF, and -0.00568 and 0.00154 for MAJ (Kennedy 1981).
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ratio levels as theoretically expected. Thus, IMF performs well at all positive ratio levels and
outperforms the other combiner methods when it matters the most, i.e., in skewed datasets with
low to medium positive ratios for which, given the tested cost-benefit ratios, trivial rules
classifying all objects as either positive or negative are likely to be ineffective. For low to
medium positive ratios, IMF on average has a 1.01%, 1.31% and 0.71%8 greater impact on Net
Benefits than AVG, MAJ and WAVG, respectively.
To put this into perspective assume a fraud classification task where the average cost savings
from a fraud detection is $20,000, the average cost of investigation is $500, the positive rate is
1% (a low positive rate), there are 40,000 transactions per year, and using IMF 50% of the
positive instances and 98% of the negative instances are classified accurately. The benefit from
this classification is $4,000,000 ($20,000*200), the cost is $496,000 (200*500+792*500), and the
net-benefit is $3,504,000. In this example, IMF provides an additional benefit per year of
$35,390, $45,902 and $24,878 over AVG, MAJ and WAVG, respectively. However, note that
IMF also consumes more resources, an average of 6.21 msec of CPU time9 to classify one object
as compared to 5.07 msec for WAVG, 1.68 msec for AVG, and 1.69 msec for MAJ. The slightly
larger CPU time consumed by IMF is minor given that in most settings IMF classifies on average,
579,415 objects per hour of CPU time on an off-the-shelf PC.
IMF also outperforms MAJ, WAVG, and aWAVG, and AVG (at a marginal level of
significance), when true classes of objects classified as positive as well as negative are revealed.
These results are robust within a wide range of cost-to-benefit ratios, number of agents in the
ensemble, ensemble diversity, and dataset size, positive ratio and average base-classifier
accuracy.
To understand why IMF has superior performance compared to the other combiner methods,
we need to understand the workings of IMF. Because of the log utility function, IMF should
perform on par with AVG if all the agents have the same amount of funds available for placing
8

Based on estimation using β coefficients and standard errors of: -0.002053 and 0.001751 for AVG,

0.0079922 and 0.001751 for IMF, and -0.005092 and 0.001751 for MAJ (Kennedy 1981).
9

I used GetProcessTimes from Kernel32.lib, which measures CPU time used, rather than actual time to run

the algorithms. CPU time excludes time that the process is waiting for other processes to complete. The
resource consumption experiment is performed on computers ranging from a desktop computer with a
Pentium 4 2.0 GHz processor with 256 MB of RAM to a personal laptop with an AMD Turion 64 X2
Mobile Technology TL-56 processor and 2,048 MB of RAM. The computer is held constant within each
treatment group.
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bets in the market, i.e., if the aggregation is not wealth weighted (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2006).
However, as more accurate agents become wealthier, these agents end up influencing the market
prices to a greater degree than the less accurate agents, and as the equilibrium prices represent the
aggregated probabilities of the ensemble, the more accurate agents have a greater impact on the
ensemble’s decision than the less accurate agents. Thus the ensemble decision in IMF is a
performance-weighted average, which explains why there is a difference between IMF and AVG,
and also perhaps why IMF outperforms AVG, and to some extent MAJ, since MAJ is also a nonweighted combiner method with performance similar to AVG.
When comparing IMF to WAVG, we need to examine three major differences between IMF
and WAVG: 1) WAVG assigns weights solely based on the precision of the base-classifiers
relative to the precision of the other base-classifiers. IMF in contrast, places progressively greater
weight on better performing agents’ decisions, as agents with wealth above what they are allowed
to bet hedge their bets to a lesser degree than other agents; 2) In IMF, weights are adjusted based
on the degree of agent’s performance as opposed to WAVG where the weights are adjusted solely
based on the ratio of an individual classifier’s precision to the total precision of all the classifiers
in the ensemble. To clarify, in IMF, an agents’ wealth increases (decreases) to a greater degree
the more (less) accurate the agent is in each bet as agent bets are increasing in agent probability
estimates. Thus, agents that are correct and more certain, receive a higher payout than agents that
are correct but less certain, since the bets of more certain agents are higher, and vice versa; 3) The
weights in IMF, but not in WAVG, are adjusted based on agents’ relative contribution to the
ensemble diversity. In IMF, agents with correct bets receive a greater payout if the odds are
higher for that class, which occurs when the bets are higher for the other class.
2.6.2

Time Lag, IMF Parameters and Base-Classifier Cost-Benefit Retraining

The results do not show that time lag between object classification and object determination
impact the performance of IMF within the range tested (0 to 50% of the records in the dataset).
Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that the performance of IMF deteriorates with time lags
between object classifications and object true class determination. The results also do not indicate
that the binary search stopping parameter ε and maximum bet parameter k should be set to
different values for different classification domains. In the experiments ε was held constant at
0.000001 and k was held constant at 50. I also do not find any evidence that there is a systematic
bias in the relative performance of the combiner methods from not retraining the base-classifiers
for the different cost-to-benefit ratios.
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2.6.3

Combiner Method Design Considerations

For multi-agent system MCC implementations, IMF handles changes in ensemble
composition and base-classifier performance. The market mechanism used in IMF functions
independently of any specific agents that participate in the market. Furthermore, changes in an
agent’s relative performance impact the agent’s wealth, and therefore also the weight given to the
agent’s decisions in the decision fusion process. IMF also provides market participants incentives
to truthfully provide their private decisions. This is especially useful in multi-agent systems
based on competitive agents (Ygge and Akkermans 1999).
2.7. Conclusions and Future Research Directions
In this essay, I present IMF, a new and novel combiner method based on information markets
for multi-classifier combination. I show through extensive experimentation that IMF provides
additional utility compared to three benchmark combiner methods AVG, WAVG and MAJ.
For future research, the effectiveness of IMF can be compared to other combiner methods in
other multi-classifier combination architectures, such as bagging and boosting. Other research
extensions include: investigating the performance impacts of other types of agent behavior using
utility functions such as Constant Absolute Risk Aversion, Constant Relative Risk Aversion, etc;
modeling agents to update their beliefs based on market signals or ensemble consensus; mixing
agents with different utility functions; using a combination of human and software agent experts.
IMF can also be extended for the more general k-class classification problem using the parimutuel betting mechanism. Finally, future research can explore the possibility of integrating the
cost-benefit ratio into IMF itself.
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Chapter 3.

The Effect of Discretionary Accruals, Earnings Expectations and
Unexpected Productivity on Financial Statement Fraud

3.1. Introduction
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE 2006) estimates that occupational fraud
totals $652 billion per year in the U.S. Within occupational fraud, financial statement fraud
(henceforth fraud) has the highest per case cost and total cost to the defrauded organization, with
an estimated total cost of $340 billion per year in the U.S.10 In addition to the direct impact on the
defrauded organizations, fraud adversely impacts employees, investors and lenders. Fraud also
has broader, indirect negative effects on market participants by undermining the reliability of
corporate financial statements, which results in higher risk premiums. Despite recent legislation
aimed at reducing fraud, fraud remains a prevalent problem and is considered to have remained at
about the same level (ACFE 2006) or to have even risen lately (Oversight 2005).
Accounting professionals are increasingly assuming, through mandates and self-regulation, the
responsibility for detecting fraud. Statement on Auditing Standard (SAS) No. 53, did not directly
address the auditors’ responsibility for providing a reasonable assurance that the financial
statements are free of material misstatements due to fraud, but did so indirectly through reference
to “irregularities” (AICPA 1988). However, starting with SAS No. 82, auditing standards refer to
fraud directly; auditors should provide “reasonable assurance about whether the financial
statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud” (AICPA 1997,
AU 110.02). SAS No. 99 reiterates this responsibility and further requires that analytical
procedures be used specifically for the purpose of identifying risks related to fraud (AICPA
2002). Auditing Standard (AS) 2 (PCAOB 2004) specifies that managers should design and
implement internal controls to address fraud risk (primarily for fraud prevention and detection),
10

The ACFE (2006) report provides estimates of total fraud cost, mean cost per fraud category and number

of cases. To derive the estimate for total cost of financial statement fraud, I assumed that the relative
difference in mean is similar to the relative difference in median cost among the different occupational
fraud categories.
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and auditors should evaluate these internal controls. Finally, AS5 (PCAOB 2007) adopts a topdown audit approach and highlights that a fraud risk assessment should be taken into account
when planning and performing the audit of internal control over financial reporting, which in turn
impacts the audit. To summarize, the importance of fraud from an audit perspective has shifted
from auditing standards only containing implicit reference to fraud, to fraud being one of the
primary considerations of auditing standards.
Research that adds to our knowledge about fraud antecedents and detection is important to
defrauded organizations, their employees, investors, lenders and financial markets, in general, as
this knowledge can help curb costs associated with fraud and improve market efficiency. This
knowledge is also important to auditors when providing a reasonable assurance about whether the
financial statements are free of material misstatements caused by fraud, especially during client
selection and continuation judgments, and audit planning. My research objective is to improve
our understanding of antecedents of fraud, and thereby improve our ability to detect fraud. More
specifically, I address three research questions not previously examined in the fraud literature: (1)
what is the relation between the usage of discretionary accruals in prior years and fraud; (2) are
managers that meet or exceed analyst forecasts more likely to have committed fraud; and (3) are
firms with unexpected increases in revenue per employee more likely to have committed fraud?
The results of my research confirm that the likelihood of fraud is significantly higher for firms
that meet or exceed analyst forecasts, are constrained by prior year earnings management, or have
high labor productivity. These findings add to our theoretical understanding of fraud and at the
same time make a practical contribution by improving our ability to detect fraud.
The chapter is organized as follows. A brief definition of earnings management, financial
statement fraud and earnings manipulation as used in this study is provided in Section 3.2 along
with a review of related fraud research. The research hypotheses are developed in Section 3.3. I
present the research design, including descriptions of the sample selection, measures and
descriptive statistics, in Section 3.4. The results are reported in Section 3.5 and additional
analyses are provided in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes the chapter with a discussion of
research contributions, limitations and future research opportunities.
3.2. Related Research
Healy and Wahlen (1999) state that: “earnings management occurs when managers use
judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” (p. 368). While
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fraud has the same objective as earnings management, i.e., to alter financial reports with the
intention of misleading its users, it differs from earnings management in that fraud is outside of
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), whereas, earnings management is within
GAAP. While this definition is clear cut, the distinction in reality is less clear. Rather than
defining earnings management and fraud as two distinct classes, I view earnings management and
fraud as being on opposite ends of a continuum, where the extremes are represented by earnings
alterations that are either within or outside of GAAP. I furthermore use the term earnings
manipulation to refer to the entire continuum, i.e., I consider both earnings management and fraud
to be sub-categories of earnings manipulation. Fraud and earnings management also differ on two
other important dimensions: 1) earnings management reverses over time but fraud does not; and
2) there are potential legal costs associated with fraud but not with earnings management. These
dimensions will be further discussed in subsequent sections.
I now turn to the prior literature. Because of the importance of understanding fraud
antecedents and improved fraud detection, a stream of research has focused on developing new
predictors that explain and predict fraud. This research stream has taken either a confirmatory or
exploratory approach. The confirmatory predictor research, the approach followed in this essay,
has focused on testing specific fraud hypotheses primarily grounded in earnings management and
corporate governance literature. The exploratory predictor research has taken a large number of
variables, for example red flags proposed in SAS No. 53 and No. 82, and financial statement
ratios, and either mapped these variables to fraud frameworks and/or tested their explanatory
power. There has, however, been relatively little agreement in the results from the exploratory
research as to what variables are significant predictors of fraud. To reduce the risk of obtaining
statistically significant findings with low generalizability I follow the confirmatory predictor
research approach, and propose and evaluate three novel fraud predictors.
The next section (Section 3.2.1) reviews research examining the impact of earnings
management on fraud. This research proposes, but only partially tests, that the act of earnings
management increases the likelihood of subsequent fraud (Beneish 1997, Lee et al. 1999). Section
3.2.2 reviews fraud predictor research that leverages earnings management hypotheses, more
specifically the debt covenant and the bonus plan hypotheses. This research has examined
whether earnings management motivations also provide incentives for managers to commit fraud
(Dechow et al. 1996, Beneish 1999). Finally, Section 3.2.3 describes research that has examined
predictors related to the revenue account, which is the most commonly manipulated financial
statement account (Beneish 1997).
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3.2.1

Fraud Motivated by Prior Years’ Earnings Management

Prior fraud research has made the argument that as income-increasing accruals at some point
reverse (Healy 1985), managers with income increasing accruals in prior years either have to deal
with the consequences of the accrual reversals or commit fraud to offset the reversals (Dechow et
al. 1996, Beneish 1997, Beneish 1999, Lee et al. 1999). Prior year income-increasing
discretionary accruals might also cause the managers to run out of ways to manage earnings.
When faced with these earnings reversals and decreased earnings management flexibility,
managers can resort to fraudulent activities to achieve objectives that were earlier accomplished
by managing earnings. A positive relation is, therefore, expected between prior discretionary
accruals and fraud. I name this relation, and henceforth refer to it as the earnings reversals
hypothesis.
The earnings reversals hypothesis was graphically depicted in Dechow et al. (1996) (see
Figure 3.1). Fraud firms appeared to have greater total and discretionary accruals to assets in the
three years, t-3, t-2 and t-1, leading up to the first fraud year, t0, than did non fraud firms. The
statistical analysis in Dechow et al. (1996), however, only examined the relation between total
accruals in year t0 and fraud in year t0, rather than in the years prior to t0, as predicted by the
earnings reversals hypothesis and indicated graphically by Dechow et al. (1996). Dechow et al.
(1996) found a significant positive relation between total accruals in year t0 and fraud in year t0.
Contrary to this result, Beneish (1997) found a negative relation between total accruals in year t0
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Figure 3.1: Income-Increasing Discretionary Accruals of Fraud and NonFraud Firms
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and fraud in year t0. The likelihood of fraud in year t0 was, however, positively related to a
dummy variable measuring whether the firm had positive accruals in both year t-1 and t0 (Beneish
1997). A more recent paper by Beneish (1999), reported a positive relation between total
discretionary accruals in year t-1 and fraud in year t0. Lee et al. (1999) found a positive and
significant relation between fraud and the difference between operating accruals summed over a
three-year time span prior to the fraud being discovered by the SEC. However, the SEC fraud
discovery on average lags the first fraud occurrence by 28 months (Beneish 1999). Thus, for the
average firm, the discretionary accruals measure used in Lee et al. (1999) was for total accruals
summed over years t-1, t0 and t+1. More recently, Dechow et al. (2007) found indications, though
not supported based on a statistical test, of accruals reversing subsequent to t0, thus providing
further support for the earning reversal hypothesis.
To summarize, prior fraud research examining the earnings reversals hypothesis has primarily
used current accruals, but also accruals one year prior to the first year of the fraud. However, the
earnings reversals hypothesis used in these studies does not specify a relation between current
income-increasing discretionary accruals and fraud. Furthermore, the pressure to commit fraud
due to accrual reversals should be higher when the firms have used income-increasing accruals to
boost income over multiple years rather than just one year. The graphical analysis (See Figure 3.1
for a similar analysis based on this study’s data) in Dechow et al. (1996) indicates that an
appropriate time period to measure income-increasing accruals is three years prior to the first
fraud year rather than only one year prior to the first fraud year. I extend the fraud literature by
validating the previously discussed, but not yet hypothesized and fully examined, relation
between positive discretionary accruals in prior years and fraud.
3.2.2

Fraud and Earnings Management Motivations

Given the shared objective of fraud and earnings management, fraud research has examined
whether the same incentives that motivate earnings management also motivate fraud. This
research has focused on examining incentives related to the debt covenant hypothesis and the
bonus plan hypothesis in a fraud context.
Beneish (1999) and Dechow et al. (1996) examine fraud incentives related to the debt
covenant hypothesis. In earnings management, the debt covenant hypothesis predicts that when
firms are close to violating debt covenants managers will use income-increasing discretionary
accruals to avoid violating the covenants (Dichev and Skinner 2002). Beneish (1999) and
Dechow et al. (1996) hypothesize a positive relation between demand for external financing and
fraud, and between incentives related to avoiding debt covenant violations and fraud. Demand for
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external financing is measured in both studies as whether the difference between cash flow from
operations and average capital expenditures to current assets is less than -0.5, and whether
securities were issued in the fraud period. Incentives related to avoiding debt covenant violations
are measured in both studies using leverage and actual instances of technical default. The results
of the studies are mixed with one study (Dechow et al. 1996) finding support for the hypothesized
relationships and the other (Beneish 1999) finding no support.
Beneish (1999), Summers and Sweeney (1998), and Dechow et al. (1996) also examine fraud
incentives related to the bonus plan hypothesis. In earnings management, the bonus plan
hypothesis predicts that earnings based bonuses provide managers with an incentive to manage
earnings to increase their bonuses over multiple years. More specifically, if bonuses are (not)
increasing in earnings then managers will use income-increasing (income-decreasing)
discretionary accruals to increase their current (future) bonuses (Healy 1985).
In terms of the bonus plan hypothesis, Dechow et al. (1996) and Beneish (1999) posit that
managers have greater incentives to commit fraud when they can benefit from the fraud either
through their compensation agreements or through insider trading. Both Dechow et al. (1996) and
Beneish (1999) measure compensation agreement using a dummy variable of whether a bonus
plan exists. Beneish (1999) also uses stock appreciation rights. Neither study finds support for the
hypothesis that the existence of a bonus plan increases the likelihood of fraud. Beneish (1999),
however, does find support for a positive relation between fraud likelihood and whether managers
redeem stock appreciation rights.
While both Dechow et al. (1996) and Beneish (1999) also examine insider trading incentives,
they use different measures for this construct. In Dechow et al. (1996) insider trading, measured
as insider sales divided by market value of equity, is not found to be a significant predictor of
fraud. Beneish (1999) argues that in addition to insider sales, insider purchases should be
included as fraudsters have incentives to both sell more and purchase less of their companies’
stock when committing fraud. Beneish (1999), therefore, uses the difference between insider
purchases and sales, and divides this difference by total trading activity. Beneish (1999) also uses
the percentage of firm security offerings sold by insiders. Unlike Dechow et al. (1996), Beneish
(1999) obtains significant results for insider trading. Beneish (1999) also finds support for
whether managers redeem stock appreciation rights. In a similar study, Summers and Sweeney
(1998) examine insider sales and purchases. In addition to dollar amounts sold and purchased,
Summers and Sweeney (1998) measure the number of shares and number of transactions in
insider sales and purchases. They find that only the number of shares sold is a moderately
significant predictor of fraud.
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As shown, prior fraud research focusing on earnings management motivations in a fraud
context has examined compensation and debt incentives but not fraud incentives related to capital
market expectations; specifically, the relation between analyst forecasts and fraud. In earnings
management, capital market expectation hypotheses predict that managers have incentives to
manipulate earnings to meet or exceed analyst forecasts when these forecasts would not otherwise
have been met or exceeded. These incentives are related to manager performance and
compensation, and firm performance in general, which are often evaluated based on meeting or
exceeding analyst expectations (Burgstahler and Eames 2006). I extend fraud research by
examining fraud incentives related to capital market expectations.
3.2.3

Fraud in the Revenue Account

Prior fraud literature has identified the revenue account as being the primary target for
financial statement fraud (Beneish 1997). Given that the revenue account is typically
manipulated, unusual revenue levels or changes in revenue might be indicative of revenue fraud.
However, considering that revenue varies from year to year and among firms for reasons other
than fraud, straight revenue is a relatively noisy measure of fraud. For example, it is very difficult
to disentangle differences in revenue due to fraud from differences in revenue due to the size of
the firm and the successfulness of the firm. To detect revenue fraud, SAS No. 99 highlights the
need to analyze and identify unusual relationships involving revenue, for example between
revenue and production capacity.
Prior research has included sales in various ratios that are not, typically, designed for the
purpose of detecting revenue fraud. Nevertheless, the results from these studies are largely
consistent with fraud firms manipulating the revenue account. For example, sales growth, used as
a proxy for firm growth, has been used as a predictor of fraud based on the idea that high-growth
firms have incentives to sustain their high growth levels and that slow-growth firms have
incentives to increase growth (Erickson et al. 2006; Brazel et al. 2007). Erickson et al. (2006)
found a positive relation between sales growth and fraud. Brazel et al. (2007) examined the
relation between performance improvements and fraud in more detail and found a negative
relation between sales growth and fraud, and a positive relation between sales growth minus
growth measured using a non-financial measure and fraud. Together these results indicate that
firms that increase revenue fraudulently are more likely to have abnormally high growth rates,
and that poorly performing firms, i.e., firms with low actual growth rates, are more likely to
commit fraud.
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Both Chen and Sennetti (2005) and Fanning and Cogger (1998) examine the relation between
gross profit margin and fraud. Chen and Sennetti (2005) examine this relation to detect inflated
sales, while Fanning and Cogger (1998) argued that it is an indication of deflated cost of goods
sold. Both these studies find a positive relation between gross profit margin and fraud, providing
an indication of revenue fraud or manipulation of cost of goods sold. Chen and Sennetti (2005)
also find that fraud firms have lower ratios of research and development expenditures to sales,
and sales and marketing expenditures to sales than non-fraud firms. These results seemingly
argue that fraud firms are more likely to be financially distressed and therefore, less likely to
invest in research and development, and sales and marketing. Alternatively, these relations could
indicate revenue manipulation as revenue fraud decreases both these ratios.
While these studies support the conjecture that managers fraudulently increase sales, both
Summers and Sweeney (1998) and Fanning and Cogger (1998) examine ratios of sales that do not
show evidence of revenue manipulation. Summers and Sweeney (1998) find a positive relation
between change in inventory to sales and fraud, which they interpret to be evidence of fraudulent
inventory manipulation. Note that a fraudulent increase in sales would reduce the ratio of
inventory to sales in the fraud year. Fanning and Cogger (1998) examine the ratio of sales to
assets with the idea that firms with relatively low sales to asset ratios are in financial distress and
therefore, more likely to commit financial statement fraud. As they expect, they find a negative
relation between the ratio of sales to assets and fraud. Note that a fraudulent increase in sales
would increase sales to assets, if it is assumed that assets is not changed.
I extend this research by developing a productivity based measure that is designed specifically
for the purpose of detecting financial statement fraud. I use a productivity measure because firms
use resources, for example assets, to generate revenue. Thus, some of the noise associated with
using revenue as a predictor can be removed by deflating revenue by the resources used to
produce the revenue. Because resources are used to generate sales, the relation between sales and
resources should be relatively stable over time compared to straight sales. Given the identified
importance of the revenue account in fraud, the difficulty in using straight revenue for fraud
detection, the inability of sales to assets (capital productivity) to detect fraudulent revenue
manipulation (Fanning and Cogger 1998) and the appeal of using a productivity measures to
detect revenue fraud, I examine the use of a different productivity measure, labor productivity.
The rationale for using labor productivity rather than capital productivity is provided in the
discussion leading up to the third hypothesis.
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3.3. Hypotheses Development
3.3.1

Prior Years’ Discretionary Accruals and Fraud

Managers can use discretionary accruals to transfer earnings between periods but over time
discretionary accruals sum to zero (Healy 1985). Thus, income-increasing behavior in one period
decreases the amount of discretionary accruals that can be used to increase earnings in subsequent
periods as the prior income-increasing discretionary accruals eventually reverse (Dechow et al.
1996; Beneish 1997). For example, managers make judgments about the amount of outstanding
accounts receivables that are uncollectible and adjust allowance for uncollectible accounts based
on this judgment by debiting bad debt expense. The manager can manage earnings by deciding to
establish the allowance level below the manager’s actual estimate, thereby lowering bad debt
expense and increasing earnings. However, assuming that the initial judgment about the correct
allowance level was more accurate than the established allowance, the allowance account will not
be sufficient and has to be increased at some point to cover actual receivables that could not be
collected, thereby increasing future bad debt expense and decreasing future earnings.
When confronted with accrual reversals, managers can choose to either face the consequences
of net income-decreasing accruals or fraudulently manipulate earnings to offset or more than
offset the reversals (Beneish 1997). Given that managers facing accrual reversals can resort to
fraudulent activities to achieve similar objectives that were earlier accomplished by managing
earnings, I expect a positive relation between prior discretionary accruals and fraud. This relation
was graphically depicted but not tested in Dechow et al. (1996), where fraud firms appeared to
have higher total and discretionary accruals in the three years leading up to the first fraud year
than did non-fraud firms (see Figure 3.1).
Based on this I posit11 that the pressure of accruals reversal is greater and that earnings
management flexibility is reduced the more earnings were managed in prior years. The pressure

11

Note that firms with strong performance are less likely to resort to fraudulent activities to offset earnings

reversals as their strong performance offsets the reversals and vice-versa for firms with poor performance.
However, on average, firms facing accrual reversals are more likely to commit fraud than firms that are not
facing accrual reversals. Although the posited relation could be further refined by taking into consideration
firm performance, I do not hypothesize an interaction between performance and accrual reversals as firms
that commit fraud also report higher performance. That is, while firms with low performance are more
likely to commit fraud when faced with accrual reversal, firms that commit fraud are also more likely to
report better performance.
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from earnings reversals provides an incentive to manipulate earnings and the earnings
management inflexibility increases the likelihood that fraud, rather than earnings management, is
used to manipulate earnings. I define total prior discretionary accruals as discretionary accruals
summed over three years prior to the first fraud year. In accordance with the earnings reversals
hypothesis:
H1: Total prior discretionary accruals is positively related to the likelihood of fraud.
3.3.2

Capital Market Expectations and Fraud

Firm performance, and consequently market value, is partially determined by the firms’ ability
to meet or exceed analyst expectations. Managers, therefore, have incentives to manipulate
earnings to meet or exceed analyst forecasts when these forecasts would not otherwise have been
met or exceeded (Burgstahler and Eames 2006). Managers can manipulate earnings to meet or
exceed analyst forecasts by managing earnings or by committing fraud.
When earnings are manipulated using earnings management, managers are likely to manage
earnings to just meet analyst forecasts (Burgstahler and Eames 2006). While there are incremental
benefits associated with exceeding forecasts, managers prefer to just meet analyst forecasts as the
costs of earnings management also increase when forecasts are exceeded (Burgstahler and Eames
2006). One such cost relates to future earnings being negatively impacted by current earnings
management. To be able to meet analyst forecasts in future periods managers are, therefore, likely
to manage earnings to meet, rather than exceed analyst forecasts.
While prior research has not examined the relation between analyst forecasts and fraud,
Dechow et al. (2007) show that fraud firms have unusually strong stock price performance prior
to committing fraud, and indicate that this may put pressure on the firm to commit fraud to avoid
disappointing investors and losing their high stock prices. Additionally, a large number of SEC
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER) provide anecdotal evidence of specific
cases where fraud was committed to meet or exceed analyst forecasts. Thus, there are reasons to
believe that managers may fraudulently manipulate earnings to meet or exceed analyst forecasts.
As in earnings management, both the incremental benefits from meeting or exceeding analyst
forecasts and expected costs associated with fraud are increasing in the magnitude of the fraud.
However, earnings manipulated using fraud, as opposed to earnings manipulated using earnings
management, do not reverse in future periods; therefore, it is difficult to predict whether
managers prefer to fraudulently manipulate earnings to meet or to exceed forecasts. Since the
exact nature of the utility managers derive from meeting or exceeding analyst forecasts when
committing fraud is unknown, I define meeting or exceeding analyst forecasts as a dummy

41

variable that equals one if analyst forecasts are met or exceeded rather than attempting to define a
cut-off as is done in earnings management research (Burgstahler and Eames 2006). Based on this
discussion I hypothesize:
H2: Firms that meet or exceed analyst forecasts are more likely to have committed fraud than
firms that fail to meet analyst forecasts.
3.3.3

Unexpected Labor Productivity and Fraud

The revenue account is the most commonly manipulated account in fraud (Beneish 1997).
Thus, unusual increases in revenue could be an indication of fraud. To reduce some of the noise
associated with this measure, revenue can be deflated by assets (capital productivity). Prior
research has found capital productivity to be a significant predictor of fraud (Fanning and Cogger
1998; Kaminski et al. 2004).
However, capital productivity is still a somewhat noisy measure given constant changes in
assets that do not directly impact revenue. Furthermore, and more importantly, given that
accounting information systems are double-entry based, the utility of this measure in detecting
fraud is reduced; for example, fictitious revenue will increase both the numerator (sales) and the
denominator (assets) in capital productivity. The direction and magnitude of change in capital
productivity resulting from revenue fraud depends on the level of a firm’s actual capital
productivity and profit margins. As an illustration, take firm A and firm B that both fraudulently
increase sales by $10 million, which in turn increases assets by $5 million. Further assume that:
(1) both firms have $100 million in assets before manipulating sales; (2) firm A has premanipulation sales of $50 million; and (3) firm B has pre-manipulation sales of $250 million.
Under these assumptions, sales to asset increases from 0.5 to 0.57 for firm A and decreases from
2.5 to 2.48 for firm B. Thus, because revenue fraud increases both the numerator and the
denominator of capital productivity, the ability of capital productivity to predict revenue
manipulations is reduced.
In support of this discussion, Fanning and Cogger (1998) did not find a positive relation
between capital productivity and fraud. They instead found a negative relation, which was
described as showing that firms in financial distress are more likely to commit fraud. Thus, it is
questionable whether it is possible to use sales to assets as evidence of revenue manipulation.
Labor productivity, another form of productivity, is measured as the amount of output per
employee. Like capital productivity, labor productivity reduces the noise associated with sales by
scaling sales by the input that is used to generate the output. However, unlike capital productivity,
the denominator in labor productivity is not impacted by double-entry systems. Therefore, labor

42

productivity should be a less noisy predictor of revenue fraud. A recent working paper by Brazel
et al. (2007) provides additional support for use of the number of employees as the denominator.
This study examines the efficacy of nonfinancial measures, including the number of employees,
in predicting fraud. They argue that nonfinancial measures that are strongly correlated to actual
performance and at the same time relatively difficult to manipulate, like number of employees,
can be used to assess the reasonableness of performance changes. The results in Brazel et al.
(2007) show a positive relation between fraud and the difference between change in revenue and
change in the nonfinancial measures.
Based on this discussion, I propose that firms that have high unexpected labor productivity are
more likely to have committed fraud. I measure unexpected labor productivity as the percentage
change in firm labor productivity from year t-1 to year t0, minus the percentage change in industry
labor productivity from year t-1 to year t0, and hypothesize that:
H3: Unexpected labor productivity is positively related to the likelihood of fraud.
3.4. Research Design
3.4.1

Variable Construction

3.4.1.1 Total Discretionary Accruals
To test H1 a measure of total prior discretionary accruals that captures the pressure of earnings
reversals and earnings management inflexibility is needed. I define Total Discretionary
Accrualsj,t as the total amount of discretionary accruals in the three years prior to the first fraud
year deflated by assets at the beginning of each year:
Total Discretionary Accrualsj,t =

t −1

∑t −3 DA j,t / A j,t −1 ,

(26)

where discretionary accruals DAj,t is calculated as the difference between total accruals TAj,t and
estimated accruals, typically referred to as nondiscretionary accruals, NDˆ A j ,t :
DAj,t / A j ,t −1 = TAj,t / A j ,t −1 - NDˆ A j ,t / A j ,t −1 ,

(27)

where total accruals, TAj,t, is defined as income before extraordinary items (#18)12 minus cash
flow from operations (#308). Nondiscretionary accruals, NDAj,t, for firm j in year t0 is estimated
using the extended version of the modified Jones model (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995)
proposed in Kasznik (1999). To derive NDAj,t the regression parameters in model (28) are
12

Numbers in parentheses refer to the Compustat number for the variable identified and is provided first

time the variable is used in the essay and in footnotes in tables.
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estimated for firm j using all firms in J, where J is the two-digit SIC code industry of j. These
estimates are then used to calculate estimated NDAj,t for firm j using model (29):

TA j ,t / A j ,t −1 = α 0 / A j ,t −1 + α 1 (∆REV j ,t − ∆REC j ,t ) / A j ,t −1 +

(28)

α 2 PPE j ,t / A j ,t −1 + α 3 ∆CFO j ,t / A j ,t −1
NDˆ A j ,t / A j ,t −1 = αˆ 0, J / A j ,t −1 + αˆ1, J (∆REV j ,t − ∆REC j ,t ) / A j ,t −1 +

(29)

αˆ 2, J PPE j ,t / A j ,t −1 + αˆ 3, J ∆CFO j ,t / A j ,t −1 ,
where ∆REVj,t is the change in revenue (#12), ∆RECj,t is the change in receivables (#2) and
∆CFOj,t is the change in cash flow from operations of firm j from year t-1 to year t0; PPEj,t is firm
j’s gross property, plant and equipment (#7) at time t0; and all values are deflated by Aj,t-1, firm j’s
assets (#6) at time t-1.
3.4.1.2 Forecast Attainment
I develop a measure of whether firms meet or exceed analyst forecasts to test H2. I define
Forecast Attainmentj,t as a dummy variable that measures whether or not analyst forecasts were
met or exceeded:

1, if ( EPS j ,t − AF j ,t ) ≥ 0
Forecast _ Attainment j ,t = 
0, if ( EPS j ,t − AF j ,t ) < 0,

(30)

where for firm j, EPSj,t is actual earnings per share in year t0, AFj,t is the first one year ahead
analyst consensus forecast of earnings per share for firm j in year t0 based on mean I/B/E/S
earnings forecasts.
3.4.1.3 Unexpected Revenue per Employee
To test H3 I develop an unexpected labor productivity measure. I define Unexpected Revenue
per Employeej,t as the difference in percentage change in revenue per employee between firm j
and industry J:
Unexpected Revenue per Employeej,t = %∆RE j ,t − % ∆RE J ,t ,

(31)

where revenue per employee, RE, defined as total revenue to total number of employees (#29), is
measured for firm j and for firm j’s industry J in year t0 and year t-1. The percentage difference
between revenue per employee in year t0 and t-1 is labeled percentage change in revenue per
employee:

%∆REt =

REt − REt −1
REt −1

(32)
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3.4.1.4 Control Variables
Confirmatory fraud research typically relies on matching non-fraud firms to fraud firms based
on size and year of fraud, and includes measured variables, to control for potential omitted
variable bias. However, the use of control variables is not standard. For example, Beneish (1999)
and Summers and Sweeney (1998) included additional control variables, while Dechow et al.
(1996) did not. Further, the control variables have not been used consistently. Without a
theoretical basis or empirical support for the most appropriate set of control variables, I rely on
variables that, given my hypotheses, conceptually are omitted variables.
Exploratory fraud research offers a rich set of variables from which to select controls that
could conceptually be omitted variables in my study. Fanning and Cogger (1998) investigated the
predictive value of 62 potential fraud indicators. Using stepwise logistic regression13 they derived
a model with eight significant fraud predictors: percent of outside directors; non-Big 4 auditor;
whether CFO changed in the last three years; whether LIFO was used; debt to equity; sales to
assets; whether accounts receivable was greater than 1.1 of last year’s accounts receivable; and
whether gross margin percentage was greater than 1.1 of last year’s. Bell and Carcello (2000)
matched 305 non-fraud cases to the 77 fraud cases in Loebbecke et al. (1989) and evaluated the
discriminatory power of the indicators used in Loebbecke et al. (1989). All variables were
measured using a survey of auditors with questions asking about the existence of risk factors.14
Based on univariate results and testing a number of different logistic regression models, the final
model contained five significant risk factors: weak internal control environment, rapid company
growth, undue emphasis on meeting earnings projections, management lied or was overly
evasive, and whether the company is public. Using univariate tests Kaminski et al. (2004) found
that five out of 20 financial ratios tested were significant predictors of fraud during the year of
fraud and one, two and three years prior to the fraud: fixed assets to assets, sales to accounts
receivable, inventory to current assets, inventory to sales, and sales to assets. However, for these
four years, a total of 84 tests were calculated, thereby, greatly increasing the chances of finding
some significant relations by chance alone. Further, it is likely that many of these ratios were

13

Fanning and Cogger (1998) also used an artificial neural network and two versions of discriminant

analysis in their multivariate analyses. However, statistical significance was not reported for the selected
variables for these models.
14

Many of the examined factors cannot be obtained from public sources and require actual audits to be

conducted, for example, the risk factor indicating whether the internal control environment was weak.
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correlated, possibly giving rise to multicollinearity issues. Based on their findings, Kaminski et
al. (2004) concluded that the red-flag approach only provides limited utility in detecting fraud.
Chen and Sennetti (2005) examined 17 computer industry specific fraud predictors selected based
on the most common fraud types in the computer industry and found significance for eight
variables: research and development to sales, gross profit margin, net profit margin, sales and
marketing to sales, tax benefits from exercising of employee stock options to operating cash
flows, changes in free cash flow, accounts receivable turnover, and return on assets.
In general, these studies find significant predictors of fraud that can provide utility in the
detection of financial statement fraud. However, 87% of the tested variables in this literature are
insignificant predictors of fraud, and there is very little overlap between studies as to the variables
that are identified as significant predictors of fraud. I, therefore, select variables from one study
and supplement these variables with variables that could conceptually be considered omitted
variables from this study. I select controls from Fanning and Cogger (1998), who compared a
relatively comprehensive set of 62 potential predictors covering a wide number of potential fraud
predictor types ranging from corporate governance to financial ratios. From the eight significant
predictors in Fanning and Cogger (1998) I use three variables, CFO Change, Auditor and Sales to
Assets. I also add two controls that were not among the 62 variables examined in Fanning and
Cogger (1998), Asset Growth and Current Discretionary Accruals.
CFO Change is a dummy variable that measures whether the CFO has changed during the
three years leading up to the first fraud year. While Fanning and Cogger (1998) were expecting a
positive relation based on the idea that some CFOs committing fraud will leave their firms to
avoid getting caught or are fired because of fraud suspicion, they found a negative relation but do
not provide an explanation for this finding. A possible explanation for the negative relation is that
CFOs committing fraud are less likely to leave as by leaving they relinquish control over
evidence of the fraud and expose themselves to scrutiny by the incoming CFO. I include CFO
Change to control for the possibility that both Total Discretionary Accruals and Fraud are related
to ineffective corporate governance. Based on the empirical results in Fanning and Cogger (1998)
I expect a negative relation between CFO Change and Fraud. Note that Fanning and Cogger
(1998) examined 31 variables related to corporate governance and found in multivariate analysis
that only CFO Change, Auditor and the percentage of insiders on the board were significant
predictors of fraud. To reduce the number of control variables I chose to include CFO Change to
control for corporate governance effectiveness in the main analysis but not the percentage of
insiders on the board. I made this selection after empirically comparing the predictive ability of
the two variables: CFO Change (p=0.113) and percentage of outsiders on the board (p=0.267).
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Auditor is a dummy variable that measures whether the firm’s auditor is a Big 4 auditor. Big 4
auditing firms are believed to provide a higher quality audit, which in turn is expected to increase
the effectiveness of the monitoring function provided by the auditors and thereby decrease the
likelihood of fraud. Thus, Auditor is expected to be negatively related to Fraud (Fanning and
Cogger 1998). Like CFO Change, Auditor is included to provide a measure of a corporate
governance mechanism that could conceptually explain the hypothesized relation between Total
Discretionary Accruals and Fraud.
Sales to Assets is the ratio of sales to assets (capital productivity). Sales to Assets is expected
to be negatively related to fraud given that low Sales to Assets is an indicator of financial distress
(Fanning and Cogger 1998). I include Sales to Assets to examine my argument in H3 that
Unexpected Revenue per Employee is a better predictor of revenue fraud than Sales to Assets. The
inclusion of Sales to Assets also allows me to examine whether Sales to Assets and Unexpected
Revenue per Employee capture different dimensions of productivity that can lead to fraud – Sales
to Assets capturing low productivity and financial distress that drives fraud, and Unexpected
Revenue per Employee capturing productivity that is artificially high as a result of revenue fraud
(H3).
I add two additional variables, Current Discretionary Accruals and Asset Growth. Current
Discretionary Accruals is the discretionary accruals in the first fraud year, t0, calculated using the
extended version of the modified Jones model (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995) proposed in
Kasznik (1999), see (27), (28) and (29) in section 3.4.1.1. As an indication of management
attitude towards fraud, I expect Current Discretionary Accruals to be positively related to fraud.
Attitude (henceforth management character) is difficult to measure and as in prior fraud research,
I have to assume that management character is not an omitted variable. However, Current
Discretionary Accruals might proxy for management character given that management character
is positively related to management’s use of discretionary accruals. This argument is based on the
assumption that a manager’s attitude towards earnings management is an indication of the
manager’s attitude towards fraud. I include this management character proxy to control for the
possibility that management character, i.e., poor set of ethical values, explains both Total
Discretionary Accruals and Fraud.
Asset Growth is a dummy variable that measures whether assets exceed 110% of the previous
year’s assets. Asset Growth is expected to be positively related to Fraud given that small growth
firms are more likely to be investigated by the SEC (Beneish 1999) than larger slower growing
firms. I include Asset Growth to control for the possibility that Asset Growth explains the positive
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relations between Unexpected Revenue per Employee and Fraud, or Forecast Attainment and
Fraud. Firm age and firm size are controlled in the matching procedure employed in my study.
3.4.2

Model for Hypotheses Testing

Model 33 is used to evaluate the hypotheses. More specifically, H1, H2 and H3 predict that α1,
α2 and α3, respectively, are positive and significant.
Fraud = α0 + α1Total Discretionary Accruals + α2Forecast Attainment +

(33)

α3Unexpected Revenue per Employee + αncontrol variables + ε,
where Fraud is a dependent dichotomous variable, equal to 1 if the firm was investigated by
the SEC for fraud and otherwise 0, Total Discretionary Accruals is the total discretionary
accruals in years t-1, t-2 and t-3, Forecast Attainment is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if analyst
forecasts were met or exceeded and 0 otherwise, and Unexpected Revenue per Employee is the
difference between a firm and its industry in the percentage change in revenue per employee from
year t-1 to t0. Five controls are used: Current Discretionary Accruals, Sales to Assets, Auditor,
CFO Change and Asset Growth. Please refer to the previous section (Section 3.4.1.4) for
descriptions of the control variables.
3.4.3

Data Sample

3.4.3.1 Experimental Sample
The fraudulent observations were located based on firms investigated by the SEC for fraud
and reported in AAER from the 4th quarter of 1999 through 2005. I searched AAERs for explicit
reference to section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, or descriptions of fraud. From this search a total of 745
potential observations were obtained (see Table 3.1). This initial selection was then reduced by
eliminating: duplicates, financial companies, firms without the first fraud year specified in the
SEC release, non-annual fraud, foreign corporations, AAERs focusing on auditors, not-for-profit
organizations, and fraud related to registration statements, 10-KSB or IPO. Financial companies
were, as is typically done, excluded from the sample as the rules and regulations governing
financial firms are substantially different from other firms. An additional 75 fraud firms15 from
Beasley (1996) were added to the remaining 139 fraud firms, for a total of 214 fraud firms.
Finally, 160 firms with missing data in Compustat for the fraud year or four prior years, Compact
15

These fraud firms were kindly provided by Mark Beasley. Beasley (1996) collected the data from 348

AAERs released between 1982 and 1991 (67 of the 75 fraud firms) and from the Wall Street Journal Index
caption of “Crime—White Collar Crime” between 1980 and 1991 (8 additional fraud firms).
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Table 3.1
Sample Selection
Panel A: Fraud Firms
Firms investigated by the SEC for fraudulent financial reporting from 4Q 1998
through 3Q 2005
Less: Financial companies
Less: Not annual (10-K) fraud
Less: Foreign companies
Less: Not-for-profit organizations
Less: Registration, 10-KSB and IPO related fraud
Less: Fraud year missing
Less: Duplicates
Remaining Fraud Observations
Add: Fraud firms from Beasley (1996)
Less: Not in Compustat or CompactD for first fraud year or four prior years or
I/B/E/S for first fraud year
Usable Fraud Observations
Panel B: Non-Fraud Firms
Firms in the same SIC industry as fraud firm in the year the fraud was committed
(firms included in count once for each year matched to one or more fraud firms)
Less: Firms with missing data in fraud year or in four years prior to
the fraud
Less: Firms not most similar in age and size to the fraud firms
Usable Non-Fraud Observations

745
(35)
(116)
(9)
(10)
(78)
(13)
(287)
197
75
(218)
54

12,423
(2,705)
(9,664)
54

D/SEC for the fraud year or three prior years, or I/B/E/S for the fraud year, were deleted for a
total of 54 useable fraud firms. Seventy-four of the 75 companies provided by Beasley (1996)
were part of the 160 deleted fraud observations. The fraud year for these 75 companies ranged
from 1978 to 1990. Governance, analyst forecasts, or financial statement data were missing for
these firms. The governance data, gathered from Compact D/SEC, were only available from 1988
and forward, and analyst forecast data, obtained from I/B/E/S, were only available from 1980 and
forward, and were relatively sparse until 1995. Note that both governance and financial statement
data were needed for the three years prior to the first fraud year.
Table 3.2 shows the industry distribution of the fraud firms by one-digit SIC groups.
Manufacturing is the largest group, making up 35.19% of the sample, followed by Personal and
Business Services (24.07%) and Wholesale and Retail (16.67%). This industry distribution is
similar to distributions of prior fraud research (Beneish 1997).
The remaining 54 fraud firms were then matched with 54 non-fraud firms based on two-digit
SIC code, firm age group and firm size, as measured by total assets in year t0. Three age groups,
over 10 years, five through 10 years, and four years were created so that a number of firms would
be available for selection when matching on size. Note that the smallest firm age is four as
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Table 3.2
Industry Distribution of Fraud Firma
2-digit SIC
10-19
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70-79
80-89
99

Industry Description
Mining and Construction
Commodity Production
Manufacturing
Transportation and Utilities
Wholesale and Retail
Financial Services (excl. 60-63)
Personal and Business Services
Health and Other Services
Nonclassifiable Establishments

Number of Firms
0
6
19
2
9
0
13
4
1
54

%
0.00%
11.11%
35.19%
3.70%
16.67%
0.00%
24.07%
7.41%
1.85%
100.00%

a

Table adapted from Beneish (1997), industry names are from the Standard Industrial
Classification Manual (1987)

Compustat and Compact/D data were required for the fraud year and the three years leading up to
the first fraud year. The matching was based on firm age before firm size based on Beneish’s
(1999) finding that matches based on age reduce the potential for omitted variable problems. The
SEC typically targets young growth firms for investigation. Thus, an omitted variable problem
can be introduced when such a firm is compared to other firms of similar size that are not young
growth firms (Beneish 1999). For example, a young growth firm could have both high
Unexpected Revenue per Employee and increased fraud likelihood. By matching based on age and
size, Beneish (1999) found that differences in terms of age, growth and ownership structure
between fraud and non-fraud firms were better controlled than when matched on only size, while
both types of matches controlled for size, liquidity, leverage, profitability and cash flows.
Because young firms are more likely to be growth firms the pair-wise matching should, at least
partially, control for growth in addition to age (Beneish 1999). In addition to matching, I also
include Asset Growth to more directly control for growth as not all high (low) growth firms are
young (old).
For the 54 matched pairs, financial statement data for the first year of the fraud and each of the
four years leading up to the first fraud year, were collected from Compustat. One-year-ahead
analyst earnings per share forecasts and actual earnings per share in the fraud year were collected
from I/B/E/S and matched to financial statement data collected from Compustat. Finally, CFO
Change and percentage of outsiders on the board, collected for use in sensitive analysis, were
collected from Compact D/SEC and manually from proxy statements.
3.4.3.2 Comparing Treatment and Control Samples
Table 3.3 contains descriptive statistics for the two samples. There was no statistical
difference between fraud and non-fraud firms for median Age (p=0.347) or Assets (p=0.702).
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Fraud firms were, however, more likely have high asset growth; 61% of the fraud firms versus
46% of non-fraud firms had high asset growth (p=0.062). Thus, the matching procedure
effectively matched fraud firms with similar non-fraud firms in terms of firm age and size.
However, the matching procedure was not as effective at eliminating differences in growth, and I,
therefore, include the variable Asset Growth to control for any possible difference in growth
between fraud and non-fraud firms.
There was no statistical difference16 between fraud and non-fraud firms for median Total
Discretionary Accruals (p=0.125), Unexpected Revenue per Employee (p=0.125), Current
Discretionary Accruals (p=0.222), Sales to Assets (p=0.222), Auditor (p=1.000) and CFO
Change (p=0.110). Forecast Attainment was significant (p=0.010), thus fraud firms were more
likely than non-fraud firms to meet or exceed analyst forecasts. Fifty-two percent of the fraud
firms had earnings equal to or greater than consensus forecasts as opposed to 30% of non-fraud
firms. These univariate results provide initial support for H2, Forecast Attainment (p=0.010), but
not for H1, Total Discretionary Accruals (p=0.125), and H3, Unexpected Revenue per Employee
(p=0.125).
The correlation matrix in Table 3.4 shows positive significant (alpha<0.05) correlations
between Fraud and three independent variables: Total Discretionary Accruals (r=0.17), Forecast
Attainment (r=0.23) and Unexpected Revenue per Employee (r=0.16); and marginally significant
relation between Asset Growth and Fraud (r=0.15). Firms are seemingly more likely to have
committed fraud if they have high Total Discretionary Accruals, meet or exceed analyst
forecasts, have high Unexpected Revenue per Employee or have high Asset Growth.
3.5. Results
3.5.1

Hypotheses Testing

The dependent variable, whether a firm has committed fraud, is dichotomous; therefore
logistic regression is used to evaluate the model. The primary assumptions for logistic regression
are as follows. (1) Binomial Distribution - the dependent variable must follow a binomial
distribution. As there are only two potential outcomes, fraud and not fraud, this assumption is
satisfied. (2) Bernoulli Distribution - the dependent variable classes must be mutually exclusive.
This assumption is satisfied, as financial statements are either fraudulent or non-fraudulent, and

16

One-tailed tests reported for estimates in the direction predicted, all other two-tailed, unless noted

otherwise.
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Variablesb
Total Discretionary Accruals
Forecast Attainment
Unexpected Revenue per Employee
Current Discretionary Accruals
Sales to Assets
Auditor
Asset Growth
CFO Change
Firm Age
Assets

Table 3.3
Sample Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables
Fraud Observations (n=54)
Non-Fraud Observations (n=54)
Mean
Std
Min
Median Max
Mean
Std
Min
Median Max
0.15
0.51
-1.25
0.07
2.65
0.02
0.23
-0.58
0.03
0.50
0.52
0.50
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.30
0.46
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.04
0.38
-1.12
0.00
1.29
-0.07
0.26
-0.69
-0.02
1.07
0.00
0.20
-1.03
0.01
0.67
0.00
0.13
-0.32
0.00
0.53
1.16
0.64
0.09
1.09
3.42
1.24
0.76
0.30
1.16
4.13
0.96
0.19
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.96
0.19
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.61
0.49
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.46
0.50
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.15
0.36
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.07
0.26
0.00
0.00
1.00
15.3
10.1
4.00
13.0
33.0
11.1
5.76
4.00
11.5
22.0
3254
6993
21.8
386 33381
2595
5802
25.83
361 31749

Diff
p-stata
0.125
0.010
0.125
0.222
0.222
1.000
0.062
0.110
0.347
0.702

a

Median χ2 pair-wise comparison between fraud and non-fraud sample for continuous variables, Pearson χ2 for dichotomous variables. One-tailed tests reported
for estimates in the direction predicted, all other two-tailed.
b
Total Discretionary Accrualsj,t, is the total amount of discretionary accruals deflated by assets in the beginning of the year in the three years leading up to the
fraud year. Discretionary accruals in year t0 is estimated using the extended version of the modified Jones model (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995; Kasznik
1999). Discretionary accruals DAj,t is calculated as estimated nondiscretionary accruals minus total accruals. Total accruals is income before extraordinary items
(#18) minus cash flow from operations (#308). To obtain nondiscretionary accruals, NDAj,t, for firm j in year t0 regression parameters are first estimated in cross
section for all firms in the same major industry group J (two-digit sic): TA j ,t = α 0 / A j ,t −1 + α1 (∆REV j ,t − ∆REC j ,t ) + α 2 PPE j ,t + α 3 ∆CFO j ,t . These parameter
estimates are then used to derive estimated nondiscretionary accruals: NDˆ A j ,t = αˆ 0, j + αˆ1, j (∆REV j ,t − ∆REC j ,t ) + αˆ 2, j PPE j ,t + αˆ 3, j ∆CFO j ,t , where ∆REVj,t is
the change in revenue (#12), ∆RECj,t is the change in receivables (#2) and ∆CFOj,t is the change in cash flow from operations from time t-1 to t0; and PPEj,t is
gross property, plant and equipment (#8) at time t0. All values are deflated by A j,t-1, firm j’s assets (#6) at time t-1. Forecast Attainment is a dummy variable,
equal to 1 if analyst forecast were met or exceeded and 0 otherwise (I/B/E/S). Unexpected Revenue per Employee for firm j in industry J is the difference
between the % change in revenue per employee, RE=total sales (#12) divided by the number of employees (#29), of j and the % change in revenue per employee
of J: Unexpected Revenue per Employee = (REjt - REjt-1)/REjt-1 - (REJt - REJt-1)/REJt-1. Current Discretionary Accruals is the discretionary accruals in year t0, see
definition in Total Discretionary Accruals. Sales to Assets = net sales / assets. Auditor is a dummy variable equal to 1 if auditor was a Big 4 audit firm (#149) and
0 otherwise. Asset Growth is a dummy variable equal to 1 if total assets exceeds 110% of the previous year’s value and 0 otherwise. CFO Change is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if CFO has changed in the three years leading up to the first fraud year and 0 otherwise. Firm Age is the number of years between t0 and the
first year data are reported for the company in Compustat. Assets is total assets of firm j.
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Table 3.4
Pearson and Spearman Correlations a for Study Variablesb

Fraud
Fraud
Total Discretionary
Accruals
Forecast Attainment
Unexpected Revenue
per Employee
Current Discretionary
Accruals
Sales to Assets
Auditor
Asset Growth
CFO Change
a
b

1.00
0.17
(0.08)
0.23
(0.02)
0.16
(0.10)
0.01
(0.90)
-0.06
(0.54)
0.00
(1.00)
0.15
(0.13)
0.12
(0.23)

Total
Discretionary Forecast
Accruals
Attainment
0.14
(0.14)
1.00
0.02
(0.86)
-0.01
(0.93)
0.34
(0.00)
0.06
(0.52)
-0.04
(0.72)
0.03
(0.79)
-0.13
(0.19)

0.23
(0.02)
-0.05
(0.59)
1.00
-0.08
(0.43)
-0.02
(0.82)
0.04
(0.68)
0.06
(0.52)
0.09
(0.36)
-0.05
(0.58)

Unexpected
Revenue
Per
Employee
0.15
(0.11)
-0.02
(0.82)
-0.11
(0.25)
1.00
-0.01
(0.92)
0.05
(0.64)
-0.12
(0.21)
-0.09
(0.38)
0.07
(0.49)

Current
Discretionary
Accruals

Sales
to
Assets

0.04
(0.69)
0.28
(0.00)
-0.06
(0.55)
-0.05
(0.64)

-0.06
(0.57)
-0.01
(0.90)
0.09
(0.35)
0.13
(0.17)
0.08
(0.40)

1.00
0.03
(0.75)
0.01
(0.96)
0.10
(0.32)
0.02
(0.81)

1.00
-0.03
(0.75)
-0.02
(0.84)
0.01
(0.94)

Asset
Auditor Growth
0.00
(1.00)
-0.12
(0.23)
0.06
(0.52)
-0.11
(0.24)
-0.01
(0.92)
-0.03
(0.77)
1.00
0.11
(0.25)
-0.24
(0.01)

0.15
(0.13)
-0.08
(0.43)
0.09
(0.36)
-0.03
(0.76)
0.13
(0.18)
-0.09
(0.38)
0.11
(0.25)
1.00
-0.09
(0.38)

Pearson correlations are below and Spearman correlations are above the diagonal. Two-tailed p-values reported within parentheses.
Please refer to footnotes in Table 3.3 for variable definitions.
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CFO
Change
0.12
(0.23)
-0.07
(0.46)
-0.05
(0.58)
0.06
(0.55)
0.02
(0.82)
0.03
(0.77)
-0.24
(0.01)
-0.09
(0.38)
1.00

cannot be both fraudulent and non-fraudulent. (3) Independent Observations - the observations
are independent as the order of the observations in the sample is irrelevant, i.e., I do not have
time-series data, and there is only one observation per firm.
The model estimates in logistic regression can be sensitive to outliers and multicollinearity.
Although the firms were matched based on major industry, age and size, the descriptive statistics
indicate the possibility of outliers in the sample, for example the median Assets for fraud (nonfraud) firms is $386 ($361) as compared to a mean of $3,254 ($2,595), with a minimum of $22
($26) and a maximum of $33,381 ($31,749).
To evaluate the impact of potential outliers I used Pearson residuals. One observation had
Pearson residuals above 2. For this observation all continuous measures were truncated at a plus
minus two standard deviations.17 I did not find any evidence of multicollinearity; the highest
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was 1.11, which is relatively low, and the highest condition index
among the continuous variables was 6.00. Based on these findings I did not discard any variables
due to multicollinearity.
The results in Table 3.5 show that: (1) Total Discretionary Accruals is positively related to
Fraud (p=0.009); (2) Forecast Attainment is positively related to Fraud (p=0.004); and (3)
Unexpected Revenue per Employee is positively related to Fraud (p=0.016). The positive relation
between total prior discretionary accruals and fraud, supports H1, which states that total prior
discretionary accruals is positively related to the likelihood of Fraud (p=0.009). H2,
hypothesizing that firms that meet or exceed analyst forecasts are more likely to have committed
fraud than firms that fail to meet analyst forecasts, is supported by the positive relation between
Forecast Attainment and Fraud (p=0.004). Finally, the results, showing a positive relation
between Unexpected Revenue per Employee and Fraud (p=0.016), provide support for H3, stating
that unexpected labor productivity is positively related to the likelihood of fraud. Thus, H1, H2
and H3 are supported.
The logit estimates for Total Discretionary Accruals, Forecast Attainment and Unexpected
Revenue per Employee are 1.641, 0.573 and 1.445, respectively. Thus, as Total Discretionary

17

I also examined the hypotheses after: (1) deleting the outlier from the sample; (2) deleting the outlier and

the outlier’s matched non-fraud firm from the sample; and (3) including the outlier in the model without
truncating it. The results obtained from these three sensitivity analyses were equivalent to the reported
results.
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Table 3.5
The Effect of Total Discretionary Accruals, Forecast Attainment and Unexpected
Revenue per Employee on Financial Statement Fraud Likelihood
a
Logistic Regression Results
Variable

χ2

prob>χ2

(?)

0.065

0.746

0.01

0.931

Tests for Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3
Total Discretionary Accruals
Forecast Attainment
Unexpected Revenue per Employee

(+)
(+)
(+)

1.641
0.573
1.445

0.789
0.225
0.713

5.66
6.86
4.55

0.009
0.004
0.016

Control Variables
Current Discretionary Accruals
Sales to Assets
Auditor
Asset Growth
CFO Change

(+)
(-)
(-)
(+)
(+)

-0.875
-0.327
0.192
0.359
1.304

1.554
0.319
0.629
0.217
0.726

0.34
1.09
0.09
2.80
3.49

0.560
0.148
0.759
0.047
0.031

2

b

Prediction Estimate

Standard
Error

Intercept

Pseudo R2

a

b

0.135

χ -test of model fit

20.15 (p=0.010)

n

108
Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests, one-tailed tests reported for estimates in the direction of the
prediction, all other two-tailed.
Dependent variable is financial statement fraud likelihood; please refer to footnotes in Table 3.3
for variable definitions.

Accruals increases by one unit, the odds of fraud increase by a factor of 5.1618, holding the other
variables constant. The odds of fraud are higher by a factor of 1.77 for companies that meet or
exceed analyst forecasts than for companies that do not meet or exceed analyst forecasts, holding
the other variables constant. As Unexpected Revenue per Employee increases by one unit, the
odds of fraud increase by a factor of 4.24, holding the other variables constant. In terms of the
control variables, the positive relation between CFO Change and Fraud (p=0.031) indicate that
firms that have had CFO turnover in the three years leading up to the first fraud year are more
likely to have committed fraud than firms that have had the same CFO during this period. Asset
Growth was also positively related to Fraud (p=0.047), which indicates that high growth firms
are more likely to have committed fraud than firms that are not high growth firms. Sales to Assets
(p=0.148), Current Discretionary Accruals (p=0.560) and Auditor (p=0.759) were insignificant. It
18

Odds ratios of fraud are calculated by applying the exponential function to the logit estimates, i.e., the

base of the natural logarithm is raised by the logit estimates. For example, 5.16=e^1.641, where e≈2.718.
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is interesting to note that Total Discretionary Accruals is positive and significant and that Current
Discretionary Accruals is insignificant. This indicates, tentatively, that the relation between Total
Discretionary Accruals and fraud is not driven by management character, i.e., poor set of ethical
values, explaining both earnings management and current year fraud.
While Sales to Assets is insignificant (p=0.148) the direction is negative as expected. When
removing Sales to Assets from the model, Unexpected Revenue per Employee remains positive
and significant (p=0.019). When removing Unexpected Revenue per Employee from the model,
Sales to Assets remains negative an insignificant (p=0.186). Thus, it appears, as discussed earlier,
that Unexpected Revenue per Employee and Sales to Assets capture different aspects of
productivity. The positive and significant result for Unexpected Revenue per Employee indicates
that Unexpected Revenue per Employee captures fraudulent revenue manipulation. While the
negative, though insignificant, result for Sales to Assets provides some tentative indication of
Sales to Assets capturing the relatively poor actual productivity of fraud firms, which puts
pressure on these firms to commit fraud.
3.6. Additional Analyses
I next examine the sensitivity of the reported results (Section 3.6.1) and the appropriateness of
variable design choices (Section 3.6.2). The sensitivity of the relation between Total
Discretionary Accruals and Fraud to the use of a different discretionary accruals measure and to
the inclusion of two real activities manipulation measures is examined in Section 3.6.1.1 and
Section 3.6.1.2, respectively. Section 3.6.1.3 evaluates the sensitive of the results to the inclusion
of additional control variables, while Section 3.6.1.4 evaluates the sensitivity of the results to the
exclusion of industries.
The labor productivity measures used in Unexpected Revenue per Employee is compared to
two similar measures that have been proposed in concurrent research in Section 3.6.2.1. Section
3.6.2.2 compares the aggregation period used to calculate Total Discretionary Accruals to two
shorter periods. Section 3.6.2.3 provides an evaluation of the appropriateness of using the earliest
one-year ahead analyst consensus forecast for calculating Forecast Attainment.
3.6.1

Sensitivity Analyses

3.6.1.1 Discretionary Accruals
As a sensitivity analysis of the relation between Total Discretionary Accruals and Fraud I
used an alternative cash flow statement based measure of discretionary accruals from Hribar and
Collins (2002). This measure, Total Cash Based Discretionary Accruals calculates total accruals
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as net income (#172) minus cash flow from operations. Discretionary accruals and nondiscretionary accruals are estimated following equations (27), (28) and (29), respectively. The
results (see Table 3.6) were qualitatively the same, more specifically Total Discretionary
Accruals derived using this alternative accruals measure remains positively (p=0.014) related to
Fraud.
Table 3.6
Alternative Total Discretionary Accruals Measure
a
Logistic Regression Results
Variable

b

Prediction

Intercept
Cash Based Discretionary Accruals
Forecast Attainment
Unexpected Revenue per Employee
Current Discretionary Accruals
Sales to Assets
Auditor
Asset Growth
CFO Change
Pseudo R2
2

Estimate

(?)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(-)
(-)
(+)
(+)

Standard
Error

0.081
1.527
0.565
1.422
-0.761
-0.330
0.187
0.351
1.345
19.32 (p=0.013)

n

108

b

prob>χ2

0.010
4.827
6.728
4.443
0.278
1.120
0.090
2.706
3.609

0.913
0.014
0.005
0.018
0.598
0.145
0.765
0.050
0.029

0.129

χ -test of model fit
a

0.745
0.785
0.224
0.710
1.485
0.319
0.628
0.215
0.738

χ2

Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests, one-tailed tests reported for estimates in the direction of the prediction, all
other two-tailed.
Dependent variable is financial statement fraud likelihood; Total Cash Based Discretionary Accruals is
calculated using a cash based measure of total accruals, net income (#172) minus total cash from
operations. This cash based measure of TA is then used to estimate discretionary accruals and nondiscretionary accruals following equations (27), (28) and (29), respectively. Please refer to footnotes in
table 3.3 for definitions of all other variables.

3.6.1.2 Real Activities Manipulation
Research has shown that in addition to using discretionary accruals to manage earnings,
managers use real activities manipulation (Roychowdhury 2006). Real activities manipulation
could, conceptually, be positively related to both Total Discretionary Accruals and Fraud if real
activities manipulation is captured in discretionary accruals and if this manipulation is
subsequently detected or leads to fraud. Thus, I evaluate if real activities manipulation is an
omitted variable. This evaluation also provides some insight into whether the earnings reversal
hypothesis can be applied to real activities manipulation.
I add two real activities manipulation measures to model 33, Abnormal Production Costs and
Abnormal Discretionary Expenditures (Roychowdhury 2006), each summed over the three years
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leading up to the first fraud year. Production costs are the sum of cost of goods sold and change in
inventory. Abnormal Production Costs is the residual from a regression model estimating normal
production costs using current sales, change in sales between t0 and t-1 and change in sales
between t-1 and t-2, all variables are deflated by beginning of the period assets. Discretionary
Expenditures are the sum of advertising expenses, R&D expenses, and selling, general and
administrative expense. Abnormal Discretionary Expenditures is the residual from a regression
model estimating normal discretionary expenditures using sales in t-1, all variables are deflated by
t-1 assets. Please refer to Roychowdhury (2006) for details on how to compute these measures.
The results in Table 3.7 show that Total Discretionary Accruals remain positive and
significant (p=0.002), and that both Abnormal Discretionary Expenditures (p=0.027) and
Abnormal Production Costs (p=0.033) are positive and significant. The positive relation between
Abnormal Discretionary Expenditures and fraud was not expected19. Based on the idea that
managers that manipulate earnings using real activities will reduce discretionary expenditures, I
was expecting a negative relation between Abnormal Discretionary Expenditures in prior years
and Fraud. Managers will over time run out of ways to manipulate earnings using real activities
manipulation just like they do when they manipulate earnings using discretionary accruals. For
example, if discretionary expenditures, such as research and development, are reduced to increase
earnings then further reductions will eventually become difficult as there are limits to how much
these real activities can be manipulated. Furthermore, by manipulating earnings using real
activities manipulation the firm does not operate at an optimal level, at least not what
management would consider optimal, and the firm becomes less likely to perform well in
subsequent years. The deterioration in performance will pressure management to increase revenue
and as the flexibility to manipulate earnings using real activities manipulation is reduced through
earlier manipulation, it becomes more likely that the manager will commit fraud to increase
revenue. A potential explanation for the unexpected positive relation could be that abnormally
high discretionary expenditures in prior years indicate inefficient use of resources in prior years
that lead to poor performance in subsequent years, and this poor performance puts pressure on
management to commit fraud to manipulate earnings. The relation between Abnormal Production
Costs is in the direction that the earnings reversal hypothesis would predict, indicating that as
managers manipulate earnings using real activities in prior years they are more likely to commit

19

I did not find any evidence of multicollinearity; the highest VIF was 1.48, which is relatively low.
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Table 3.7
Total Discretionary Accruals, Real Activities
Manipulation and Financial Statement Fraud
Logistic Regression Resultsa
Variable

b

Prediction

Intercept
Total Discretionary Accruals
Forecast Attainment
Unexpected Revenue per Employee
Abnormal Production Costs
Abnormal Discretionary Expenditures
Current Discretionary Accruals
Sales to Assets
Auditor
Asset Growth
CFO Change
Pseudo R2
2

Estimate

(?)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(-)
(+)
(-)
(-)
(+)
(+)

Standard
Error

0.331
2.286
0.527
1.300
0.802
0.885
-0.433
-0.435
0.077
0.465
1.300
25.14 (p=0.005)

n

100c

b

c

prob>χ2

0.160
8.766
4.793
3.262
3.361
4.888
0.070
1.574
0.012
3.993
3.274

0.691
0.002
0.014
0.035
0.033
0.027
0.791
0.105
0.912
0.023
0.035

0.183

χ -test of model fit
a

0.832
0.870
0.247
0.744
0.437
0.431
1.660
0.357
0.697
0.237
0.745

χ2

Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests, one-tailed tests reported for estimates in the direction of the prediction, all
other two-tailed.
Dependent variable is financial statement fraud likelihood; Abnormal Production Costs is the residual
from a regression model estimating normal production costs using production costs (defined as the sum
of cost of goods sold and change in inventory), current sales, change in sales between t0 and t-1 and
change in sales between t-1 and t-2, all variables are deflated by t-1 assets. Abnormal Discretionary
Expenditures is the residual from a regression model estimating normal discretionary expenditures using
discretionary expenditures (defined as the sum of advertising expenses, R&D expenses, and selling,
general and administrative expense) and sales in t-1, all variables are deflated by t-1 assets. Please refer
to footnotes in table 3.3 for definitions of all other variables.
The sample was reduced by four matched pairs because discretionary expenditures data were not
available for all firms.

fraud in subsequent years. Finally, note that the relation between Total Discretionary Accruals
and Fraud is robust to the inclusion of the two real activities manipulation measures.
3.6.1.3 Additional Control Variables
As a sensitivity analysis I also added the other five variables found to be significant predictors
of fraud in Fanning and Cogger (1998), and total assets, total sales and sales growth, as controls.
The five additional variables in Fanning and Cogger 1998 are as follows. (1) Accounts
Receivable Growth measured as a dummy variable equal to one if accounts receivable exceeds
110% of the previous year’s value and zero otherwise. Given that accounts receivables often
increases as a result of fraud, a positive relation is expected between Accounts Receivable
Growth and Fraud.
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Note that this information is captured in Current Discretionary Accruals. (2) Debt to Equity is
the ratio of debt to equity (leverage) and is expected to be positively related to Fraud given that
higher levels of leverage put more pressure on management to meet debt covenants. (3) Gross
Margin Percentage is a dummy variable that is one if the gross margin percentage exceeds 110%
of the previous year’s value and zero otherwise; assuming that the gross margin percentage
improves as a result of fraud, a positive relation is expected between Gross Margin Percentage
and Fraud. (4) LIFO is a dummy variable that is one if the last-in-first-out inventory method is
used and zero otherwise. Given that prices were generally rising during the examined period,
LIFO is expected to be negatively related to Fraud as the usage of last-in-first-out, relative to
first-in-first-out, decreases earnings when prices are rising. (5) The Percentage of Executive
Directors on the board of directors is expected to be positively related to Fraud as the
independence and monitoring effectiveness of the board of directors is reduced by including
company executives on the board. The other additional control variables in the sensitivity analysis
are defined as follows. (1) Assets is expected to be negatively related to Fraud given that small
growth firms are more likely to be investigated by the SEC (Beneish 1999) than larger slower
growing firms. (2) Sales is expected to be negatively related to Fraud given that small growth
firms are more likely to be investigated by the SEC (Beneish 1999) than larger, slower growing
firms. (3) Sales Growth is a dummy variable that measures whether sales exceeds 110% of the
previous year’s sales and is expected to be positively related to Fraud given that small growth
firms are more likely to be investigated by the SEC (Beneish 1999) than larger, slower growing
firms. The results (see Table 3.8) obtained from the sensitivity analysis were equivalent to the
reported results with the exception that Asset Growth became insignificant (p=0.463). Note that
both Sales Growth (p=0.157) and Asset Growth are measures of firm growth. Debt to Equity was
additionally positive and marginally significant at (p=0.062).
3.6.1.4 Industry Clustering
I next investigate potential industry differences in the effect of Total Discretionary Accruals,
Forecast Attainment and Unexpected Revenue per Employee on Fraud. I first add dummy
variables for the seven one-digit SIC industries represented in the sample to model 33. The results
(Table 3.9) show insignificant industry dummies (p>0.398) and that the interpretation of the other
variables does not change when the industry dummy’s are included in the main model, except for
that Sales to Assets becomes marginally significant (p=0.090).
Due to sample size limitations I cannot, however, test the significance and direction of Total
Discretionary Accruals, Forecast Attainment and Unexpected Revenue per Employee within each
industry. I instead create seven subsamples by excluding, from each subsample, all firms
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belonging to one of the industries. Using model 33, I then examine the significance and direction
of Total Discretionary Accruals, Forecast Attainment and Unexpected Revenue per Employee
within each subsample. The results (untabulated) show that Total Discretionary Accruals remains
positive and significant (p<0.028) in six subsamples, and positive and marginally significant
(p=0.054) when Personal and Business Services firms are excluded. Forecast Attainment remains
positive and significant (p<0.008) in six subsamples, and positive but insignificant (p=0.106)
when Wholesale and Retail firms are excluded. Unexpected Revenue per Employee remains
positive and significant (p<0.034) in six subsamples, and positive but insignificant (p=0.161)
Table 3.8
Additional Control Variables
a
Logistic Regression Results
Variable

b

Intercept
Total Discretionary Accruals
Forecast Attainment
Unexpected Revenue per Employee
Current Discretionary Accruals
Sales to Assets
Auditor
Asset Growth
CFO Change
Account Receivable Growth
Debt to Equity
Gross Margin Percentage
LIFO
Percentage of Executive Directors
Assets
Sales
Sales Growth
Pseudo R2
2

Estimate

Prediction
(?)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(-)
(-)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(-)
(+)
(-)
(-)
(+)

Standard
Error

-0.273
1.619
0.486
1.226
-0.851
-0.334
0.170
0.032
1.336
0.279
0.135
0.259
0.013
1.200
0.000
0.000
0.320
25.56 (p=0.061)

n

108

b

prob>χ2

0.060
5.023
3.877
2.993
0.304
0.772
0.071
0.009
3.149
1.040
2.357
0.356
0.001
0.889
0.001
0.008
1.013

0.812
0.013
0.025
0.042
0.581
0.190
0.790
0.463
0.038
0.154
0.062
0.275
0.979
0.173
0.490
0.929
0.157

0.171

χ -test of model fit
a

1.148
0.817
0.251
0.725
1.599
0.385
0.646
0.339
0.777
0.274
0.109
0.434
0.495
1.276
0.000
000
0.319

χ2

Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests, one-tailed tests reported for estimates in the direction of the
prediction, all other two-tailed.
Dependent variable is financial statement fraud likelihood; Account Receivable Growth is a
dummy variable equal to one if accounts receivable exceeds 110% of the previous year’s
value and zero otherwise. Debt to Equity is the ratio of debt to equity. Gross Margin
Percentage is a dummy variable that is one if the gross margin percentage exceeds 110% of
the previous year’s value and zero otherwise. LIFO is a dummy variable that is one if the last
in first out inventory method is used and zero otherwise. The Percentage of Executive
Directors is the percentage of all directors on the board of directors that are company
executives. Sales is total sales. Sales Growth is a dummy variable that measures whether
assets exceeds 110% of the previous year’s assets. Please refer to footnotes in table 3.3 for
definitions of all other variables.
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when Manufacturing firms are excluded. Note that the results only changed to marginally
significant or insignificant in three out of 21 tests, and that the significance levels only dropped
when one of the three industries with the largest number of observations was removed from the
sample, i.e., when the sample size was the smallest. Thus, the effects of Total Discretionary
Accruals, Forecast Attainment and Unexpected Revenue per Employee on Fraud appear to be
relatively robust for different industries.
3.6.2

Alternative Measure Design

3.6.2.1 Revenue Fraud
The measure difference between revenue growth and employee growth (DiffEmp) introduced
in a concurrent working paper (Brazel et al. 2007) is similar to percentage change in revenue per
employee (%∆RE), which is used to derive Unexpected Revenue per Employee. However, the

Table 3.9
Major Industry, Total Discretionary Accruals,
Forecast Attainment and Unexpected Revenue per Employee
a
Logistic Regression Results
Variable

b

Prediction

Intercept
Total Discretionary Accruals
Forecast Attainment
Unexpected Revenue per Employee
Current Discretionary Accruals
Sales to Assets
Auditor
Asset Growth
CFO Change
Major Industry = 2
Major Industry = 3
Major Industry = 4
Major Industry = 5
Major Industry = 7
Major Industry = 8
Pseudo R2
2

Estimate

(?)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(-)
(-)
(+)
(+)
?
?
?
?
?
?

Standard
Error

0.514
1.576
0.612
1.781
-1.210
-0.530
0.047
0.405
1.318
0.221
-0.226
-0.122
0.398
-0.449
0.578
22.08 (p=0.077)

n

108

b

0.350
5.532
7.453
5.918
0.587
1.793
0.005
3.297
3.437
0.120
0.250
0.020
0.350
0.710
0.590

prob>χ2
0.557
0.009
0.003
0.008
0.444
0.090
0.944
0.035
0.032
0.724
0.614
0.902
0.556
0.398
0.443

0.1475

χ -test of model fit
a

0.875
0.773
0.232
0.775
1.664
0.409
0.670
0.227
0.739
0.628
0.447
0.994
0.677
0.531
0.753

χ2

Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests, one-tailed tests reported for estimates in the direction of the
prediction, all other two-tailed.
Dependent variable is financial statement fraud likelihood; Major Industry are dummy variables
for the seven one-digit SIC code industries represented in the sample. Please refer to footnotes in
table 3.3 for definitions of all other variables.
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conceptual basis for using the measures differs, leading to differences in definitions and what is
actually measured. DiffEmp, defined as

revt − revt −1 empt − empt −1
−
, is based on the idea that
revt −1
empt −1

nonfinancial measures that are highly correlated to performance and that at the same time are
difficult to manipulate can be used to evaluate the reasonableness of changes in firm
performance. Unexpected Revenue per Employee started with the idea that revenue manipulation
is difficult to detect in the revenue account, as revenue varies for reasons other than fraud, and
that some of this variation can be removed by deflating revenue by a production process input
variable. The number of employees was selected as the deflator rather than assets as the number
of employees is not impacted by revenue fraud when the fraudulent revenue is recorded following
the double-entry system. The primary difference between the two measures is how they adjust
revenue growth using employee growth. Note that both measures are based on the idea that there
is a relatively constant relation between the number of employees and revenue. Thus, if the
number of employees grows by 10%, both measures assume that revenue should also grow by
10%, and vice versa. The two measures, however, differ in how the difference between expected
and actual revenue is measured. Diffemp is increasing in the absolute difference between
expected revenue growth and actual revenue growth, while %∆RE is increasing in the ratio of
expected revenue growth to actual revenue growth. To clarify, take company A that is growing at
a rate of 10% as indicated by the number of employees growing by a rate of 10% and company B
that is growing at a rate of 100%. Further assume that both companies fraudulently increase
revenue by 30% over what could be expected given prior revenue, prior number of employees
and current number of employees. Thus, in absolute terms, company B manipulated revenue more
than company A, but as a percentage of expected revenue there was no difference between the
two firms. In this situation Diffemp is 0.33 for company A and 0.6 for company B, while

%∆RE is 0.3 for both company A and company B. Assuming a constant percentage manipulation
over expected revenue Diffemp is, while %∆RE is not, increasing in the percentage change in the
number of employees. Based on this discussion I expect that %∆RE models will provide better
fit and predictive ability than Diffemp models, when the models do not control for firm growth,
and that their performance will be similar when the models control for firm growth using
employee growth.
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Using model 33 without a control for firm growth (removing Asset Growth from the model)
and replacing Unexpected Revenue per Employee with %∆RE , %∆RE is in the expected
direction and significant (p=0.016), see column 1 in Table 3.10. When replacing Unexpected
Revenue per Employee with Diffemp, Diffemp is in the expected direction, but only marginally
significant (p=0.067), see column 2 in Table 3.10. Using the same models but adding a control
for employee growth, %∆RE is in the expected direction and significant (p=0.003) and Diffemp
is in the expected direction and significant (p=0.003), see Table 3.10 columns 3 and 4,
respectively. These results support the analytical analysis by indicating that when controlling for
employee growth the two measures are equivalent, but that without a control for employee
growth, the percentage change in revenue per employee %∆RE is a better predictor of fraud than
Diffemp.

Table 3.10
Comparison of %∆RE and Diffemp
Logistic Regression Resultsa

Variable

b

Prediction

Intercept
Total Discretionary Accruals
Forecast Attainment
%∆RE
Diffemp
Current Discretionary Accruals
Sales to Assets
Auditor
CFO Change
Employee Growth
Pseudo R2
χ2-test of model fit
n
a

b

(?)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(-)
(-)
(+)
(+)

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Estim- prob Estim- prob> Estim- prob Estim- prob
ate
>χ2
ate
χ2
ate
>χ2
ate
>χ2
0.572
1.551
0.575
1.690
-0.743
-0.333
0.218
0.597

0.448 0.635 0.384 0.385 0.614
0.011 1.524 0.011 1.519 0.016
0.004 0.575 0.004 0.518 0.009
0.016
2.552 0.003
0.882 0.067
0.614 -0.690 0.634 -0.818 0.624
0.146 -0.312 0.160 -0.322 0.151
0.722 0.200 0.737 0.178 0.773
0.041 0.589 0.041 0.644 0.032
1.282 0.029

0.119
17.74
(p=0.013)
108

0.103
15.41
(p=0.031)
108

0.1426
21.35
(p=0.006)
108

0.419 0.574
1.556 0.014
0.537 0.007
2.357
-1.11
-0.31
0.149
0.669
1.989

0.003
0.529
0.159
0.804
0.028
0.008

0.1417
21.22
(p=0.007)
108

Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests, one-tailed tests reported for estimates in the direction of the prediction,
all other two-tailed.
Dependent variable is financial statement fraud likelihood; %∆RE is defined as

revt
revt −1
revt −1
rev t − revt −1 emp t − emp t −1
−
) /(
) , DiffEmp, is defined as
−
, and
emp t emp t −1 emp t −1
rev t −1
emp t −1
emp t − emp t −1
Employee Growth is defined as
. Please refer to footnotes in table 3.3 for
emp t −1
(

definitions of all other variables.
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To further substantiate this claim I perform a nested F-test where the fit of a reduced model is
compared to full models. The reduced model includes all variables reported in Table 3.10 except
for %∆RE or Diffemp, see column 3 in Table 3.11. The full models include %∆RE or Diffemp,
see columns 1 and 2 in Table 3.11, respectively. The log likelihood values of the full models are
then compared to the log likelihood value of the reduced model. The results show that only the

%∆RE model (column 1, Table 3.11) significantly (p=0.032) improves the fit of the reduced
model.
I also evaluate the predictive ability of the %∆RE model to the predictive ability of the
Diffemp model. The prediction errors of the %∆RE model are significantly lower than the

Table 3.11
Comparison of Model Fit and Predictive Ability of %∆RE and Diffemp
a
Logistic Regression Results
(1)
Variable

b

Prediction

Intercept
Total Discretionary Accruals
Forecast Attainment
%∆RE
Diffemp
Current Discretionary Accruals
Sales to Assets
Auditor
CFO Change
Pseudo R2
χ2-test of model fit
Diffχ2full -χ2reduced
Predictive Ability (Mean Diff.)
Predictive Ability (Wilcoxon)
n
a

b

(?)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(-)
(-)
(+)

Estimate
0.572
1.551
0.575
1.690

(2)

prob>χ

Estimate

0.448
0.011
0.004

0.635
1.524
0.575

2

(3)

prob>χ

Estimate

prob>χ2

0.384
0.011
0.004

0.632
1.443
0.530

0.367
0.013
0.006

2

0.016

0.882 0.067
-0.743 0.614 -0.690 0.634
-0.333 0.146 -0.312 0.160
0.218 0.722
0.200 0.737
0.597 0.041
0.589 0.041
0.119
0.103
15.41
17.74 (p=0.013) (p=0.031)
4.58 (p=0.032)
2.29 (p=0.134)
p=0.045
z=0.006
108
108

-0.557 0.689
-0.271 0.182
0.171 0.767
0.591 0.040
0.0879
13.16
(p=0.041)

108

Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests, one-tailed tests reported for estimates in the direction of the
prediction, all other two-tailed.
Dependent variable is financial statement fraud likelihood; %∆RE is defined as

(

revt
revt −1
revt −1
rev t − revt −1 emp t − emp t −1
−
) /(
) , and DiffEmp is defined as
−
.
emp t emp t −1 emp t −1
rev t −1
emp t −1

Please refer to footnotes in table 3.3 for definitions of all other variables.
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prediction errors of the Diffemp model (Wilcoxon, z=0.006; mean difference, p=0.045). The
nested F-test evaluation and the predictive ability comparison provide further support that

%∆RE is a better predictor of Fraud than Diffemp. Recall that Unexpected Revenue per
Employee is defined as the difference between a firm’s %∆RE and the %∆RE of the firm’s
industry. Diffemp is, however, not adjusted for industry differences and as such I used %∆RE
instead of Unexpected Revenue per Employee in the comparison just described. The specific
form of the capital productivity measure and whether the industry adjustment adds value are
empirical questions that I leave unanswered for future research to explore.
Dechow et al. (2007) also introduce an employee based fraud indicator, Abnormal Change in
Employees defined as the percentage change in employees minus the percentage change in assets.
This measure is very similar to the measure introduced in Brazel et al. (2007), though neither
study discusses the other measure. I focus on comparing Unexpected Employee Revenue to
Diffemp in this supplemental analysis as Diffemp is closer in nature than Abnormal Change in
Employees to Unexpected Employee Revenue. I nevertheless provide some brief results from
analyses of Abnormal Change in Employees. Since the correlation between Abnormal Change in
Employees and Unexpected Revenue per Employee is low (r=-0.103), I include these two
variables in the same model. The results in Table 3.12 show that Unexpected Revenue per
Employee is in the direction expected and significant (p=0.018), while Abnormal Change in
Employees is insignificant (p=0.955).
3.6.2.2 Total Discretionary Accruals Aggregation Periods
The results of my research confirm that the likelihood of fraud is significantly (p=0.009)
higher for firms that are pressured and constrained by earnings management in prior years (Table
3.5). Total Discretionary Accruals was measured as a firm’s total discretionary accruals during
the three years leading up to the first fraud year. I chose to aggregate discretionary accruals over
multiple years based on the idea that over time discretionary accruals reverse. Three years was
used since it conceptually seems to be an appropriate time frame and based on the graphical
depiction of the relation between discretionary accruals and fraud in (Dechow et al. 1996). To
evaluate the appropriateness of this decision, I examine the relation between fraud likelihood and
discretionary accruals aggregated over the two years leading up to the first fraud year, Total
Discretionary Accruals2, and discretionary accruals in the year prior to the first fraud year, Total
Discretionary Accruals1. Using model 33 and one of the prior year(s) total discretionary accruals
measures at a time, Total Discretionary Accruals2 is in the expected direction and marginal
significant (p=0.068) and Total Discretionary Accruals1 is also in expected direction but
insignificant (p=0.108), see Table 3.13 columns 2 and 3, respectively. The Total Discretionary
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Table 3.12
Unexpected Revenue per Employee and Abnormal Change in Employees
a
Logistic Regression Results
Variable

b

Intercept
Total Discretionary Accruals
Forecast Attainment
Unexpected Revenue per Employee
Abnormal Change in Employees
Current Discretionary Accruals
Sales to Assets
Auditor
Asset Growth
CFO Change
Pseudo R2
2

Estimate

Prediction
(?)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(-)
(-)
(+)
(+)

Standard
Error

0.702
1.641
0.571
1.440
-0.042
-0.852
-0.320
0.192
0.354
0.650
25.14 (p=0.005)

n

100

b

0.770
5.600
6.737
4.398
0.003
0.291
0.901
0.095
2.376
3.441

prob>χ2
0.380
0.009
0.005
0.018
0.955
0.590
0.171
0.758
0.062
0.032

0.183

χ -test of model fit
a

0.800
0.791
0.227
0.718
0.747
1.612
0.342
0.629
0.232
0.364

χ2

c

Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests, one-tailed tests reported for estimates in the direction of the
prediction, all other two-tailed.
Dependent variable is financial statement fraud likelihood; Abnormal Change in Employees is
defined as the percentage change in employees minus the percentage change in assets. Please refer to
footnotes in table 3.3 for definitions of all other variables.

Accruals2 and the Total Discretionary Accruals1 models have Pseudo R2 values of 0.110 and
0.107, respectively. The higher p-value of Total Discretionary Accruals (p=0.009) and the higher
Pseudo R2 value of the Total Discretionary Accruals model (0.135) (Table 3.13 column 1)
indicates that Total Discretionary Accruals is a stronger predictor of Fraud than either Total
Discretionary Accruals2 or Total Discretionary Accruals1.
To further substantiate this claim I perform nested F-tests where the fit of a reduced model is
compared to a full model. The reduced model excludes the Total Discretionary Accruals variables
(column 4, Table 3.13). The full models are the three models described above. The log likelihood
of these models (columns 1, 2, and 3, Table 3.13) are then compared to the log likelihood of the
reduced model. The results show that only the Total Discretionary Accruals model (column 1,
Table 3.13) significantly (p=0.017) improves the fit of the reduced model.
I also evaluate the predictive ability of the Total Discretionary Accruals model against the
Total Discretionary Accruals2 model and Total Discretionary Accruals1 model. The prediction
errors of the Total Discretionary Accruals model are significantly lower than the prediction errors
of the Total Discretionary Accruals2 model (Wilcoxon, z=0.0007; mean difference, p=0.0102)
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Table 3.13
Three Years, Two Years and One Year Total Discretionary Accruals
a
Logistic Regression Results
(1)
b

Variable
Prediction
(?)
Intercept
Total Discretionary Accruals
(+)
Total Discretionary Accruals2
(+)
Total Discretionary Accruals1
(+)
Forecast Attainment
(+)
Unexpected Revenue per Employee
(+)
Current Discretionary Accruals
(+)
Sales to Assets
(-)
Auditor
(-)
Asset Growth
(+)
CFO Change
(+)
2
Pseudo R
χ2-test of model fit
Diffχ2full -χ2reduced
Predictive Ability (Mean Difference)
Predictive Ability (Wilcoxon)
n
a
b

Estimate
0.065
1.641

(2)
prob>χ2 Estimate
0.931
0.034
0.009
1.390

0.573
0.004
1.445
0.016
-0.875
0.560
-0.327
0.148
0.192
0.759
0.359
0.047
1.304
0.031
0.135
20.15 (p=0.010)
5.65 (p=0.017)

108

(3)
prob>χ2
0.963

Estimate
0.054

(4)
prob>χ2
0.941

Estimate prob>χ2
0.181
0.800

0.068

0.524
0.007
1.393
0.018
-0.923
0.527
-0.280
0.179
0.207
0.736
0.344
0.051
1.165
0.046
0.110
16.72 (p=0.033)
2.22 (p=0.136)
p=0.0102
z=0.0007
108

1.701
0.108
0.509
0.009
1.466
0.015
-0.656
0.655
-0.262
0.193
0.187
0.762
0.368
0.042
1.074
0.057
0.107
16.03 (p=0.042)
1.53 (p=0.216)
p=0.0098
z=0.0087
108

0.530
0.006
1.341
0.020
0.054
0.482
-0.254
0.200
0.115
0.848
0.332
0.056
0.990
0.073
0.097
14.50 (p=0.043)

108

Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests, one-tailed tests reported for estimates in the direction of the prediction, all other two-tailed.
Dependent variable is financial statement fraud likelihood; Total Discretionary Accruals is the total amount of discretionary accruals deflated
by assets in the three years leading up to the fraud year, see table 3.3 for calculation of discretionary accruals, while Total Discretionary
Accruals2 (Total Discretionary Accruals1) is the total amount of discretionary accruals in the two (one) years leading up to the fraud year.
2
2
Diffχ full -χ reduced is twice the difference in negative log-likelihoods between the reduced model in column (4) and the full models in columns
(1), (2) and (3). Predictive Ability compares the prediction errors of the full model in column (1) to the prediction errors of the full models in
column (2) and (3). Please refer to footnotes in table 3.3 for definitions of all other variables.
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Table 3.14
Alternative Analyst Forecast Measure
a
Logistic Regression Results
Variable

b

Estimate

Prediction

Intercept
Total Discretionary Accruals
Forecast Attainment (average)
Unexpected Revenue per Employee
Current Discretionary Accruals
Sales to Assets
Auditor
Asset Growth
CFO Change
Pseudo R2
2

(?)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(-)
(-)
(+)
(+)

Standard
Error

-0.112
1.576
0.336
1.206
-0.875
-0.255
0.228
0.382
1.269

15.81 (p=0.045)

n

108

b

prob>χ2

0.020
6.001
2.514
3.318
0.375
0.717
0.141
3.314
3.368

0.877
0.007
0.056
0.034
0.540
0.199
0.707
0.034
0.033

0.106

χ -test of model fit
a

0.720
0.742
0.214
0.688
1.481
0.305
0.609
0.213
0.719

χ2

Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests, one-tailed tests reported for estimates in the direction of the
prediction, all other two-tailed.
Dependent variable is financial statement fraud likelihood; Forecast Attainment (average) is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if analyst forecast were met or exceeded and 0 otherwise (I/B/E/S),
where the analyst forecast is the average of all consensus forecasts made throughout the year
leading up to the first fraud year. Please refer to footnotes in table 3.3 for definitions of all other
variables.

and the Total Discretionary Accruals1 model (Wilcoxon Sign-Rank, z=0.0087; mean difference,
p=0.0098).
To summarize, in addition to being supported conceptually and by prior empirical research,
the individual variable statistics, the nested F-test evaluation and the predictive ability
comparison, support the use of Total Discretionary Accruals over Total Discretionary Accruals1
and Total Discretionary Accruals2.
3.6.2.3 Analyst Forecast Period
I use the first forecast rather than the most current forecast because financial statement fraud
can be an on going activity occurring throughout the year. To evaluate the appropriateness of this
decision I also examined the average of all consensus forecasts made throughout the year leading
up to the first fraud year. The results were weaker but in the same direction, more specifically
meeting or exceeding analyst forecasts was positively (p=0.056) related to the likelihood of fraud
(Table 3.14). Thus, it appears that using the first forecast in the period is preferable in fraud
detection.
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3.7. Conclusions
My research objective was to improve our understanding of antecedents of fraud, and thereby
improve our ability to detect fraud. To realize this objective I developed a new measure that
aggregates discretionary accruals over the three years leading up to the first fraud year to capture
the pressure of earnings reversals and earnings management inflexibility. My results show that
firms that are running out of ways to manage earnings, and are facing accruals reversals as a
result of earnings management in prior years are more likely to commit financial statement fraud.
I also perform more in depth analyses of the earnings reversal hypothesis that provides some
initial indications that (1) the earnings reversal hypothesis also applies to real activities
manipulation, and (2) discretionary accruals should be summed over three years, rather than two
years or one year.
This study also adds to fraud research by examining whether capital market expectations
provide incentives to commit financial statement fraud. My results show that evidence of a firm
meeting or beating analyst forecasts can be used to detect financial statement fraud. Additionally,
this study adds to earnings management research investigating capital market expectation, which
typically assumes that distributional inconsistencies in reported earnings around analyst forecasts
indicate that some firms manipulated earnings to meet analyst forecasts. The results provide more
direct evidence of earnings manipulation incentives related to capital market expectations and
corroborate the findings of earnings management research.
I also develop a new productivity based measure designed to capture revenue fraud. The
results show that this measure provides utility in fraud prediction and that the inclusion of this
measure in fraud detection models improves model fit and model predictive ability more than
similar measures being proposed in contemporary research. This measure might also provide
insights to the development of new and improved discretionary accrual measures.
These results should, however, be interpreted knowing that the sample of fraud firms was
taken from SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases. Thus, I am really improving
our understanding of fraud firms investigated by the SEC and this knowledge might not fully
generalize to fraud in general.
Future research can extend this study in a number of ways. I proposed that total discretionary
accruals increase the likelihood of fraud through two processes, prior earnings management puts
pressure on management as the accruals reverse and prior earnings management constrains
current earnings management flexibility. Future research can explore these two dimensions
further and examine if only one, or if both, processes increase the likelihood of fraud. Earnings
reversals can be viewed as providing an incentive to commit fraud, while earnings management
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inflexibility is a condition that increases the likelihood of fraud given a set of incentives. Thus,
earnings management inflexibility should interact with other incentives. Future research can also
examine fraud incentives related to other capital market expectations than analyst forecasts. For
example, do firms commit fraud so they do not have to report small losses or small earnings
growth declines? Future research can also develop additional account specific fraud measures, or
even focus on specific types of fraud. I developed a measure for detecting revenue fraud because
revenue is the most commonly manipulated account. However, other accounts are also
fraudulently manipulated. Future research could design new measures for detecting fraud in these
accounts as well. These account specific measures could then be combined with non-specific
measures that measure general incentives, conditions and management character, to improve the
utility of fraud classification models. Different models could be built to identify different types of
fraud and the classifications of these individual models could then be combined into an overall
classification. Multi-classifier combination is a rich research stream in machine learning that
could provide the foundation for this research.
To summarize, the results show that the likelihood of fraud is significantly higher for firms
that meet or exceed analyst forecasts, are running out of ways to manage earnings and are facing
accrual reversals, or have high labor productivity. These findings can help the SEC, auditors,
financial institutions and others improve fraud prevention and detection, and thereby curb costs
associated with fraud and improve market efficiency. These findings are also important to
auditors that need to provide reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free
of material misstatements caused by fraud, especially during client selection and continuation
judgments, and audit planning.
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Chapter 4.

Financial Statement Fraud Detection: An Analysis of Statistical and
Machine Learning Algorithms

4.1. Introduction
Undetected financial fraud is one of the greatest risks to an organization’s
viability and corporate reputation, and it has the capacity to draw into its sphere
all associated people, not only the guilty (KPMG 2006)
- Jeffrey Lucy, Chairman, Australian Securities and Investments Commission
The cost of financial statement fraud to defrauded organizations is estimated at $340 billion20
per year in the U.S. (ACFE 2006). In addition to these direct costs, employees and investors are
impacted negatively by financial statement fraud. Fraud also undermines the trustworthiness of
corporate financial statements, which results in higher transaction costs and a less efficient
market. Auditors have, both through self regulation and legislation, assumed the responsibility of
providing reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free of material misstatement due
to error or fraud. Earlier auditing standards, i.e., Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 53,
only indirectly addressed this responsibility through references to “irregularities” (AICPA 1988).
However, more recent auditing standards, SAS No. 82 and later, make this responsibility explicit.
The auditor must provide “reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of
material misstatements, whether caused by error or fraud” (AICPA 1997, AU 110.02).
A stream of accounting research focuses on testing various statistical and data mining models
with the goal of improving fraud detection. Data mining research that focuses specifically on
financial statement fraud detection is important since the financial statement fraud domain is

20

The ACFE (2006) report provides estimates of total fraud cost, mean cost per fraud category and number

of cases. To derive the estimate for total cost of financial statement fraud, I assumed that the relative
difference in mean is similar to the relative difference in median cost among the different occupational
fraud categories.
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unique. Distinguishing characteristics that make this domain unique include: (1) the ratio of fraud
to non-fraud firms is small (high class imbalance); (2) there are different types of fraud (target
class disjunct); (3) the ratio of false positive to false negative classification error cost is small
(cost imbalance); (4) the attributes used to detect fraud are relatively noisy where similar attribute
values can signal both fraudulent and non-fraudulent activities; and (5) fraudsters actively attempt
to conceal the fraud by making the fraud firm’s attribute values look like the attribute values of
non-fraud firms. Because of the unique characteristics it is not clear, without empirical
evaluation, whether classifiers that perform well in other domains will also perform well in the
financial statement fraud domain.
The financial statement fraud research typically uses logistic regression as the baseline model
against which data mining models are tested. The data mining algorithm used in this line of
research has almost exclusively been artificial neural networks (ANN), for example Green and
Choi (1997), Lin et al. (2003), Fanning and Cogger (1998) and Feroz et al. (2000). A number of
data mining algorithms that have been found to be good predictors in other domains have not
been investigated in financial statement fraud research. Two more recent financial statement
fraud studies have included additional algorithms in their comparisons (Kotsiantis et al. 2006;
Kirkos et al. 2007). However, these comparisons were based on unrealistic ratios of fraud to nonfraud firms (1:1: and 1:3); assumed equal costs of Type I and Type II errors; and used accuracy
and error rate to measure performance, which generally are considered inappropriate for a domain
like fraud detection. Furthermore, the Kotisantis et al. (2006) and Kirkos et al. (2007) studies
included only financial ratios as predictor variables, leaving out many measures developed in
confirmatory financial statement fraud research. Thus, we know very little about what algorithms
are useful for detecting financial statement fraud, under what specific circumstances one
algorithm might be better than another and what predictors are useful for the different algorithms.
My research objective is to compare the utility of a fairly comprehensive set of data mining
algorithms in financial statement fraud prediction. More specifically, my research questions are:
1. What algorithm(s) provide the most utility given different assumptions about classification
costs and prior probabilities of fraud?
2. What predictors are useful to these algorithms when detecting financial statement fraud?
The answers to these questions are of practical value to auditors and institutions, like the
Securities and Exchange Commision (SEC). The results provide guidance as to what algorithms
and predictors to use when creating new models for financial statement fraud detection. Auditors
can use these algorithms and predictors to improve client selection, audit planning and analytical
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procedures; while the SEC can leverage the findings to target audit engagements where the
auditee is more likely to have committed financial statement fraud.
I provide an overview of related research in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 contains a description of
the experimental variables and data used to evaluate the classification algorithms, while Section
4.4 describes the experimental procedure and reports pre-processing results. The experimental
results are reported in Section 4.5. The results are summarized in Section 4.6, along with a
discussion of research contributions and limitations, and suggestions for future research.
4.2. Related Research
Research focusing on evaluating the effectiveness of different fraud prediction algorithms has
typically introduced different variations of ANN and compared these algorithms to logistic
regression. Green and Choi (1997) evaluated the performance of three ANNs with input variables
preprocessed in different ways: simple percentage change, plain sum-of-the-years’-digit weighted
average, and incremental sum-of-the-years’-digit weighted average. In an experiment with 86
SEC fraud cases matched with 86 non-fraud cases the ANNs were compared to random guessing,
defined as Type I and Type II error rates of 0.5, and summed error rate below 1. The results
showed that the ANNs performed better than random guessing on the training sample. On the
evaluation sample, however, the ANNs did not perform significantly better in terms of either
Type I or Type II errors. The summed error rate comparison did show that the ANNs performed
significantly better than random guessing, but this comparison used classification results from a
combined sample of both the training and evaluation samples.
Starting with 62 potential fraud predictors, Fanning and Cogger (1998) compared an ANN to
quadratic discriminant analysis, linear discriminant analysis and logistic regression. The ANN
correctly classified 63% of the cases, as compared to 52% for the highest benchmark algorithm
(linear discriminant analysis). However, the ANN had a lower true positive rate, defined as the
number of true positive classifications divided by the number of positive instances in the dataset,
than all three benchmark algorithms.
In both Green and Choi (1997) and Fanning and Cogger (1998) the experiments assumed that
the costs of false positive and false negative were equal and that the dataset was balanced with a
prior probability of 0.5. In reality, the probability of fraud is much smaller than 50%21, and the
cost of false negatives is often much larger than the cost of false positives. The optimal threshold

21

In one estimate the probability of fraud is 0.6% (Bell and Carcello 2000).
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for classifying a financial statement as fraudulent in discriminant analysis and logistic regression
analyses is, therefore, likely to be much lower than the default of 0.5 used in these studies. As
false positive and false negative rates do not remain constant over different threshold levels and
the relative performance of algorithms is often different at different thresholds, the assumptions
made in these studies limit our understanding of the performance of these algorithms to one
specific scenario that is unrealistic.
Using seven SAS No. 53 red-flags, Feroz et al. (2000) focused on comparing the utility of an
ANN model with logistic regression based on hit-rate, overall error rate22 and estimated relative
costs of misclassification.23 The results did not show that one algorithm was dominant at all
treatment levels where prior probabilities24 and the relative cost of different classification errors25
were manipulated. Lin et al. (2003) introduced an existing data mining algorithm, fuzzy ANN,
into the accounting domain and compared the fuzzy ANN model to logistic regression using hit
rate,26 overall error rate and estimated relative costs of misclassification. The results, as in Feroz
et al. (2000), did not show that either of the algorithms dominated. The analysis was performed
using seven financial ratios that were related specifically to the revenue cycle. The sample was,
however, not adjusted accordingly, i.e., non-revenue based fraud was included in the sample. In
the overall error rate and estimated relative costs of misclassification analyses in Feroz et al.
(2000) and Lin et al. (2003), the optimal fraud classification probability cutoff level was not
determined for each treatment group, i.e., algorithm, relative error cost and prior probability
treatment combination. The analyses instead used error rates obtained based on optimal cutoffs

22

Overall error rate takes into account differences in prior-probabilities of the different outcomes and the

type of classification error.
23

Estimated relative costs of misclassification takes into account: prior-probabilities, classification costs of

different outcomes, and the type of classification error (false positive or false negative). Note, however, that
if the prior-probabilities and relative costs are not adjusted during model building, i.e., training, then the
models might not perform optimally for the different prior-probability and relative classification costs
combinations. Thus, this performance measure might be misleading if the different models are not
rebuilt/retrained for each prior-probability and relative classification cost combination examined using the
measure.
24

The prior-probability refers to the percentage of fraud firms.

25

The cost of making a Type I error (false positive) compared to the cost of making a Type II error (false

negative).
26

Hit rate is the percentage of objects accurately classified.
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when assuming no differences in classification costs and without finding the best prior training
fraud probabilities for different evaluation prior fraud probability levels.
More recently, Kotsiantis et al. (2006) used 41 fraud and 123 non-fraud firms in Greece to
examine seven classification algorithms: C4.5 (Decision Tree), RBF (ANN), K2 (Bayesian
networks), 3-NN (nearest-neighbor), RIPPER (rule-learner) and SMO (support vector machine)
and logistic regression. They also examined four ensemble based algorithms27: MP stacking
(stacking with seven base-classifier and a tree learner meta-classifier that only learns from true
class probabilities), MLR stacking (stacking with seven base-classifier and a multi-response
linear regression meta-classifier that learns from all class probabilities), Grading (IBk baseclassifier with 10-NN meta-classifier) and Simple Voting (stacking with seven base-classifier and
a tree learner meta-classifier). The algorithms were trained using 10-fold cross validation using
financial statement ratios as input variables. The results in terms of overall accuracy showed that
MP stacking provided the best performance (95.1%) followed by MLR stacking (93.9%), and that
all ensemble based methods outperformed the best non-ensemble algorithm. The best nonensemble algorithm was C4.5 (91.2%), followed by RIPPER (86.8%). The accuracy of logistic
regression (75.3%) and the ANN (73.4%) was relatively low. Accuracy was also reported for
each class, i.e., the equivalent of Type I and Type II error rates. While Kotsiantis et al. (2006)
evaluated a relatively comprehensive set of classifiers, the percentage of fraud firms in their
dataset (25%) was much higher than estimates indicating that around 0.6% of all organizations
are fraud firms (Bell and Carcello 2000). Furthermore, they assumed that costs associated with
Type I and Type II errors were equivalent, while in reality it is likely that Type II errors were
much more expensive than Type I errors. Based on financial statement fraud effects reported in
Beneish (1999), Bayley and Taylor (2007) estimated that the ratio of Type I error classification
costs to Type II error classification costs was between 1:20 and 1:40. These assumptions were
also reflected in their training data, in that they did not examine the performance of the classifiers
at different classification thresholds.
Kirkos et al. (2007) compared an ANN, a Bayesian belief network and a decision tree learner
using 35 fraud and 38 non-fraud firms. The reported class accuracies (fraud accuracy, non-fraud
accuracy) indicated that the Bayesian belief network (91.7%, 88.9%) outperformed the ANN
(82.5%, 77.5%) and the decision tree (75%, 72.5%). As in Kotsiantis et al. (2006) the

27

Ensemble based classification algorithms combines the decision output from multiple classifiers, i.e.,

they use an ensemble of classifiers (see Section 4.3.1.2. for further detail).
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classification costs were assumed to be the same for Type I and II errors, and the dataset
contained almost the same number of fraud firms as non-fraud firms.
I extend this literature by evaluating the performance of a relatively extensive set of
algorithms selected based on their classification performance in both prior financial statement
fraud research and in domains similar to the financial statement fraud domain. I also examine
under what specific, realistic circumstances these algorithms perform well and what predictors
provide utility to these algorithms in terms of improving classification performance.
4.3. Experimental Variables and Data
To answer my research questions, I ran experiments to evaluate the performance of a
relatively comprehensive and representative set of classification algorithms. The classification
algorithms were used to classify firms as either fraud or non-fraud firms based on firm attributes
derived from the financial statements, analyst forecasts and proxy statements of the firms.
Classifier performance was measured using estimated relative cost under different assumptions of
relative costs of Type I and Type II errors and prior probability of fraud and non-fraud (Dopuch
et al. 1987). The performance of each classifier configuration and training scenario combination
was measured 10 times using 10-fold cross validation for each combination of classification costs
and prior fraud probability. Section 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 describe the three factors that were
manipulated in the experiment: classification algorithms, classification costs and prior probability
of fraud, respectively. The dependent measure, estimated relative cost, is described in Section
4.3.4. The dataset, which includes objects (fraud and non-fraud firms) and object features (fraud
predictors), is described in Section 4.3.5.
4.3.1

Classification Algorithms

4.3.1.1 Overview
One of the goals of this research is to examine classification algorithm performance in fraud
detection. The primary experimental factor of interest was, therefore, classification algorithms.
The classification algorithms were obtained from Weka, an open source data mining tool that
contains components for (1) preprocessing data, including data loading, data filtering and
transforming object attributes, (2) object classification, clustering and association rule mining, (3)
object attribute evaluation, and (4) result analysis and visualization. Using an open source tool
facilitates the replication and extension of this study by future financial statement fraud data
mining research. Weka implements a relatively complete set of classification algorithms,
including many of the most popular algorithms. Based on prior financial statement fraud research
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and prior data mining research in domains with imbalanced datasets, I selected six algorithms
from Weka: J48, SMO, MultilayerPerceptron, Logistics, stacking and bagging. J48 is a decision
tree learner and Weka’s implementation of C4.5. SMO is a support vector machine (SVM) and
Logistics is Weka’s logistic regression implementation, both of these classifiers are linear
functions. MultilayerPerceptron is Weka’s backpropagation ANN implementation, and stacking
and bagging are two ensemble based methods. Section 4.3.1.3 provides more in-depth
descriptions of these algorithms. In addition to the algorithms implemented in Weka, I also
included Information Marked based Fusion (IMF), described in Essay I.
Logistic regression, ANN and stacking were included as they had performed well in prior
fraud research (Feroz et al. 2000; Lin et al. 2003; Kotsiantis et al. 2006). Note that it was,
however, not clear if these algorithms would perform well under realistic conditions and relative
to not yet examined classifiers. Bagging, J48, SMO and IMF were included because prior data
mining research (Fries et al. 1998; Phua et al. 2004; West et al. 2005) and the research in Chapter
2 found that these algorithms performed well in domains with imbalanced data, i.e., where the
majority class was larger than the minority class, which is true in the financial statement fraud
domain. It was, however, not known how these classifiers would perform in fraud detection.
In the next section, I describe in greater detail why these specific algorithms were selected
(Section 4.3.1.2). I then provide more in-depth descriptions of each algorithm and experimental
classifier parameter settings (Section 4.3.1.3).
4.3.1.2 Algorithm Selection
Of the classifiers I selected, four were individual classifiers: J48 (C4.5), SMO (SVM),
MultilayerPerceptron (ANN) and Logistics (logistic regression). I included logistic regression and
ANN algorithms to allow for comparisons with prior financial statement fraud research (Green
and Choi 1997; Fanning and Cogger 1998; Feroz et al. 2000). I included SVM and C4.5 as these
algorithms were found, in domains other than fraud, to provide good classification performances
(Fries et al. 1998; Fan and Palaniswami 2000; Phua et al. 2004).
Fries et al. (1998) examined the performance of SVM on a dataset with a 34.5% prior
probability of patients having breast cancer. The accuracy of SVM (99.5%) was higher than that
reported previously for CART (94.2%), RBF ANN (95.9%), linear discriminant (96.0%) and
multi-layered ANN (96.6%). Fan and Palaniswami (2000) compared a SVM to an ANN, MDA
and learning vector quantization in bankruptcy prediction, with a 49.4% prior probability of
bankruptcy, and found that the SVM outperformed the other classifiers. In another bankruptcy
prediction evaluation, Shin et al. (2005) used a balanced dataset of 1160 bankrupt firms and 1160
non-bankrupt firms and found that the SVM outperformed the ANN.
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Data mining research has also investigated the efficacy of various algorithms in the medical
field. Weiss and Kapouleas (1990) found that two rule-based classifiers, CART (0.006428) and
PVM (0.0067), outperformed ANN (0.0146), Bayes Independence (0.0394), Nearest Neighbor
(0.0473), DA linear (0.0615), Bayes 2nd order (0.0756), and DA Quadratic (0.1161) on a thyroid
disease dataset with a 7.7% prior probability of thyroid disease. They also found similar results
on a breast cancer dataset with a 70% prior probability of the existence cancer. CART (0.229) and
PVM (0.229) again had the best overall performance and outperformed ASSISTANT Tree
(0.280), Bayes Independence (0.282), ANN (0.285), DA linear (0.294), Bayes 2nd order (0.344),
DA Quadratic (0.344), and Nearest Neighbor (0.347). Based on these results they concluded that
rule based classifiers provided the best performance, especially on imbalanced data. In addition to
performance benefits, rule-based classifiers also generate output that is interpretable by humans.
Of the rule-based classifiers, and perhaps of all machine learning algorithms, C4.5 and its
commercial successor C5 have arguably become the most commonly used off-the-shelf classifiers
(Witten and Frank 2005). Using a 1:3 unbalanced dataset of Greek financial statement fraud
firms, Kotsiantis et al. (2006) found that C4.5 (91.2%), followed by RIPPER (86.8%), two rulebased classifiers, were the best non-ensemble based algorithms in their experiment. Their
experiment also included five other individual classifiers: an ANN (RBF), a Bayesian network
(K2), a nearest-neighbor (3-NN), a SVM (SMO) and logistic regression. Phua et al. (2004)
provided further support for including the C4.5 algorithm in this study. They found that C4.5
performed relatively well in a dataset with a 6% prior probability of auto insurance claims fraud.
Using a cost sensitive performance measure (cost savings within parentheses), C4.5 ($165)
performed better than bagging ($127), stacking ($104), Naive Bayesian ($94) and ANN ($89).
Furthermore, the performance of C4.5 was relatively robust with respect to the sampling method.
In addition to these four individual classifiers, I also examined three ensemble based
methods29: bagging, stacking and IMF. By combining the results of a group or ensemble of
individual classifiers, classification performance can be improved over the best individual
classifier in the ensemble. The basic idea behind ensemble based methods is that different
28

Error rates, defined as the number of false positive and false negative classifications divided by all

instances in the dataset, are reported within the parentheses.
29

As the name indicates an ensemble based method is a type of classification method that uses a group

(ensemble) of individual classifiers, so called base-classifiers, to classify objects. Different ensemble based
methods include different base-classifiers, train the base-classifiers differently and use different algorithms
to combine base-classifier decision or probability outputs into an overall ensemble decision or probability.
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classifiers have different strengths and weaknesses, and therefore provide complementary
information about the classification problem. These differences can be leveraged to improve
classification performance by combining the individual classifiers’ decisions (Kittler et al. 1998).
Ensemble research has primarily focused on two areas: (1) ensemble architecture, examining
what classifiers to include in the ensemble and how to train these classifiers; and (2) combiner
method, examining how to combine the base-classifiers’ decisions.
Using an ensemble of ANN base-classifiers, West et al. (2005) compared the performance of
crossvalidation (CV), bagging and boosting, three popular methods from ensemble architecture
research. Three datasets were used in this comparison: Credit Rating Australian (307 no credit
given and 383 credit given), Credit Rating German (300 no credit given and 700 credit given),
and Bankruptcy (93 bankrupt and 236 non-bankrupt companies). The results (error rates) for the
three datasets showed that bagging performed relatively well. More specifically, in the Australian
Credit Rating dataset, bagging (0.128) outperformed CV (0.131), the single best base-classifier
(0.132) and boosting (0.148). In the German Credit Rating dataset, CV (0.242) outperformed
bagging (0.251), but these two ensemble methods both performed better than the single best baseclassifier (0.253) and boosting (0.255). In the Bankruptcy dataset, bagging (0.126) outperformed
boosting (0.128), CV (0.129) and the single best base-classifier (0.131). Note that in addition to
performing well, bagging was the best performing classifier in the Bankruptcy dataset. This
dataset is the most similar of the three to the fraud domain; it is highly imbalanced with object
attributes derived largely from financial data and with a classification objective similar to that in
the fraud domain. Based on these findings I included bagging in my experiment. I additionally
included stacking, since prior fraud research using Greek fraud firms found stacking to perform
well (see the literature review in Section 4.2, in particular Kotsiantis et al. 2006).
Ensemble combiner method research has found that relatively simple methods like Majority
Vote and Average perform either at the same level or significantly better than more complex
methods (Duin and Tax 2000), but that Information Market based Fusion (IMF) outperforms
these two combiner methods and Weighted Average when the true classes of all objects are
revealed (see Chapter 2). Further, Chapter 2 shows that when only the true classes of objects
classified as positive are known, which is a more realistic assumption in certain domains such as
fraud detection, IMF outperforms Majority Vote, Average and Weighted Average for datasets
with low prior probabilities of the minority class (defined as datasets with prior probabilities
below 40%). Based on these findings I include IMF in my experiment.
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4.3.1.3 Algorithm Overview and Tuning
J4.8 is Weka’s implementation of C4.5 version 8. C4.5 generates a decision tree, which is a
divide and conquer classification method. The algorithm examines the information gain provided
by each attribute and splits the data using the attribute that provides the highest information gain.
The created branches are then split further by again examining the information gain, within each
branch, provided by the different attributes. If an attribute creates a split with a branch with no or
only a small number of instances, then this attribute is not used. The minimum number of
instances permissible at a leaf is set by default to two, but can be changed. To avoid overfitting,
the branches are pruned using subtree-raising where internal decision nodes (branch splits) are
subsumed by lower nodes, thereby eliminating one node. The pruning is performed based on
estimates of classification errors established using a confidence value that is set by default to 25%
(Witten and Frank 2005). The reader is referred to Quinlan (1993) for further detail on C4.5.
Witten and Frank (2005) suggest tuning C4.5 by testing lower confidence values and higher
minimum number of instances. I examined three confidence values, 15%, 20% and 25%, and
three minimum number of instances at a leaf, 2, 3 and 5, for a total of nine C4.5 configurations.
Logistic regression is a statistical algorithm that estimates the probability of a certain event
occurring by applying maximum likelihood estimation after transforming the dependent variable
into the natural log of the odds of the firm being fraudulent. ANNs are non-linear machine
learning algorithms designed based on biological neural networks with interconnected input,
hidden and output nodes.30 Both of these classifiers have been used extensively in prior
accounting and fraud research. Following prior research, logistic regression was not tuned,
meaning that logistic regression was used with parameters set to their default values. I
manipulated the learning time (epochs), learning rate, the number of hidden nodes and
momentum for the ANN (Feroz et al. 2000; Green and Choi 1997). A good learning time was
first determined without manipulating the other settings, which were set at their default Weka
values (learning rate = 0.3; momentum = 0.2; the number of hidden nodes = the sum of the
number of attributes and the number of classes divided by 2). The learning time was determined
by comparing the performance of ANNs created using different learning times, starting with 500
epochs (iterations through the training data) and then increasing the number of epochs by 500 in
each new evaluation round. The learning time evaluation was terminated when the performance
did not improve over three consecutive learning time levels. At this point the learning time was
30

See Green and Choi (1997) for a good description of ANNs.
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set to the lowest learning time generating the highest performance, and the other settings were
manipulated. The learning rate and momentum were both manipulated at three levels: 0.1, 0.3 and
0.5. The number of hidden nodes was manipulated at four levels: 4, 8, 12 and 16. Thus, after the
learning time was determined, a total of 27 ANN configurations were included in the experiment.
SVM algorithms classify data points by learning hyperplanes (linear models) that provide the
best separation of a set of positive instances from a set of negative instances. In a classification
context with n object features, a hyperplane is a linear model with n-1 dimensions intersecting a
space of n dimensions into two parts. For example, in a two-dimensional space the hyperplane is
a line, and in a three-dimensional space, the hyperplane is a plane. The objective is to find the
hyperplane that maximizes the separation of the data points of the different classes. While the
hyperplane is a linear model, the input data can be transformed before the hyperplane is
constructed. The effect of learning the hyperplane on transformed data is a non-linear decision
boundary in the original space (Witten and Frank 2005). The hyperplane that provides the best
separation is found by solving a large quadratic programming optimization problem. To improve
training speed, sequential minimal optimization (SMO) solves the quadratic programming
problem by breaking it up into a series of smaller problems that are then solved analytically (Platt
1999). Weka implements SVM using SMO. Following Shin et al. (2005), the complexity
parameter C was manipulated at five values: 1, 10, 50, 75 and 100. Shin et al. (2005) also
manipulated a radial basis kernel parameter, but since I used a polynomial kernel function I
instead manipulated the exponent of the polynomial kernel at five values: 0.5, 1, 2, 5 and 10.
Thus, 25 potential SVM configurations were included in the experiment. Furthermore,
buildLogisticModels was set to true. This enabled proper probability estimates by fitting logistic
regression models to the SVM outputs.
Stacking is an ensemble based method that combines the output of heterogeneous baseclassifiers, i.e., different types of classifiers, trained on the same data. The base-classifier output
is combined using a meta-classifier. The meta-classifier can be any classification algorithm, but is
typically a relatively simple linear model or decision tree. To avoid overfitting the training data,
the meta-classifier is trained on base-classifiers evaluation output generated using test data rather
than training data. This is typically accomplished using k-fold cross validation (Wolpert 1992;
Witten and Frank 2005). In the experiment, stacking was configured using the default Weka
setting for the number of cross-validation folds (set at 10). In selecting base-classifiers, I followed
prior research (Kotsiantis et al. 2006) and used all the other experimental classifiers, including
bagging, but excluding IMF. Note that IMF was implemented using all the other classifiers in the
experiment except for stacking. Thus, the base-classifiers selected were C4.5, SVM, ANN,
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logistic regression and bagging. I included all classifier configurations that provided the best
performance for a given classifier at one or more experimental treatment levels. Based on
recommendations to use a relatively simple meta-classifier (Wolpert 1992), and experiments
performed by Chan et al. (1999) and Prodromidis et al. (2000), I used a Bayesian classifier as the
meta-classifier. In a dataset with a 0.2 prior probability of credit card fraud, Chan et al. (1999)
evaluated the performance of four individual classifiers, C4.5, Ripper, CART and Bayesian, and a
meta-classifier, Bayesian. They found that the Bayesian meta-classifier provided the best
performance followed by CART. In a similar credit card fraud detection study, Prodromidis et al.
(2000) evaluated C4.5, Ripper, CART, Bayes and ID3, and a Bayesian meta-classifier. In
addition to the dataset with the 20% fraud cases from Chan et al. (1999), they also included a
dataset with 15% fraud cases. As in Chan et al. (1999), Prodromidis et al. (2000) found that the
Bayesian meta-classifier performed better than the other classifiers. I, therefore, used Bayesian as
the meta-classifier in the stacking implementation. In Weka, NaiveBayes can be configured to use
either kernel estimation or a single normal distribution for modeling numeric attributes. There is
also an option to use supervised discretization to process numeric attributes. I manipulated these
parameter settings in the experiment for a total of four stacking configurations.
Bagging is an ensemble based method that combines the output of homogenous baseclassifiers, i.e., all classification algorithms are of the same type, trained using different data. The
training data for the base-classifiers are generated by sampling with replacement from the original
training data. Thus, the base-classifiers learn on different subsets of the original training data and,
therefore, predict test cases differently. By combining multiple base-classifiers trained on
different data subsets, bagging reduces the variance of the individual base-classifiers, which is
especially beneficial for unstable base-classifier algorithms (Witten and Frank 2005). Bagging
combines the base-classifiers using average. I based my bagging implementation on Breiman
(1996) and used decision trees as the base-classifiers, more specifically C4.5, and set the number
of sampling iterations to 50. I then manipulated the size of each bag at 75%, 100% and 125% (the
default, 100% was used in Breiman 1996), and whether to calculate the out-of-bag error (yes or
no), for a total of six bagging configurations.
IMF is an ensemble combiner method that combines the base-classifier output using an
information market based approach. The base-classifiers are implemented as software agents that
participate in an information market. The information market uses a pari-mutuel betting market
mechanism. In this market agents place bets on the true class of objects. The bets are based on
agents’ private probability estimates of object class membership and market odds, which specify
the potential payout for winning bets. These market odds are a function of the total bets placed in
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the market, thus IMF has to solve a recursive problem where agents place their bets based on
market odds and where market odds are updated based on agents’ bets. This problem is solved in
IMF using binary search. The reciprocals of the market odds that minimize the difference
between the total betting amount and the potential payouts for different classes represent the
ensemble probability class estimates (see Chapter 2). Following Chapter 2, IMF was implemented
using all the other experimental classifiers, including bagging, but excluding stacking.
4.3.2

Classification Cost

Given a binary problem like fraud, there are four potential classification outcomes: (1) True
Positive (TP), a fraud firm is correctly classified as a fraud firm; (2) False Negative (FN), a fraud
firm is incorrectly classified as a non-fraud firm; (3) True Negative (TN), a non-fraud firm is
correctly classified as a non-fraud firm; and (4) False Positive (FP), a non-fraud firm is
incorrectly classified as a fraud firm. Different classification costs are associated with TP, FN,
TN and FP. TP and FP classifications have investigation costs Ci that are incurred in order to find
out whether the firm was actually fraudulent. FN classifications have fraud costs Cf, i.e., we
missed some fraudulent activity and the fraud is costly. FP classifications might have Cw costs
related to wrongfully accusing a firm of fraud. All classifications have overhead costs, for
example computer equipment, data loading, running the classification algorithm, etc. The ratio of
these costs impact training and evaluation of classifiers (Provost et al. 1998). Two classifiers
based on the same algorithm can produce different classification results if they are trained on data
with different costs. The classifier configurations described in Section 4.3.1 were, therefore,
further tuned by manipulating the relative error cost used when training the classifiers. However,
as the Weka implementation of the classifiers examined in this essay were not cost-sensitive I
under-sampled the class with the lower relative error cost. That is, I included fewer non-fraud
firms in the sample, to achieve this objective.
When evaluating classifiers using specific assumptions about relative costs, the results might
not generalize to the population of interest. The relative error cost used in the evaluation,
therefore, has to be estimated to reflect the relative error costs in the population. These costs are
very difficult to estimate accurately. Researchers, therefore, typically examine the classification
performance over a wide range of relative error costs (Feroz et al. 2000; Lin et al. 2003), which
reduces the risk of cost misspecification, and provides richer information to other researchers and
practitioners. I followed prior research (Lin et al. 2003) and evaluated the classification
performance over a wide range of relative error costs, specifically from 1:1 through 1:100. I also
performed a focused analysis of classification performance using relative error cost estimates
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from Bayley and Taylor (2007). Bayley and Taylor (2007) estimated that relative error costs were
on average from 1:20 through 1:40. They based this estimate on an analysis of market reactions to
fraud announcements reported by Beneish (1999). In the focused analysis, I used these estimates
and examined the performance of the classifiers on three relative error costs 1:20, 1:30 and 1:40.
Thus, this analysis provides insights into the relative performance of the classifiers under what is
estimated to be realistic circumstances.
4.3.3

Prior Probability of Fraud

Like classification costs, the prior probability of fraud impacts both classifier training and
evaluation. Two homogeneous classifiers can produce different results if they are trained on data
with different prior probabilities, and the performance of a trained classifier can change if the
prior probabilities change. The classifiers, therefore, have to be tuned by using different prior
probabilities in the training sample. The classifier configurations described in Section 4.3.1 were,
therefore, further tuned by manipulating the prior probability of fraud used when training the
classifiers. Furthermore, to generalize to the population of interest, the prior probability of fraud
in the evaluation sample should reflect the prior probability of fraud in the population. Prior
financial statement fraud research has typically assumed that P(fraud) is 0.5 for training,
evaluation or both. In reality, most organizations do not commit financial statement fraud. Bell
and Carcello (2000) estimate that only around 0.6% of all firm years are fraudulent, i.e.,
P(fraud)=0.006. This estimate is however likely to change over time, and be different for different
samples examined. I, therefore, manipulated the prior probability of fraud in the evaluation
sample at three levels: low, medium and high. I defined medium as P(fraud) = 0.006, i.e., the
estimate from Bell and Carcello (2000), low as 50% of medium or P(fraud) = 0.003, and high as
200% of medium or P(fraud) = 0.012.
4.3.4

Dependent Variable

Consistent with prior financial statement fraud research (Feroz et al. 2000; Lin et al. 2003),
performance was measured using estimated relative cost (ERC). This measure was selected
instead of net benefit (used in Essay I) in order to stay consistent with prior financial statement
fraud research. The sum of ERC and net benefit per classified firm is equal to the average fraud
cost of the classified firms (see Appendix 6), which is constant in a given dataset. Thus, as net
benefit per classified firm increases ERC decreases by the same amount, and vice versa.
Given specific estimates of prior fraud probability and relative error costs for evaluation
purposes, and specific classification results, ERC is calculated as:
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ERC = nFN/ nP x CFN x P(Fraud) + nFP/ nN x CFP x P(Non-Fraud),

(34)

where P(Fraud) and P(Non-Fraud) are the evaluation prior fraud and non-fraud probabilities,
respectively; CFP is the cost of false positive classifications (wrongful accusation costs, Cw, plus
investigation cost, Ci) and CFN is the cost of false negative classifications (fraud costs, Cf, minus
investigation cost, Ci), both deflated by the lower of CFP or CFN; nFP is the number of false
positive classifications, nFN is the number of false negative classifications, nP is the number of
positive instances in the dataset and nN is the number of negative instances in the dataset. ERC is
derived for each classification algorithm at the threshold that minimizes the ERC at a specific
evaluation prior fraud probability and relative error cost.
4.3.5

Data

4.3.5.1 Classification Objects: Fraud and Non-Fraud Firms Data
The fraudulent observations were located based on firms investigated by the SEC for financial
statement fraud and reported in Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER) from
the fourth quarter of 1998 through the fourth quarter of 2005. A total of 745 potential
observations were obtained from this initial search (see Table 4.1). The data set was then reduced
by eliminating: duplicates; financial companies; firms without the first fraud year specified in the
SEC release; non-annual financial statement fraud; foreign corporations; releases related to
auditors; not-for-profit organizations; and fraud related to registration statements, 10-KSB or
IPO. Financial companies were excluded from the sample as the rules and regulations governing
financial firms are substantially different from other firms. Firms committing non-annual
financial statement fraud were excluded as quarterly financial statements report financial
information covering shorter time periods. Fraud related to registration statements were excluded
as the purpose of these statements are different from annual financial statements reporting, and
thus are likely to provide different incentives to commit fraud and to commit different types of
fraud. An additional 75 fraud firms from Beasley (1996) were added to the remaining 197 fraud
firms, for a total of 272 fraud firms. From these 272 fraud firms, 221 firms with missing data in
Compustat or Compact D/SEC for the fraud year or four prior years, or with missing data in
I/B/E/S for the fraud year, were deleted from the sample because these data were needed to create
the measures described in section 4.3.5.2. For example, total discretionary accruals require data
for five years, the current year and the four prior years, to calculate discretionary accruals for the
current year and three prior years
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To these remaining 51 fraud firms, I added 15,934 non-fraud firm years31 to obtain P(fraud) ≈
0.003 (0.00319). I used data from three sources to construct the object features: (1) financial
statement data for the current year t and each of the four years leading up to the current year, t-1,
t-2, t-3 and t-4, were collected from Compustat; (2) one-year-ahead analyst earnings per share
forecasts and actual earnings per share in the fraud year were collected from I/B/E/S; and (3)
executive and director names, titles and company holdings were collected from Compact D/SEC.
4.3.5.2 Object Features – Financial Statement Fraud Predictors
Financial statement fraud predictor research has either been confirmatory or exploratory in
nature. Confirmatory predictor research has focused on testing specific financial statement fraud
hypotheses by developing and evaluating fraud predictors. The exploratory predictor research has
taken a large number of variables, for example red flags proposed in SAS No. 53 and No. 82,
and/or financial statement ratios, and either mapped these variables to fraud frameworks and/or
tested their explanatory power. These two research streams have evaluated a large number of
potential financial statement fraud predictors and found a number of significant financial
statement fraud predictors, as shown in Table 4.2. I leveraged these findings and included in my
experiment those predictors that had been found to be significant and that were easily available
from electronic sources. Other variables were excluded since they were less likely to be used in
practice due to the difficulty in obtaining them (these variables are italicized in Table 4.2). See
Table 4.3 for the final selection of the 41 predictors included in the experiment and how these
predictors were calculated.

31

Note that matching is typically used to increase internal validity by controlling for variables not

manipulated or measured in the experiment. My goal in this research is not to improve our understanding of
factors that explain financial statement fraud, but rather to establish what classification algorithms are
useful in predicting financial statement fraud. I, therefore, attempt to create a dataset that allows me to
examine the performance impact of changing the prior probability of fraud during classifier training.
Assuming that a lower prior probability in the training dataset than what is used for evaluation purposes
will not improve performance when the minority class is already sparse, the minimum number of non-fraud
firms is equal to the number of fraud firms divided by the lowest prior probability tested minus the number
of fraud firms, i.e., (51/0.003)-51 = 16,949. Higher prior probabilities can then be obtained for training
purposes by under-sampling the majority class, i.e., eliminating non-fraud firms from the sample.
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Table 4.1
Sample Selection
Panel A: Fraud Firms
Firms investigated by the SEC for fraudulent financial reporting from 4Q 1998
through 3Q 2005
Less: Financial companies
Less: Not annual (10-K) fraud
Less: Foreign companies
Less: Not-for-profit organizations
Less: Registration, 10-KSB and IPO related fraud
Less: Fraud year missing
Less: Duplicates
Remaining Fraud Observations
Add: Fraud firms from Beasley (1996)
Less: Not in Compustat or CompactD for first fraud year or four prior years or
I/B/E/S for first fraud year

745
(33)
(116)
(9)
(10)
(78)
(13)
(287)
197
75
(221)

Usable Fraud Observations

51

Panel B: Non-Fraud Firms
Non-Fraud Observations

15,934

4.4. Experimental Procedures and Preprocessing
4.4.1

Preprocessing

Before comparing the classifiers I determined the following: 1) prior fraud probability to use
when training the classifiers; 2) method to use to filter the input data; 3) fraud predictors or
attributes to include when training and evaluating the classifiers; and 4) how to tune the
classifiers. Note that all these preprocessing steps were performed independently for each
classifier. Thus, different training prior fraud probabilities, filtering methods and attributes, could
be selected for different classifiers. I did not need to perform these steps for IMF since this
technique took the output from the tuned classifiers at the evaluation stage and simply combined
these outputs.
4.4.1.1 Training Data Prior Fraud Probability
In order to determine prior fraud probabilities for training the classifiers, the performance of
the classifiers were compared at ten different prior fraud probability levels in the training set:
0.32%, 0.6%, 1%, 1.5%, 2.5%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 40% and 60%. Note that 0.3% was the lowest
prior probability used in the evaluation data adjusted for a relative classification error cost of 1:1,
and that 60% was the highest prior probability used in the evaluation, i.e., 1.2%, adjusted for a
relative classification error cost of 1:100. At this initial step the classifiers were not tuned and
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Table 4.2
Prior Research
Financial Statement Fraud Predictors
Author
Beasley
(1996)

Dataseta

75 SEC fraud cases % outside directors
matched with 62
non-fraud cases

Dechow et 92 SEC GAAP
al. (1996) violators matched
with 92 nonviolators

Beneish
(1997)

Determinants in Final Modelb

value of issued securities to market value; total
debt to total assets; demand for financing (ex
ante); whether securities were issued; % insiders
on board; insider holdings to total board holdings;
whether the board has an audit committee;
whether board has over 50% inside directors;
whether the CEO is the founder; total accruals in
year of manipulation

64 SEC fraud
days in receivables index; total accruals to total
assets; positive accruals dummy
cases; 2,658
(1,989) aggressive
accruers (with
increasing sales)

Algorithmc
logit

paired
logit

probit

Gerety and 62 SEC fraud cases Results did not show any significant determinants
Lehn
matched with 62
(1997)
non-fraud cases

paired

Green and 86 SEC fraud cases AFDA to net sales; AFDA to accounts receivable;
Choi
matched with 86
net sales to accounts receivable; gross margin to
(1997)
non-fraud cases
net sales; accounts receivable to total assets; net
sales; accounts receivable; AFDA

ANN

Fanning
and
Cogger
(1998)

102 SEC fraud
cases matched with
102 non-fraud
cases

ANN
DA
logit

Summers
and
Sweeney
(1998)

51 WSJ fraud cases current minus prior year inventory to sales; prior
matched with 51
year ROA to total assets current year
non-fraud cases

logit

Beneish
(1999)

49 SEC fraud cases insider trading; whether managers redeem stock
matched with 49
appreciation rights; holding period return in the
non-fraud cases
violation period; discretionary accruals in
violation period

probit

% of outside directors; non-big X auditor;
whether CFO changed in last three years; whether
LIFO; debt to equity; sales to total assets; whether
accounts receivable > 1.1 of last year’s; whether
gross margin % > 1.1 of last year’s
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Table 4.2 (Continued)
total accruals to total assets; total debt to total
assets; whether new securities were issued;
whether firm was listed on AMEX; whether SIC
code >2999 and <4000

logit

Lee et al.
(1999)

56 SEC fraud cases
matched with
60,453 non-fraud
cases

Beasley
(2000)

66 SEC fraud cases whether technology company and board has an
audit committee;whether health care and audit
matched with
unknown number committee has 100% outside directors
of industry
benchmark
companies from
National
Association of
Corporate
Directors

univariate

Bell and
Carcello
(2000)

77 PRP fraud cases
matched with 305
PRP non-fraud
cases

logit

weak internal control environment; rapid
company growth; undue emphasis on meeting
earnings projections; management lied or was
overly evasive; whether company is public

Feroz et
42 SEC fraud cases industry ROE minus firm ROE; times interest
al. (2000) matched with 90
earned; accounts receivable to sales; Altman Z
non-fraud cases
Score; the number of CEO turnovers; the number
of CFO turnovers; the number of auditor
turnovers

ANN
logit

Lin et al.
(2003)

40 SEC fraud cases net sales; accounts receivable; AFDA; AFDA to
matched with 160 net sales; AFDA to accounts receivable; accounts
non-fraud cases
receivable to net sales; accounts receivable to
total assets; gross margin to net sales

ANN
logit

Dunn
(2003)

113 SEC and WSJ control philosophy*structure; motivation
fraud cases
matched with 113
non-fraud cases

Logit

Kaminski 79 SEC fraud cases fixed assets to total assets; sales to accounts
et al.
matched with 79
receivable; inventory to current assets; inventory
(2004)
non-fraud cases
to sales; sales to total assets

DA

Uzun et
133 WSJ fraud
al. (2004) cases matched with
133 non-fraud
cases

Logit

% of outside directors; % of gray audit
committee directors; % of gray compensation
committee directors; % of gray nominating
committee directors
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Table 4.2 (Continued)
Chen and 52 SEC fraud cases research and development to sales; gross profit
Sennetti matched with 52
margin; net profit margin; sales and marketing to
(2005)
non-fraud cases
sales; tax benefits from exercising of employee
stock options to operating cash flows; changes in
free cash flow; accounts receivable turnover;
return on assets

Logit

a

SEC = Dataset obtained from SEC releases; WSJ = Dataset obtained from Wall Street Journal news
releases; and PRP = Dataset derived from proprietary sources
b
Listed are variables that were: (1) significant in the primary multivariate analysis (p<0.05); or (2)
included in the primary model if p-values were not reported in the multivariate analysis and the focus
was on evaluating models or significant in univariate analyses if p-values were not reported in the
multivariate analysis and the focus was on evaluating predictors. Variables in italics were relatively
difficult to obtain and are, therefore, less likely to be used in actual, real world analyses. AFDA =
Allowance for Doubtful Accounts; ROA = Return on Assets; and ROE = Return on Equity
c
ANN = Artificial Neural Network; DA = Discriminant Analysis; and Paired = Paired t-test.

Table 4.3
Experimental
Financial Statement Fraud Predictorsa
Definitionf

Variable

Datasource

accounts receivable

(data2)

CompuSTAT

accounts receivable to
sales

(data2/data12)

CompuSTAT

accounts receivable to
total assets

(data2/data6)

CompuSTAT

AFDA

(data67)

CompuSTAT

AFDA to accounts
receivable

(data67/data2)

CompuSTAT

AFDA to net sales

(data67/data12)

CompuSTAT

Altman Z score

3.3*(data18+data15+data16)/data6+0.999*
data12/data6+0.6*data25*data199/data181+
1.2*data179/data6+1.4*data36/data6

CompuSTAT

Big 4 auditor

IF 0 < data149 < 9 THEN 1 ELSE 0

CompuSTAT
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Table 4.3 (continued)
current minus prior year
inventory to sales

(data3)/(data12)-(data3t-1)/(data12t-1)

CompuSTAT

days in receivables index

(data2/data12)/(data2t-1/data12t-1)

CompuSTAT

debt to equity

(data181/data60)

CompuSTAT

demand for financing (ex
ante)

IF ((data308-(data128t-3+data128t-2+ data128t-1)/ 3) CompuSTAT
/(data4) < -0.5 THEN 1 ELSE 0

evidence of CEO changeb

IF CEO_Name<>CEO_Namet-1 OR
CEO_Namet-1<>CEO_Namet-2 OR CEO_Namet-2
<> CEO_Namet-3 THEN 1 ELSE 0

CompactD

evidence of CFO changec

IF CFO_Name<>CFO_Namet-1 OR
CFO_Namet-1 <>CFO_Namet-2 OR CFO_Namet-2
<> CFO_Namet-3 THEN 1 ELSE 0

CompactD

fixed assets to total assets

data7/data6

CompuSTAT

four year geometric sales
growth rate

(data12/data12t-3)^(1/4)-1

CompuSTAT

gross margin to net sales

(data12-data41)/data12

CompuSTAT

holding period return in
the violation period

(data199 – data199t-1) / data199

CompuSTAT

industry ROE minus firm
ROE

data172 / data 60

CompuSTAT

insider holdings to total
board holdings

SUM(IF relationship code = CB, D, DO, H, OD
THEN Insider_Holdings ELSE 0 ) /
SUM(Insider_Holdings)

CompactD

inventory to sales

data3/data12

net sales

data12

CompuSTAT

positive accruals dummy

IF (data18-data308) > 0 and (data18t-1-data308t-1)
> 0 THEN 1 ELSE 0

CompuSTAT

percentage officers on the SUM(IF Executive_Name = Director_Name
board of directorsd
THEN 1 ELSE 0) / Number_Of_Directors

CompactD

prior year ROA to total
assets current year

(data172t-1 / data 6t-1) / data6

CompuSTAT

property plant and
equipment to sales

data8/data12

CompuSTAT
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Table 4.3 (continued)
sales to total assets

data12/data6

CompuSTAT

the number of auditor
turnovers

IF data149<>data149t-1 THEN 1 ELSE 0 + IF
data149t-1<>data149t-2 THEN 1 ELSE 0 + IF
data149t-2<>data149t-3 THEN 1 ELSE 0

CompuSTAT

times interest earned

(data18+data15+data16) / data15

CompuSTAT

total accruals to total
assetse

(data18-data308) / data6

CompuSTAT

total debt to total assets

data181/data6

CompuSTAT

total discretionary accrual DAt-1 + DAt-2 + DAt-3, where
DA = TA/A-estimated(NDA); TA/A = (data18data308) /data6t-1; NDA = 1/data6t-1 + (data12 data12t-1 - data2 + data2t-1)/data6t-1+ (data308 data308t-1)/data6t-1 + data7/data6t-1

CompuSTAT

unexpected employee
productivity

FIRM((data12/data29 data12t-1/data29t-1)/(data12t-1/data29t-1)) INDUSTRY((data12/data29 data12t-1/data29t-1)/(data12 t-1/data29t-1))

CompuSTAT

value of issued securities
to market value

IF data396 > 0 THEN
data396*data199/(data25*data199) ELSE IF
(data25-data25t-1)>0 THEN ((data25 data25t-1)*data199) / (data25*data199) ELSE 0

CompuSTAT

whether accounts
receivable > 1.1 of last
year’s

IF (data2/data2 t-1) > 1.1 THEN 1 ELSE 0

CompuSTAT

whether firm was listed
on AMEX

IF ZLIST=5, 15, 16, 17, 18 THEN 1 ELSE 0

CompuSTAT

whether gross margin %
> 1.1 of last year’s

IF ((data12-data41) / data12) / ((data12t-1 data41t-1)/data12t-1) > 1.1 THEN 1 ELSE 0

CompuSTAT

whether LIFO

IF data59=2 THEN 1 ELSE 0

CompuSTAT

whether meeting or
beating analyst forecast

IF EPS - Analyst_Forecast >= 0 THEN 1 ELSE 0

I/B/E/S

whether new securities
were issued

IF (data25-data25t-1)>0 OR data396>0 THEN 1
ELSE 0

CompuSTAT
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Table 4.3 (continued)
whether SIC code larger
(smaller) than 2999
(4000)

IF 2999<DNUM<4000 THEN 1 ELSE 0

CompuSTAT

a

Showing all predictors found to be significant determinants of financial statement fraud in prior
research and that were relatively essay to obtained.
b

Because of the similarity between evidence of CEO change and the number of CEO turnovers, the
number of CEO turnovers was excluded.
c

Because of the similarity between evidence of CFO change and the number of CFO turnovers, the
number of CFO turnovers was excluded.
d
Because of the similarity between the percentage officers on the board of directors and percentage
insiders on board, percentage insiders on board was excluded.
e
Because of the similarity between total accruals to total assets and discretionary accruals in violation
period, and between total discretionary accruals and discretionary accruals in violation period, and
because the violation period was not known in the sample, and because there was no violation period
for non-fraud firms as non-fraud firms were not matched with fraud firms, discretionary accruals in
violation period was excluded.
f

data# refers to specific items in CompuSTAT based on the numbering system in existence as of April
17, 2008.

were instead implemented using their default settings as described in the classifier tuning section.
For each classifier, the prior fraud probability of the training dataset that produced the lowest
classification error cost was selected in each evaluation prior fraud probability and relative error
cost treatment group. Note that optimal decision thresholds were used when calculating the ERC
for each classifier and treatment group. This threshold was determined empirically by calculating
the ERC for each classifier at each treatment group 101 times as the threshold was changed from
0 to 1 in 0.01 increments. Thus, in this experiment a total of 13,332 ERC were derived (101
decision thresholds times 11 relative error cost treatment levels times three evaluation prior fraud
probabilities times four classifiers).
As seen in Table 4.4, ANN minimized ERC at a training prior fraud probability of 0.6% for
evaluation cost ratios from 1:1 through 1:50, 1:1 through 1:20 and 1:1 through 1:10, and at an
evaluation prior fraud probability of 0.3%, 0.6% and 1.2%, respectively. For the remaining
evaluation cost ratio and prior fraud probability levels, ANN minimized ERC using a training set
with 60% prior fraud probability. All the other algorithms also minimized ERC using two or more
prior fraud probabilities in the training set, as shown in Table 4.4. In general, the results show, as
expected, that the optimal prior fraud probability level in the training set increased as the
evaluation relative cost and prior probability of fraud treatments increased.
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Table 4.4
Training Prior Fraud Probabilities:
Selected Training Prior Fraud Probabilities for each Classifier at Different Levels of
Evaluation Prior Fraud Probability and Evaluation Relative Error Costa
Evaluation Factors
Classifiers
Relative
Error Cost
1:1
1:10
1:20
1:30
1:40
1:50
1:60
1:70
1:80
1:90
1:100

Prior Fraud
Probability
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003

ANN
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6

SVM
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.6

C4.5
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05

1:1
1:10
1:20
1:30
1:40
1:50
1:60
1:70
1:80
1:90
1:100

0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006

0.006
0.006
0.006
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6

0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6

0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.4

0.015
0.015
0.015
0.015
0.015
0.015
0.015
0.015
0.015
0.015
0.015

0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6

0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6

1:1
1:10
1:20
1:30
1:40
1:50
1:60
1:70
1:80
1:90
1:100

0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012

0.006
0.006
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6

0.2
0.2
0.2
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6

0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.6
0.6

0.015
0.015
0.015
0.015
0.015
0.015
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2

0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6

0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6

a

Logistic Bagging Stacking
0.015
0.6
0.6
0.015
0.6
0.6
0.015
0.6
0.6
0.015
0.6
0.6
0.015
0.6
0.6
0.015
0.6
0.6
0.015
0.6
0.6
0.015
0.6
0.6
0.015
0.6
0.6
0.015
0.6
0.6
0.015
0.6
0.6

For each evaluation treatment group (two columns to the left) the classifiers were evaluated using
different prior fraud probabilities in the training dataset. The training dataset prior fraud probability
that generated the lowest ERC for each classifier in each evaluation treatment group was then
selected. This probability is shown for each classifier and treatment group (six columns to the right)
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4.4.1.2 Data Filtering
I continued the preprocessing by evaluating whether filtering the data, using one of three
filtering methods that transformed the continuous fraud predictors, improved classifier
performance. These methods normalized, discretized and standardized the data. The utility of
these methods and no filter were compared for each classifier at the training prior fraud
probabilities that minimized ERC (see Table 4.4) at a cost ratio of 1:50 and a prior fraud
probability of 0.3%, i.e., the median treatment level of the two evaluation factors. To discretize
the attributes, I used the PKIDiscretize procedure in Weka, which implements equal frequency
binning with the number of bins set to the square root of the number of non-missing values. This
approach has been shown to produce improved classification results (Witten and Frank 2005).
The standardized data were obtained by subtracting attribute means from instance values and then
dividing this difference by the standard deviation of the attribute. To normalize the data, the
difference between each instance value and the minimum instance value was divided by the range
of the attribute values, i.e., maximum minus minimum value. The standardized attributes had
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, while the normalized attributes had values that
were between zero and one.
The results reported in Table 4.5 show a relatively clear trend indicating that classifiers trained
with data that were normalized and not filtered produced lower ERC than classifiers trained with
data that were standardized, which in turn produced lower ERC than classifiers trained with data
that were discretized. More specifically, the performance benefits, measured using ERC, of
normalization, standardization and no filter were the same for both ANN and logistic regression,
and were better than discretization in 23 and 27 out of 33 comparisons, respectively. For C4.5 no
filter was better than or as good as the other methods in 31 out of 33 comparisons, while
normalization was better than or as good as the other methods at all evaluation levels for SVM.
Normalization was also the best approach for stacking, for which normalization was better than or
as good as the other methods in 30 out of 33 comparisons. Finally, no filter was superior in 22 out
of 33 comparisons, and inferior to normalization and standardization in the remaining 11
comparisons for bagging.
4.4.1.3 Fraud Predictor Utility
One of my research objectives was to improve our understanding of what predictors provide
utility to the different classifiers. Answering this question can facilitate more efficient data
collection as predictors that provide little or no utility to the classifiers do not have to be
collected. Furthermore, this knowledge can provide the foundation for reducing the dataset
dimensionality (reducing the number of attributes), which can improve the performance of the
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Table 4.5
Data Filtering:
ERC for each Combination of Classifier and Data Filtering Method at Different
Levels of Evaluation Prior Fraud Probability and Evaluation Relative Costa
Prior
Relative
NormFraud
Error Cost Probability alized
1:1
0.003
0.003
1:10
0.003
0.030
1:20
0.003
0.060
1:30
0.003
0.090
1:40
0.003
0.120
1:50
0.003
0.150
1:60
0.003
0.168
1:70
0.003
0.186
1:80
0.003
0.205
1:90
0.003
0.223
1:100
0.003
0.241

ANN
Stand- Discrardized etized
0.003 0.003
0.030 0.030
0.060 0.060
0.090 0.090
0.120 0.120
0.150 0.150
0.168 0.180
0.186 0.203
0.205 0.223
0.223 0.244
0.241 0.265

Logistic Regression
No Norm- Stand- Discr- No
Filter alized ardized etized Filter
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030
0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060
0.090 0.088 0.088 0.090 0.088
0.120 0.115 0.115 0.120 0.115
0.150 0.142 0.142 0.150 0.142
0.168 0.169 0.169 0.180 0.169
0.186 0.193 0.193 0.210 0.193
0.205 0.217 0.217 0.240 0.217
0.223 0.241 0.241 0.270 0.241
0.241 0.265 0.265 0.300 0.265

1:1
1:10
1:20
1:30
1:40
1:50
1:60
1:70
1:80
1:90
1:100

0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006

0.006
0.060
0.120
0.168
0.204
0.241
0.277
0.314
0.350
0.387
0.411

0.006
0.060
0.120
0.168
0.204
0.241
0.277
0.314
0.350
0.387
0.411

0.006
0.060
0.120
0.180
0.223
0.264
0.306
0.347
0.388
0.429
0.470

0.006
0.060
0.120
0.168
0.204
0.241
0.277
0.314
0.350
0.387
0.411

0.006
0.060
0.115
0.169
0.217
0.265
0.313
0.362
0.409
0.454
0.500

0.006
0.060
0.115
0.169
0.217
0.265
0.313
0.362
0.409
0.454
0.500

0.006
0.060
0.120
0.180
0.240
0.300
0.360
0.420
0.480
0.540
0.600

0.006
0.060
0.115
0.169
0.217
0.265
0.313
0.362
0.409
0.454
0.500

1:1
1:10
1:20
1:30
1:40
1:50
1:60
1:70
1:80
1:90
1:100

0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012

0.012
0.120
0.204
0.277
0.350
0.410
0.457
0.504
0.551
0.598
0.645

0.012
0.120
0.204
0.277
0.350
0.410
0.457
0.504
0.551
0.598
0.645

0.012
0.120
0.223
0.305
0.388
0.470
0.552
0.635
0.717
0.775
0.812

0.012
0.120
0.204
0.277
0.350
0.410
0.457
0.504
0.551
0.598
0.645

0.012
0.115
0.217
0.313
0.408
0.500
0.590
0.680
0.769
0.858
0.947

0.012
0.115
0.217
0.313
0.408
0.500
0.590
0.680
0.769
0.858
0.947

0.012
0.120
0.240
0.360
0.480
0.600
0.720
0.831
0.936
1.040
1.143

0.012
0.115
0.217
0.313
0.408
0.500
0.590
0.680
0.769
0.858
0.947
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Table 4.5 (Continued)
Prior
Relative
Fraud
NormError Cost Probability alized
1:1
0.003
0.003
1:10
0.003
0.030
1:20
0.003
0.060
1:30
0.003
0.090
1:40
0.003
0.120
1:50
0.003
0.150
1:60
0.003
0.180
1:70
0.003
0.210
1:80
0.003
0.240
1:90
0.003
0.270
1:100
0.003
0.300

C4.5
Stand- Discrardized etized
0.003 0.003
0.030 0.030
0.060 0.060
0.090 0.090
0.120 0.120
0.150 0.150
0.180 0.180
0.210 0.210
0.240 0.240
0.270 0.270
0.300 0.300

No
Filter
0.003
0.030
0.060
0.090
0.120
0.150
0.180
0.210
0.240
0.270
0.300

Support Vector Machines
Norm- Stand- Discr- No
alized ardized etized Filter
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030
0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060
0.090 0.090 0.090 0.090
0.120 0.120 0.120 0.120
0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150
0.180 0.180 0.180 0.180
0.210 0.210 0.210 0.210
0.239 0.240 0.240 0.239
0.257 0.270 0.270 0.257
0.276 0.300 0.300 0.276

1:1
1:10
1:20
1:30
1:40
1:50
1:60
1:70
1:80
1:90
1:100

0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006

0.006
0.060
0.120
0.180
0.240
0.300
0.360
0.420
0.480
0.540
0.600

0.006
0.060
0.120
0.180
0.240
0.300
0.360
0.418
0.476
0.533
0.591

0.006
0.060
0.120
0.180
0.240
0.300
0.360
0.420
0.480
0.540
0.600

0.006
0.060
0.120
0.180
0.240
0.300
0.357
0.415
0.472
0.530
0.588

0.006
0.060
0.120
0.180
0.238
0.276
0.314
0.348
0.380
0.413
0.446

0.006
0.060
0.120
0.180
0.240
0.300
0.360
0.420
0.480
0.540
0.600

0.006
0.060
0.120
0.180
0.240
0.300
0.360
0.420
0.480
0.540
0.600

0.006
0.060
0.120
0.180
0.238
0.276
0.314
0.348
0.380
0.413
0.446

1:1
1:10
1:20
1:30
1:40
1:50
1:60
1:70
1:80
1:90
1:100

0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012

0.012
0.120
0.240
0.360
0.480
0.599
0.717
0.830
0.943
1.004
1.006

0.012
0.120
0.240
0.360
0.475
0.591
0.706
0.817
0.928
0.966
0.966

0.012
0.120
0.240
0.360
0.480
0.600
0.720
0.840
0.960
0.988
0.988

0.012
0.120
0.240
0.357
0.472
0.588
0.703
0.814
0.924
0.981
0.981

0.012
0.120
0.238
0.313
0.380
0.446
0.512
0.577
0.628
0.677
0.727

0.012
0.120
0.240
0.360
0.480
0.600
0.720
0.787
0.824
0.862
0.900

0.012
0.120
0.240
0.360
0.480
0.600
0.686
0.752
0.818
0.884
0.949

0.012
0.120
0.238
0.313
0.380
0.446
0.512
0.577
0.643
0.709
0.761
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Table 4.5 (Continued)
Prior
Relative
Fraud
NormError Cost Probability alized
1:1
0.003
0.003
1:10
0.003
0.029
1:20
0.003
0.059
1:30
0.003
0.088
1:40
0.003
0.118
1:50
0.003
0.147
1:60
0.003
0.176
1:70
0.003
0.202
1:80
0.003
0.227
1:90
0.003
0.244
1:100
0.003
0.258

Bagging
Stand- Discrardized etized
0.003 0.003
0.030 0.029
0.060 0.059
0.090 0.088
0.120 0.118
0.150 0.147
0.180 0.176
0.206 0.206
0.230 0.235
0.244 0.265
0.258 0.294

No
Filter
0.003
0.029
0.058
0.086
0.115
0.144
0.173
0.202
0.220
0.236
0.253

Normalized
0.003
0.030
0.060
0.090
0.120
0.150
0.180
0.210
0.235
0.250
0.264

Stacking
Stand- Discrardized etized
0.003 0.003
0.030 0.030
0.060 0.060
0.090 0.090
0.120 0.120
0.150 0.150
0.180 0.180
0.210 0.210
0.235 0.240
0.250 0.270
0.264 0.300

No
Filter
0.003
0.030
0.060
0.090
0.120
0.150
0.180
0.210
0.234
0.252
0.270

1:1
1:10
1:20
1:30
1:40
1:50
1:60
1:70
1:80
1:90
1:100

0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006

0.006
0.059
0.118
0.176
0.227
0.258
0.286
0.315
0.343
0.369
0.393

0.006
0.060
0.120
0.180
0.230
0.258
0.286
0.315
0.343
0.369
0.393

0.006
0.059
0.118
0.176
0.235
0.293
0.329
0.364
0.399
0.435
0.470

0.006
0.058
0.115
0.173
0.219
0.252
0.285
0.318
0.351
0.384
0.417

0.006
0.060
0.120
0.180
0.235
0.264
0.293
0.323
0.352
0.382
0.411

0.006
0.060
0.120
0.180
0.235
0.264
0.293
0.323
0.352
0.382
0.411

0.006
0.060
0.120
0.180
0.240
0.300
0.360
0.420
0.480
0.540
0.593

0.006
0.060
0.120
0.180
0.234
0.270
0.307
0.343
0.379
0.416
0.452

1:1
1:10
1:20
1:30
1:40
1:50
1:60
1:70
1:80
1:90
1:100

0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012

0.012
0.118
0.227
0.286
0.342
0.392
0.442
0.491
0.541
0.590
0.639

0.012
0.120
0.229
0.286
0.342
0.392
0.442
0.491
0.541
0.590
0.639

0.012
0.118
0.235
0.328
0.399
0.469
0.540
0.610
0.681
0.700
0.717

0.012
0.115
0.219
0.285
0.351
0.417
0.482
0.548
0.614
0.672
0.714

0.012
0.120
0.234
0.293
0.352
0.410
0.469
0.525
0.563
0.600
0.638

0.012
0.120
0.234
0.293
0.352
0.410
0.469
0.528
0.582
0.622
0.662

0.012
0.120
0.240
0.360
0.480
0.591
0.657
0.723
0.789
0.854
0.920

0.012
0.120
0.233
0.306
0.379
0.452
0.525
0.574
0.619
0.664
0.709

a

For each evaluation treatment group (two columns to the left) the classifiers were evaluated
using different data filtering methods. The data filtering method that generated the lowest ERC
for each classifier in each evaluation treatment group was then selected. The ERC are displayed
for each classifier, data filtering method and evaluation treatment group (eight columns to the
left). The lowest ERC for each classifier and treatment group is highlighted in grey.
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classifiers. To reduce the dimensionality, I used a Wrapper attribute selection technique, which
has been shown to be effective (Hall and Holmes 2003). The Wrapper approach examines the
utility of the different attributes to a specific algorithm, as opposed to attribute selection
techniques that examine the attributes without considering the specific classifier that will use the
attributes. To evaluate the utility of the attributes, the Wrapper uses internal cross-validation
iterations to compare the accuracy of a classifier using different sets of attributes. However, as
discussed earlier, accuracy is not a good measure of performance in the fraud domain unless the
training prior fraud probability is altered to take into account the actual prior fraud probability
and relative costs in the domain. Assuming an average prior fraud probability of 0.006 (Bell and
Carcello 2000) and an average relative cost of 1:30 (Bayley and Taylor 2007), I used a dataset
with 51 fraud firms and 283 non-fraud firms for a prior fraud probability of 0.18 (calculated as
0.006*30). A genetic search algorithm was used within the Wrapper to search for the optimal
attribute set. To evaluate the robustness of this search, I used 10-fold cross-validation to examine
the selected attributes (note that the Wrapper also uses 5-fold cross-validation internally). In this
examination I normalized the dataset attributes for SVM, logistic regression, stacking and ANN,
and used non-filtered dataset attributes for C4.5 and bagging.
For logistic regression, nine variables were selected in at least 40% of the folds: the number of
auditor turnovers, total discretionary accruals, Big 4 auditor, accounts receivables, allowance for
doubtful accounts, whether meeting or beating analyst forecasts, inventory to sales, unexpected
employee productivity and value of issued securities to market value (see Table 4.6). Note that an
additional twelve variables would have been added to this selection if variables selected in at least
30% of the folds had been included. The SVM Wrapper selected six of the variables selected for
logistic regression: the number of auditor turnovers, total discretionary accruals, Big 4 auditor,
accounts receivables, allowance for doubtful accounts and whether meeting or beating analyst
forecasts. The SVM Wrapper additionally selected Altman Z score, percentage of executives on
the board of directors, property plant and equipment to sales, fixed assets to total assets,
allowance for doubtful accounts to accounts receivable, and total debt to total assets in at least
40% of the folds (10 additional variables in at least 30% of the folds). For C4.5, auditor turnover,
Big 4 auditor and whether meeting or beating analyst forecasts were again selected, as well as
accounts receivable to total assets, accounts receivable to sales, gross margin to net sales,
property plant and equipment to sales, industry ROE minus firm ROE, and positive accruals
dummy in at least 40% of the folds (10 additional variables in at least 30% of the folds). The
results for ANN, bagging and stacking also showed some overlap with the variables selected for
logistic regression, SVM and C4.5.
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Table 4.6
Attribute Selection:
The Percentage of Folds in which
Predictor was Selected for Each Classifiera
Predictor

SVM Logb ANN C4.5 Bagc

the number of auditor turnovers
total discretionary accruals
Big 4 auditor
accounts receivable
allowance for doubtful accounts

Stackd Avge

70% 40% 10% 70%
60% 60% 40% 30%

70%

0% 46%

30%

0% 39%

50% 40% 30% 40%
70% 50% 30% 0%

0% 38%
50%
10% 100% 35%
20%
0% 34%

whether meeting or beating forecast
evidence of CEO change

60% 80% 10% 20%
30% 30% 60% 40%
20% 20% 20% 60%
50% 40% 20% 40%
20% 30% 30% 30%

sales to total assets

30% 30% 20% 30%

0%
50%
10%
0%
10% 100%
10% 100%

inventory to sales

30% 50% 10% 30%
20% 40% 30% 20%
60% 30% 0% 20%

0% 100% 28%
0% 26%
30%
20%
0% 24%

percentage of executives on the board of
directors
demand for financing (ex ante)

40% 30% 10% 30%

20%

0% 24%

30% 30% 20% 30%

10%

0% 23%

if account receivable grew by more than 10%

20%

0% 23%

allowance for doubtful accounts to net sales
current minus prior year inventory to sales

20% 30% 50% 0%
20% 20% 10% 30%
0% 30% 10% 10%

gross margin to net sales

20% 10%

accounts receivable to total assets
accounts receivable to sales

unexpected employee productivity
Altman Z score

0% 40%
20% 20% 40% 30%

evidence of CFO change
holding period return in the violation period

30% 30% 40% 10%
40% 10% 20% 40%
30% 50% 20% 0%

property plant and equipment to sales
value of issued securities to market value
fixed assets to total assets
days in receivables index

60% 30% 0% 0%
0% 20% 20% 20%

four year geometric sales growth rate

30% 30% 20% 10%

industry ROE minus firm ROE

0%

20%

0% 33%
31%
29%
28%
28%

0% 100% 21%
30% 100% 21%
10% 100% 21%
0%

0% 21%

0%
0%

0% 21%
0% 21%

10%

0% 21%

10%

0% 19%

0% 100% 18%
0%
0% 18%
30%
0%

0% 18%

positive accruals dummy

0% 20% 40%
20% 10% 10% 50%

times interest earned
if firm was listed on AMEX

30% 10% 10% 30%
20% 20% 20% 10%

10%
10%

0% 18%
0% 16%

if gross margin grew by more than 10%

20% 10% 30% 10%

10%

0% 16%
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0% 18%

Table 4.6 (continued)
if new securities were issued
allowance for doubtful accounts to accounts
receivable
debt to equity
total debt to total assets
a

b
c
d

e

30% 10% 10% 10%
40% 10% 0% 20%

20%
10%

0% 16%
0% 16%

20% 10% 10% 30%
40% 10% 20% 10%

10%
0%

0% 16%
0% 16%

The percentage of folds in which the Wrapper included the predictor in the final set of predictors. The
percentages in bold show which predictors were selected to be included in the final dataset for each
classifier.
Log = logistic regression
Bag = bagging
Stack = stacking. Stacking is relatively computationally expensive as it uses all the other classifiers as
base-classifiers. When using the Wrapper with a genetic search algorithm, the Wrapper runs stacking
using an external, in addition to the internal, cross-validation with genetic search in each fold. This
procedure becomes very computationally expensive and external cross-validation was, therefore, not
performed for stacking.
Average percentage of folds in which the Wrapper included the predictor in the final set of predictors. To
compute this average, selected stacking predictors were assigned a percentage of 0.17 if they were not
selected in the tested fold and 0.47 if they were selected in the tests fold. These percentages were the
averages of all the selected and not selected predictors for the other classifiers.

It is interesting to note that no variables were selected by all algorithms. Whether a firm had a
Big 4 auditor was selected by all classifiers but stacking, while auditor turnover, total
discretionary accruals and accounts receivable were selected by four out of six classifiers.
Meeting or beating analyst forecasts and unexpected employee productivity were selected by
three out of six classifiers. All the other predictors were selected by less than 50% of the
classifiers. In terms of the average number of folds, auditor turnover was selected by the Wrapper
most consistently and was on average selected in about half the folds examined (46%). Total
discretionary accruals and Big 4 auditor followed closely at 39% and 38%, respectively.
Henceforth, I used the training prior fraud probabilities that minimized ERC at the different
evaluation prior fraud probability and relative error cost treatment levels (see Table 4.4). For the
different classifiers I filtered the data as follows: 1) normalized the data for SVM, logistic
regression and ANN; 2) standardized and used no filter for C4.5; and 3) normalized and used no
filter for stacking and bagging. Finally, for each classifier the data dimensionality was reduced by
only using the classifier specific Wrapper selected attributes. These preprocessing results are
summarized in Table 4.7.
4.4.2

Classifier Evaluation

For classifier tuning purposes, I examined the C4.5, SVM, ANN, logistic regression, stacking,
bagging and IMF classifier configurations described in Section 4.3.1.1. The different
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Table 4.7
Preprocessing Result Overview: Selected Training Prior Fraud
Probabilities, Data Filtering Methods and Predictors
Training Prior
Classifiers Fraud Probability
Data Filtering
Predictorsa

a

ANN

0.2, 0.6

Normalize

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 13, 14, 22, 24, 33, 35

SMO

0.006, 0.6

Normalize

2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 12, 16, 20, 21, 31

C4.5

0.05, 0.1, 0.4, 0.6

No Filter, Standardize

1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 19, 22, 27, 28

Logistic

0.015, 0.1, 0.2

Normalize

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 11, 12, 23

Bagging

0.6

No Filter, Normalize

1, 2, 3, 7, 12, 18, 27

Stacking

0.6

No Filter, Normalize

4, 9, 10, 11, 17, 18, 19, 25

Predictor numbers represent the following predictors: 1=the number of auditor turnovers, 2=total
discretionary accruals, 3=Big 4 auditor, 4=accounts receivable, 5=allowance for doubtful accounts,
6=accounts receivable to total assets, 7=accounts receivable to sales, 8=whether meeting or beating
forecast, 9=evidence of CEO chance, 10=sales to total assets, 11=inventory to sales, 12=unexpected
employee productivity, 13=Altman Z score, 14=percentage of executives on the board of directors,
15=demand for financing (ex ante), 16=whether account receivable grew by more than 10%,
17=allowance for doubtful accounts to net sales, 18=current minus prior year inventory to sales,
19=gross margin to net sales, 20=evidence of CFO chance, 21=holding period return in the violation
period, 22=property plant and equipment to sales, 23=value of issued securities to market value,
24=fixed assets to total assets, 25=days in receivables index, 26=four year geometric sales growth
rate, 27=Industry ROE minus firm ROE, 28=positive accruals dummy, 29=times interest earned,
30=whether firm was listed on AMEX, 31=whether gross margin grew by more than 10%,
32=whether new securities were issued, 33=allowance for doubtful accounts to accounts receivable,
34=debt to equity, and 35=total debt to total assets.

configurations were evaluated using ten-fold stratified cross validation with the preprocessing
dataset stratified and then randomly split into ten mutually exclusive folds of approximately equal
size that each contained approximately the same prior class probabilities as the original dataset.
The classifiers were then trained and evaluated ten times, each time using a different fold for
evaluation and the nine remaining folds for training. The classifier tuning result set is a
combination of the results from all ten evaluation folds. For each classifier type, I compared the
different classifier configurations using these result sets and selected the configuration with the
lowest ERC for each relative error costs and evaluation prior fraud probability combination.
Using the selected configurations, the ten-fold stratified cross validation was repeated ten
times. The cross-validation results from the ten iterations were then used to calculate ten ERC
scores for each classifier configuration, relative error cost and evaluation prior fraud probability
combination. The final results set used for classifier evaluation were generated by taking the ten
ERC measures of each classifier type, relative error costs and evaluation prior fraud probability
combination generated by the configuration selected for this specific experimental manipulation.
Thus, I did not necessarily take the configuration with the best final results for a specific
combination of relative error cost and evaluation prior fraud probability, but instead used the
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results from the preselected classifier configurations. The final result set contained ten
observations per classifier type, relative error costs and prior fraud probability treatment groups.
4.5. Results
Table 4.8 reports descriptive classifier performance statistics. The reported estimated relative
cost is the average for each classifier at all treatment levels. Thus, it is not surprising that the
range of ERC is high and that the standard deviation is almost as high as the mean. For example,
the standard deviation and mean ERC for logistic regression are 0.2367 and 0.2916, respectively.
The descriptive statistics provide an initial indication that logistic regression, bagging and SVM
perform well. Logistic regression performs particularly well, performing significantly32 better
(p<0.05) than ANN, IMF, C4.5 and stacking. It is, however, important to remember that these are
descriptive statistics that report on the performance of the classifiers on average. Thus, we do not
know under what specific evaluation prior fraud probabilities and relative cost conditions logistic
regression, bagging and SVM outperform the other algorithms, and even if perhaps these other
algorithms are better performers under certain conditions.
To determine whether the differences noticed in the descriptive statistics depend on the level
of evaluation prior fraud probabilities or relative cost, I examined the interactions between prior
Table 4.8
Descriptive Statistics of Classifier Estimate Relative Costa

a

b

32

Standard
Connecting
Deviation Letters Reportb
0.2367
D

Classifier
Logistic

Min
0.0026

Median
0.2167

Max
0.9100

Mean
0.2916

Bagging
SVM

0.0028
0.0025

0.2400
0.2306

0.8858
0.8946

0.2978
0.2989

0.2275
0.2453

DC
DC

ANN

0.0030

0.2400

0.8912

0.3046

0.2320

C

IMF

0.0026

0.2400

0.9880

0.3053

0.2463

C

C45

0.0028

0.2400

1.0614

0.3301

0.2734

Stacking

0.0030

0.2400

0.9880

0.3414

0.2905

B
A

Classifier performance is measured using Estimated Relative Cost. Note that lower values are
preferred over higher values.
Levels not connected by the same letter are significantly different at a p-value of 0.05 using
Tukey-Kramer HSD and blocking for the effect of evaluation prior fraud probability and
relative cost on estimated relative cost.

Significance determined using Tukey-Kramer HSD and blocking for the effect of evaluation prior fraud

probability and relative cost on estimated relative cost.
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fraud probability and classification algorithm, and between relative error cost and classification
algorithm using the following regression model:
ERC = α0 + α1Classification Algorithm + α2Prior Fraud Probability +

(35)

α3Relative Error Cost + α4Classification Algorithm*
Prior Fraud Probability + α5Classification Algorithm*
Relative Error Cost + ε
The interaction between prior fraud probability and classification algorithm (p<0.001), and the
interaction between relative error cost and classification algorithm (p<0.001) were both
significant. Thus, the relative performance of the classifiers depends on the level of evaluation
prior fraud probability and on the level of relative error cost. The parameter estimates reported in
Table 4.9 show that as prior fraud probability increases, the performance of bagging (p=0.005),
ANN (p=0.039) and logistic regression (p=0.039) improves relative to the other classifiers (the
magnitude of the performance improvement is in the order listed), the relative performance of
IMF (p=0.347) and SVM (p=0.175) does not change, while the relative performance of stacking
(p<0.001) and C4.5 (p<0.001) deteriorates. The change in relative performance is similar when
relative error cost increases; i.e., as the cost of FN errors becomes higher relative to the cost of
FP. It is also interesting to note that the intercepts of bagging (p=0.007), logistic regression
(p<0.001) and SVM (p=0.007) are lower than that of C4.5 and stacking. These results indicate
that bagging, logistic regression and SVM outperform C4.5 and stacking at all levels and that the
performance advantage of bagging and logistic regression is increasing in both evaluation prior
fraud probability and relative error cost.
Panel A in Figure 4.1 shows the relative performance of the classification algorithms at
different levels of relative cost when the evaluation prior fraud probability is 0.003, Panel B at
0.006, and Panel C at 0.012. Figure 4.1 corroborates the statistical findings showing that the
relative performance of stacking and C4.5 deteriorates as the relative error cost and prior fraud
probability increases. While the other results are also supported, SVM appears to perform slightly
better than what was indicated by the linear regression results. At both the low (0.003) and middle
(0.006) evaluation prior fraud probability levels (Figure 4.1, Panel A and Panel B) logistic
regression appears to dominate the other classifiers except for SVM at all relative error costs
except for at very low relative error costs (high FN cost), where all classifiers appear to perform
similarly. Note that the lowest relative error cost level examined assumed that the cost of not
detecting a financial statement fraud is the same as the cost of wrongfully suspecting that a
financial statement is fraudulent, a relatively unlikely scenario. When the evaluation prior
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Table 4.9
Regression Results for Testing Interactions between
a
Classifier and Prior Fraud Probability, and Classifier and Relative Error Cost
Variableb
Intercept
Classifier [ANN]
Classifier [Bagging]
Classifier [C45]
Classifier [IMF]
Classifier [Logistic]
Classifier [SVM]
Classifier [Stacking]
Prior Fraud Probability
Relative Error Cost
Classifier [ANN]*Prior Fraud Prob.
Classifier [Bagging]*Prior Fraud Prob.
Classifier [C45]*Prior Fraud Prob.
Classifier [IMF]*Prior Fraud Prob.
Classifier [Logistic]*Prior Fraud Prob.
Classifier [SVM]*Prior Fraud Prob.
Classifier [Stacking]*Prior Fraud Prob.
Classifier [ANN]*Relative Error Cost
Classifier [Bagging]*Relative Error Cost
Classifier [C45]*Relative Error Cost
Classifier [IMF]*Relative Error Cost
Classifier [Logistic]*Relative Error Cost
Classifier [SVM]*Relative Error Cost
Classifier [Stacking]*Relative Error Cost
Adjusted R2
RMSE
n
a
b

Estimate Std Error
-0.256
0.005
-0.005
0.004
-0.012
0.004
0.020
0.004
-0.005
0.004
-0.018
0.004
-0.012
0.004
0.031
0.004
39.565
0.489
0.006
0.000
-0.000
0.000
-0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.000
0.000
-0.000
0.000
-0.000
0.000
0.001
0.000
-3.340
1.199
-4.143
1.199
4.019
1.199
-1.334
1.199
-2.021
1.199
-0.640
1.199
7.236
1.199
0.878
0.088
2310

t-ratio
-52.66
-1.19
-2.72
4.48
-1.03
-4.09
-2.71
7.02
80.86
99.09
-2.07
-2.78
3.40
-0.94
-2.06
-1.36
5.63
-2.79
-3.46
3.35
-1.11
-1.69
-0.55
6.04

Prob>|t|
<0.001
0.236
0.007
<0.001
0.303
<0.001
0.007
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.039
0.005
0.001
0.347
0.039
0.175
<0.001
0.005
0.001
0.001
0.266
0.092
0.585
<0.001

Two-tailed tests reported as directional predictions are not made.
Dependent variable is Estimated Relative Cost.

probability level is high (Figure 4.1, Panel C), logistic regression still performs well, especially at
the non-extreme relative error costs, i.e., in the error cost range that is the most realistic.
Furthermore, at high prior fraud probability levels, bagging performs either on par with logistic
regression or better, at all relative error costs. Thus, bagging appears to provide the best overall
performance when the prior fraud probability is high. At the high evaluation prior fraud
probability level, ANN also performs relatively well, but not better than bagging at any relative
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error cost level. Finally, IMF is consistently a robust middle performer that outperforms the worse
performing classifiers but is outperformed by the best performing classifiers, regardless of which
specific classifiers perform well or poorly.
These results corroborate what was noted earlier in the regression analysis, and additionally
indicates that SVM performs relatively well at non-extreme values of relative error cost when the
prior fraud probability is either low or medium, and that IMF provides consistent, robust
performance. Note that while SVM appears to perform relatively well at medium treatment
levels, it appears to lose ground at high relative error costs, especially when the prior fraud
probability is high. This finding explains why the interaction estimates are lower for SVM than
for ANN, bagging and logistic regression. Based on these results it appears that logistic
regression is a robust performer that often performs better than and rarely falls far behind the
other classifiers. SVM appears to provide good performance over relevant ranges, but even so
does not appear to provide any performance advantage when compared to logistic regression.
Finally, bagging and ANN appear to perform relatively well at certain, though perhaps less
relevant ranges, which explains why bagging and ANN overall performed relatively well.
To validate these observations I created three relative error cost groups, low (1:1, 1:10, and
1:20), middle (1:30, 1:40, 1:50, 1:60, and 1:70) and high (1:80, 1:90, and 1:100). Using the three
relative error cost groups and the three original prior fraud probability levels, nine treatment
groups were created. I examined an ANOVA model where the only main effect was the classifier
algorithm within each of these nine treatment groups:
ERC = α0 + α1Classification Algorithm + ε

(36)

The post-hoc analysis using Tukey-Kramer HSD reported in Table 4.10, shows that SVM
significantly outperforms all other classifiers and that logistic regression significantly
outperforms C4.5, stacking and ANN when the relative error costs and the prior fraud probability
are low. Logistic regression and SVM significantly outperform all the other classifiers at: (1)
middle and high relative error costs when the prior fraud probability is 0.003, (2) low and middle
relative error costs when the prior fraud probability is 0.006 and (3) low relative error cost when
the prior fraud probability is 0.012. When the prior fraud probability is 0.006, logstic regression
significantly outperforms all the other classifiers except for bagging when the relative error cost is
high. SVM significantly outperforms all the other classifiers except for stacking at middle relative
error costs and a prior fraud probability of 0.012. At high relative error cost and high prior fraud
probability stacking and C4.5 perform significantly worse than all the other classifiers. Overall,
logistic regression and SVM perform well at all relative error cost and prior fraud probability
levels.
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Panel B: Prior Fraud Probability = 0.006
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Figure 4.1: Classifier Comparison Estimated Relative Cost
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Table 4.10
Comparison of Treatment Groups
Tukey-Kramer HSD Connected Letters Report
Panel A: Prior Fraud Probability = 0.003
Relative Error Cost Range
a
Classifier
Low
Classifier
Middlea
Classifier

Higha

ANN

A

ANN

A

Stacking

A

Stacking

A

Stacking

A

ANN

A

C45

A

C45

A

C45

A

Bagging

A

B

Bagging

Bagging

A

IMF

A

B

IMF

B

Logistic

D

SVM

C

SVM

D

Logistic

C

Logistic
SVM

C

B
B

C
C

IMF

B
B

Panel B: Prior Fraud Probability = 0.006
Relative Error Cost Range
Classifier
Lowa
Middlea

Higha

ANN

A

Stacking

A

Stacking

A

Stacking

A

C45

A

B

C45

A

C45

A

ANN

A

B

IMF

B

Bagging

A

Bagging

C

ANN

B

IMF

A

IMF

C

SVM

B
B

B

Logistic

B

SVM

D

Bagging

SVM

B

Logistic

D

Logistic

C

Panel C: Prior Fraud Probability = 0.012
Relative Error Cost Range
Classifier
Lowa
Classifier
Middlea
Classifier
Stacking

A

ANN

A

C45
Bagging
IMF

C

Higha

ANN

A

Stacking

B

Bagging

A

C45

A

B

C45

B

Logistic

C

A

B

IMF

B

SVM

C

Logistic

B

SVM

B
C

Stacking

B

Logistic

C

SVM

a

A
B

IMF

C

C

ANN

C

C

Bagging

C

Levels not connected by the same letter are significantly different at a p-value of 0.05 using TukeyKramer HSD and blocking for the effect of evaluation prior fraud probability and relative cost on
estimated relative cost.
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As described earlier, relative error costs between 1:20 and 1:40, and prior fraud probability of
0.006 are believed to be good estimates of actual costs and prior probabilities associated with
financial statement fraud (Bell and Carcello 2000; Bayley and Taylor 2007). Figure 4.1, Panel D
shows the estimated relative cost of the classifiers at evaluation prior fraud probability of 0.006
and at relative error cost of 1:20, 1:30 and 1:40. It appears that logistic regression and SVM are
superior when compared to the other classifiers over this relative error cost range. To validate this
observation, I examined model (36) where the only main effect was classifier algorithm, within
each of these three treatment groups.
The post-hoc analysis using Tukey-Kramer HSD and pair-wise t-test, reported in Table 4.11,
confirm that logistic regression and SVM consistently outperform the other classifiers at what are
believed to be good estimates of actual real world prior fraud probability and relative error cost.
4.6. Discussion
My experiments show that logistic regression, a relatively well-known and established
classifier, and SVM outperform or perform as well as a relatively comprehensive set of data
mining algorithms. This result is somewhat surprising considering that prior fraud research
typically found ANN to either outperform or perform on par with logistic regression. However,
this study differs from prior fraud studies in that it evaluates the classifiers using a highly
imbalanced dataset, i.e., the minority class has a low prior probability, where the prior minority
class probability is manipulated in both the training and the evaluation data. It also differs from
most prior fraud research by examining the performance using optimal classification threshold
levels for the different classifiers given a specific evaluation manipulation. Finally, this study
differs from prior fraud research that compares classification algorithms by not only including a
relatively complete set of attributes, but also using a Wrapper method to select attributes for each
classifier. Thus, while the result that logistic regression and SVM outperform or perform as well
as the other classifier is somewhat surprising it does not necessarily contradict these prior
findings. Rather, the results show that when taking these additional factors into account logistic
regression and SVM perform well in the fraud domain. A potential explanation as to why logistic
regression performs well in this study is that logistic regression produces relatively accurate
probability estimates (Perlich et al. 2003). Since the probability estimates generated by the
different classifiers are compared in this study to various thresholds to find the threshold that
minimizes ERC, the relative performance of logistic regression will be better than if performance
is measured using classification results based on the default threshold of 0.5, which has been used
in a majority of prior fraud research (Fanning and Cogger 1998; Feroz et al. 2000; Lin et al. 2003;
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Table 4.11
Classifier Average Estimated Relative Cost at Best Estimates of
Relative Error Cost and Prior Fraud Probability Levels
Panel A: Prior Fraud Probability = 0.006 and Relative Error Cost = 1:20

Classifier

TukeyKramer
a
HSD

ANN

A

0.0100
0.0113
(p<0.0001) (p<0.0001)

0.0037
(p=0.009)

0.0028
0.0009
(p=0.0438) (p=0.4954)

Stacking

A

0.0100
0.0113
(p<0.0001) (p<0.0001)

0.0037
(p=0.009)

0.0028
0.0009
(p=0.0438) (p=0.4954)

C45

A

0.009
0.0104
0.0028
0.0019
(p<0.0001) (p<0.0001) (p=0.0488) (p=0.1751)

Bagging

A

0.0085
0.0009
0.0072
(p<0.0001) (p<0.0001) (p=0.5263)

IMF

A

0.0063
0.0076
(p<0.0001) (p<0.0001)

SVM

B

Logistic

B

Pair-wise t-tests
Logistic

SVM

IMF

Bagging

C4.5

Stacking
0.0000
(p=1.000)

0.0013
(p=0.3435)

Panel B: Prior Fraud Probability = 0.006 and Relative Error Cost = 1:30

Classifier

TukeyKramer
a
HSD

ANN

Pair-wise t-tests
SVM

Logistic

IMF

Bagging

C4.5

Stacking

A

0.0169
(p<0.001)

0.0169
(p<0.001)

0.0065
(p=0.004)

0.0042
(p=0.059)

0.0015
(p=0.490)

0.0000
(p=1.000)

Stacking

A

0.0169
(p<0.001)

0.0169
(p<0.001)

0.0065
(p=0.004)

0.0042
(p=0.059)

0.0015
(p=0.490)

C45

A

0.0154
(p<0.001)

0.0154
(p<0.001)

0.005
(p=0.027)

0.0027
(p=0.225)

Bagging

A

0.0127
(p<0.001)

0.0127
(p<0.001)

0.0023
(p=0.304)

IMF

A

0.0104
(p<0.001)

0.0104
(p<0.001)

Logistic

B

SVM

B

0.0000
(p=0.994)
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Table 4.11 (continued)
Panel C: Prior Fraud Probability = 0.006 and Relative Error Cost = 1:40

Classifier

TukeyKramer
a
HSD

ANN

pair-wise t-tests
Logistic

SVM

IMF

Bagging

C4.5

Stacking

A

0.0243
(p<0.001)

0.0219
(p<0.001)

0.010
(p=0.006)

0.0056
(p=0.112)

0.0026
(p=0.461)

0.0007
(p=0.833)

Stacking

A

0.0235
(p<0.001)

0.0212
(p<0.001)

0.0093
(p=0.010)

0.0049
(p=0.166)

0.0019
(p=0.598)

C45

A

0.0217
(p<0.001)

0.0193
(p<0.001)

0.0074
(p=0.038)

0.0031
(p=0.387)

Bagging

A

0.0186
(p<0.001)

0.0163
(p<0.001)

0.0044
(p=0.216)

IMF

A

0.0143
(p=0.001)

0.0119
(p=0.001)

SVM

B

Logistic

B

a

0.0024
(p=0.501)

Levels not connected by the same letter are significantly different at a p-value of 0.05 using TukeyKramer HSD and blocking for the effect of evaluation prior fraud probability and relative cost on
estimated relative cost.

Kotsiantis et al. 2006; Kirkos et al. 2007). Another potential explanation to why logistic
regression performs well in this study is that logistic regression performs relatively well when it
is difficult to separate signal from noise (Perlich et al. 2003). The area under the curve for logistic
regression (AUC = 0.823), the measure of signal separability used in Perlich et al. (2003), is
however, between the low- and high-separability groups found in their study.
Although the results are somewhat surprising, the experimental findings are encouraging since
neither logistic regression nor SVM require extensive tuning and do not require a lot of resources
for training and evaluation purposes. Furthermore, logistic regression is widely used and
accepted, and produces results that are relatively easy to interpret and understand.
The experiment shows that out of 41 variables that have been found to be good predictors in
prior fraud research, logistic regression uses a subset of only nine variables: auditor turnover,
total discretionary accruals, Big 4 auditor, accounts receivable, allowance for doubtful accounts,
meeting or beating analyst forecasts, inventory to sales, unexpected employee productivity and
value of issued securities to market value. Across all classifiers only six variables are selected by
three or more classifiers: auditor turnover, total discretionary accruals, Big 4 auditor, accounts
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receivable, meeting or beating analyst forecasts, and unexpected employee productivity. These
results, and the results reported for each classifier (see Table 4.7) can be used by practitioners as
guidance for selecting variables to be included in fraud detection models. Another implication of
this finding is that research developing new fraud predictors needs to examine the utility of the
fraud predictor using more than one classification algorithm, i.e., in addition to using logistic
regression other classifiers like SVM and C4.5 should be used when examining the utility of
fraud predictors.
The findings in this essay need to be corroborated by future research using different datasets to
evaluate the generalizability of the results. However, to increase the generalizability of the results
I used 10-fold cross validation where the classification performance was measured on data not
used for training. This 10-fold cross validation was repeated ten times to reduce the possibility of
the results only pertaining to a specific 10-fold cross validation seed. Thus, the results should be
generalizable to the population represented by the sample. However, datasets with different fraud
firms can be used to validate that the sample is a good representative sample of fraud firms.
A natural extension of this research is to examine additional classification algorithms. While I
select classification algorithms based on findings in prior research, it is possible that other
classification algorithms will provide relatively good performance in financial statement fraud
detection. Related to this extension is the possibility of not only tuning classification algorithms
for the fraud domain, but designing novel classifiers for the specific purpose of detecting fraud.
Finally, data mining research focusing on the class imbalance problem has proposed a number of
sampling techniques such as SMOTE to improve classification performance (Chawla, et al 2002).
The utility of these techniques in predicting fraud needs to be evaluated.
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Chapter 5.

Dissertation Conclusion

The first essay, Information Market Based Decision Fusion, introduces a novel combiner
method based on theoretical and empirical findings in information market research. The results
show that when the true classes of objects are only revealed for objects classified as positive and
the positive ratio is low, IMF outperforms Majority, Average and Weighted Average. IMF
outperforms Majority and performs on par with Average and Weighted Average, when the true
classes of objects are only revealed for objects classified as positive and the positive ratio is high.
Furthermore, IMF outperforms Weighted Average and Majority, and at a marginal level of
significance, outperforms Average, when the true classes of all objects are revealed. This research
contributes to multi-classifier combination combiner method research and, thereby, also to the
broader research stream of ensemble-based classification and to classification algorithm research
in general.
The second essay, The Effect of Discretionary Accruals, Earnings Expectations and
Unexpected Productivity on Financial Statement Fraud: An Empirical Analysis, develops three
novel fraud predictors: total discretionary accruals, meeting or beating analyst forecasts and
unexpected revenue per employee. The results show that the three variables are significant
predictors of fraud. This research contributes to the confirmatory fraud predictor research stream,
which is part of a broader research area that focuses on developing and testing financial statement
fraud predictors.
The third essay, Financial Statement Fraud Detection Using Data Mining: An Empirical
Analysis, takes artifacts from the broader research streams to which the first two essays
contribute, i.e., classification algorithm research and financial statement fraud predictor research,
and compares the utility of artifacts developed in these research streams in detecting financial
statement fraud. I find that logistic regression and SVM perform well relative to the other
classification algorithms tested, i.e., C4.5, ANN, stacking, bagging and IMF. Logistic regression
and SVM also provide the best performance under what is believed to be the most relevant prior
probability and relative cost estimates. The results additionally show that out of 41 variables that
have been found to be good predictors in prior fraud research, only six variables are selected by
three or more classifiers: auditor turnover, total discretionary accruals, Big 4 auditor, accounts
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receivable, meeting or beating analyst forecasts, and unexpected employee productivity. While
other predictors are used by the classifiers their use is limited to only one or two classifiers. Thus,
the utility of a given predictor, other than the six listed above, is dependent on the specific
classifier used.
The results from Essay I in combination with the results from Essay III show that IMF
performs better than existing combiner methods and better than stacking, an ensemble-based
classification algorithm. Stacking is similar to IMF in that both methods use all the individual
classifiers in the experiment as base-classifiers and then combine the results of these classifiers
into an overall ensemble decision; stacking using a meta-learner and IMF using an information
market based combiner method. Thus, the information market based combiner method developed
in Essay I aggregates the base-classifiers decisions more effectively than the meta-learner used in
stacking. The results also show that IMF performs on par with bagging, another ensemble-based
classification algorithm. Bagging uses the combiner method AVG. Given that the positive ratio in
the fraud domain is low and that the first essay shows that IMF outperforms AVG when the
positive ratio is low, I expected IMF to outperform bagging. However, the homogeneous baseclassifiers in bagging are trained using different data samples than the heterogeneous baseclassifiers in IMF, which might explain why bagging performs on par with IMF even though
bagging uses AVG. Assuming that IMF provides better performance than AVG and that the
ensemble in bagging provides better performance than the ensemble used in IMF, it might be
possible to improve the performance over bagging and IMF by combining the two algorithms.
Future research can investigate the effectiveness of using IMF to combine the decisions of the
base-classifiers in bagging and determine if bagging with IMF performs better than bagging with
AVG.
The results from Essay II in combination with the results from Essay III show that the three
predictors created in Essay II, unexpected revenue per employee, total discretionary accruals and
meeting or beating analyst forecasts, are significant predictors of fraud and provide utility to
classification algorithms. The three predictors provide insights into (1) conditions under which
fraud is more likely to occur (total discretionary accruals is high), (2) incentives for fraud (firms
desire to meet or beat analyst forecasts), and (3) how fraud is committed and can be detected
(detection of revenue fraud using unexpected employee productivity). These three predictors are
also among the group of six predictors selected by 50 percent or more of the classification
algorithms. These results indicate that in a group of 41 fraud predictors that prior research has
found to be significant predictors of fraud, the three predictors developed in Essay II are among
the top six variables in terms of utility provided to the classification algorithms in fraud

115

prediction. Thus, the predictors developed in Essay II provide new knowledge about financial
statement fraud and are useful in financial statement fraud classification.
To conclude, IMF performs well relative to existing combiner methods over a range of
different domains, as shown in Essay I. In the fraud detection task, IMF is a robust performer and
shows some promise when compared to other ensemble based methods. The three variables
developed in Essay II were statistically significant predictors of fraud and these were shown to be
robust. These variables made up half of the six variables selected from a group of 41 by 50
percent or more of the classification algorithms. I finally provide guidance for future fraud
detection efforts by showing that logistic regression and SVM generally provide the best
performance and specifically provide the best performance under what is believed to be the most
realistic conditions. I also identified which predictors are overall most useful to the different
classification algorithms. Six variables were selected by 50 percent or more of the classification
algorithms: auditor turnover, total discretionary accruals, Big 4 auditor, accounts receivable,
meeting or beating analyst forecasts, and unexpected employee productivity.
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Appendix 1: Proof Lemma 1
Lemma 1: The optimal bets of agent i in P3 while classifying t is:

qitj* = pitj(wit+m) ∀j∈J.
Proof Lemma 1
Z3 = maxqitj pit1ln(qit1Ot1) + pit2ln(qit2Ot2)
S.T.

(37)

qit1 + qit2 = wit+m

(38)

qitj ≥ 0

(39)

Using Lagrangian multipliers λ1, λ2, and λ3, we get
L3 = pit1ln(qit1Ot1) + pit2ln(qit2Ot2) + λ1(wit + m - qit1 - qit2) + λ2(qit1 - 0) + λ3(qit2 - 0)

(40)

∂ L3/∂ qit1 = 0 => pit1Ot1/qit1Ot1 - λ1 = 0

(41)

∂ L3/∂ qit2 = 0 => pit2Ot2/qit2Ot2 - λ1 = 0

(42)

∂ L3/∂ λ1 = 0 => wit + m - qit1 - qit2 = 0

(43)

λ2(qit1 - 0) = 0 => λ2 qit1 = 0

(44)

λ3(qit2 - 0) = 0 => λ3 qit2 = 0

(45)

simplify (41) and (42)
pit1/qit1 - λ1 = 0

(46)

pit2/qit2 - λ1 = 0

(47)

combine (46) and (47)
pit1/qit1 = pit2/qit2

(48)

combine (43) and (48)
pit1 / qit1 = pit2 / (wit + m - qit1)

(49)

pit2 / qit2 = pit1 / (wit + m - qit2)

(50)

simplify (49) and (50) (note that pit1 = 1 - pit2)
pit1 (wit + m) - pit1 qit1 = qit1 - pit1 qit1

(51)

pit2 (wit + m) - pit2 qit2 = qit2 - pit2 qit2

(52)

simplify (51) and (52)
qit1 = pit1 (wit + m)

(53)
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Appendix 1: (Continued)
qit2 = pit2(wit + m)

(54)

Use the Hessian matrix for pit1ln(qit1Ot1) + pit2ln(qit2Ot2) + λ1(wit + m - qit1 - qit2) + λ2(qit1 - 0) +
λ3(qit2 - 0) to verify that L3 has a relative maximum at the critical point obtained in (53) and (54):

∂ 2 L3 / qit21
∂ 2 L3 /(qit1 , q it 2 )
 2
 , where
2
2
∂ L3 /(q it 2 , q it1 ) ∂ L3 / q it 2


(55)

∂ 2 L3 / q it21 = -pit1/qit12

(56)

∂ 2 L3 / q it2 2 = -pit2/qit22

(57)

∂ 2 L3 /(q it1 , qit 2 ) = 0

(58)

∂ 2 L3 /(q it 2 , qit1 ) = 0

(59)

The determinant of (55) is:
D3 = ( ∂ 2 L3 / qit21 )( ∂ 2 L3 / q it2 2 ) – ( ∂ 2 L3 /( q it1 , qit 2 ) )( ∂ 2 L3 /( q it 2 , qit1 ) )
D3 = (-pit1/qit12) (-pit2/qit22)

(60)

Simplify (60)
D3 = pit1 pit2/qit12qit22

(61)

∀j ∈ J , when 0<pitj<1, then 0< qitj < (wit+m) as per (53) and (54), therefore D3 > 0. Further, since
∂ 2 L3 / q it21 < 0 and ∂ 2 L3 / q it2 2 < 0 (see (56), (57)), therefore the critical point is a relative
maximum. When pitj = 0 or 1, then D3=0, i.e., the Hessian is indeterminate. It can be seen from
(38), (45) and (53) that when pit1 = 0, then qit1=0, qit2 = (wit+m) and λ3 = 0. It can similarly be
verified that when pit2 = 0, then qit2=0, qit1 = (wit+m) and λ2 = 0.
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Appendix 2: Proof Lemma 2
Lemma 2: The optimal bets of agent i in P4 while classifying t is:

p O - pit 2 Ot 2
Solution a: q it*1 = pit1 km + ait it1 t1
and
Ot1Ot 2

qit* 2 = pit2 km + ait

pit 2 Ot 2 - pit1Ot1
Ot1Ot 2

, when

p O - pit 2 Ot 2
0 < pit1 km + ait it1 t1
< km and
Ot1Ot 2

p O - pit1Ot1
0 < pit2 km + ait it 2 t 2
< km;
Ot1Ot 2

Solution b: q it*1 = km, and qit* 2 = 0, when

p O - pit 2 Ot 2
; and
km ≤ pit1 km + ait it1 t1
Ot1Ot 2

Solution c: qit* 2 = km, and q it*1 = 0, when

p O - pit1Ot1
km ≤ pit2 km + ait it 2 t 2
Ot1Ot 2

Proof Lemma 2
Z4 = maxqitj pit1ln(qit1Ot1 + ait) + pit2ln(qit2Ot2 + ait)
S.T.

(62)

qit1 + qit2 = km

(63)

qitj ≥ 0

(64)

Using Lagrangian multipliers λ1, λ2, and λ3, we get
L4 = pit1ln(qit1Ot1 + ait) + pit2ln(qit2Ot2 + ait) + λ1(km - qit1 - qit2) + λ2(qit1 - 0) + λ3(qit2 - 0)

(65)

∂ L4/∂ qit1 = 0 => pit1Ot1 / (qit1Ot1 + ait) - λ1 + λ2 = 0

(66)

∂ L4/∂ qit2 = 0 => pit2Ot2 / (qit2Ot2 + ait) - λ1 + λ3 = 0

(67)

∂ L4/∂ λ1 = 0 => km - qit1 - qit2 = 0

(68)

λ2(qit1 - 0) = 0 => λ2 qit1 = 0

(69)

λ3(qit2 - 0) = 0 => λ3 qit2 = 0

(70)

given (68), (69) and (70) Z4 has three possible solutions:
Solution a: 0 < qit1 < km  0 < qit2 < km ∧ λ2 = 0 ∧ λ3 = 0
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Appendix 2: (Continued)
Solution b: qit1 = 0  qit2 = km ∧ λ3 = 0

(72)

Solution c: qit2 = 0  qit1 = km ∧ λ2 = 0

(73)

Agent i determines the optimal solution of (62) given only the constraint in (63) as given below.
To solve for Solution a combine (66), (67) and (71)
pit1Ot1 / (qit1Ot1 + ait) - λ1 = pit2Ot2 / (qit2Ot2 + ait) - λ1

(74)

simplify (74)
pit1qit2Ot1Ot2 + pit1Ot1ait = pit2qit1Ot1Ot2 + pit2Ot2ait

(75)

combine (68) and (75)
kmpit1Ot1Ot2 - pit1qit1Ot1Ot2 + pit1Ot1ait = pit2qit1Ot1Ot2 + pit2Ot2ait

(76)

kmpit2Ot1Ot2 - pit2qit2Ot1Ot2 + pit2Ot2ait = pit1qit2Ot1Ot2 + pit1Ot1ait

(77)

simplify (76) and (77) (note that pit1 + pit2 = 1)
qit1Ot1Ot2 = kmpit1Ot1Ot2 + pit1Ot1ait - pit2Ot2ait

(78)

qit2Ot1Ot2 = kmpit2Ot1Ot2 + pit2Ot2ait - pit1Ot1ait

(79)

simplify (78) and (79)
qit1 = pit1km + ait(pit1Ot1 - pit2Ot2)/Ot1Ot2

(80)

qit2 = pit2km + ait(pit2Ot2 - pit1Ot1)/Ot1Ot2

(81)

If qit1 > 0 and qit2 >0 then Solution a is given by (80) and (81). When qit1 ≤ 0, then agent i will bet
as per Solution b, else when qit2 ≤ 0, then agent i will bet as per Solution c.
Use the Hessian matrix for pit1ln(qit1Ot1 + ait) + pit2ln(qit2Ot2 + ait) + λ1(km - qit1 - qit2) + λ2(qit1 - 0)
+ λ3(qit2 - 0) to verify that L4 has a relative maximum at the critical point obtained in (80) and
(81).

∂ 2 L4 / qit21
∂ 2 L4 /(q it1 , qit 2 )

 , where
∂ 2 L4 /( qit 2 , qit1 ) ∂ 2 L4 / q it2 2


(82)

∂ 2 L4 / q it21 = − p it1Ot21 /(q it1Ot1 + ait ) 2

(83)

∂ 2 L4 / qit2 2 = − pit 2 Ot22 /(qit 2 Ot 2 + a it ) 2

(84)
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∂ 2 L4 /(qit1 , qit 2 ) = 0

(85)

∂ 2 L4 /( qit 2 , q it1 ) = 0

(86)

The determinant of (82) is:
D4 = ( ∂ 2 L4 / q it21 )( ∂ 2 L4 / qit2 2 ) – ( ∂ 2 L4 /( qit1 , q it 2 ) )( ∂ 2 L4 /( qit 2 , q it1 ) )
D4 = ( − p it1Ot21 /( q it1Ot1 + ait ) 2 ) ( − pit 2 Ot22 /( qit 2 Ot 2 + a it ) 2 )

(87)

Simplify (87)
D4 = pit1 pit 2 Ot21Ot22 /(( q it1Ot1 + ait ) 2 ( q it 2 Ot 2 + ait ) 2 )

(88)

∀j ∈ J , when 0<pitj<1, then D4 > 0. Note that Otj≥1 by definition, ait>0 given wit > (k-1)m.
Further since ∂ 2 L4 / q it21 < 0 and ∂ 2 L4 / qit2 2 < 0 (see (83), (84)), therefore the critical point is a
relative maximum. When pitj = 0 or 1, then D4=0, i.e., the Hessian is indeterminate. It can be seen
from (63) CostSavings3 and (80) that when pit1 = 0, then qit1≤0, qit2 ≥ km, i.e., pit2 km +

p O - pit1Ot1
≥ km, as per (81). It can similarly be verified that when pit2 = 0, then qit2≤0,
ait it 2 t 2
Ot1Ot 2

p O - pit 2 Ot 2
qit1 ≥ km, i.e., pit1 km + ait it1 t1
≥ km, as per (80). When qit1≤0 then constraint (64)
Ot1Ot 2

becomes binding and qit1 is set to 0 (Solution b). Similarly, when qit2≤0 then constraint (64)
becomes binding and qit2 is set to 0 (Solution c).

128

Appendix 3: Proof Lemma 3
Lemma 3: Given any combination of betting behaviors as per Lemma 1 and Lemma 2,
equilibrium exists, and the equilibrium odd for j=1 is:

∑i∈D1U D 2a pit 2 (wit + m) + ∑i∈D 2c (km)
+1
∑i∈D1U D 2a pit1 ( wit + m) + ∑i∈D 2b (km)

Ot1 =

Proof Lemma 3
In IMF, for each object t, the house manipulates the market odds Ot1 and Ot2 to establish the
equilibrium odds that occur when:
Ot1Qt1 = Ot2Qt2

(89)

Using Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, the LHS and RHS of (89) are:
Ot1Qt1 = Ot1 ∑

p (w
i∈D1 it1 it

Ot1 ∑

i∈D 2b

(km) + Ot1 ∑i∈D 2c (0) ; and

Ot2Qt2 = Ot2 ∑

p ( wit
i∈D1 it 2

Ot2 ∑

i∈D 2b

+ m) + Ot1 ∑i∈D 2 a (p it1 km + a it

+ m) + Ot2

pit1Ot1 - p it 2 Ot 2
)+
Ot1Ot 2
(90)

∑i∈D 2a (pit2 km + ait

(0) + Ot2 ∑i∈D 2c (km) ,

pit 2 Ot 2 - pit1Ot1
)+
Ot1Ot 2
(91)

where all agents i ∈ D1 that bet per Lemma 1 are defined as i ∈ D1 and all agents that bet per
Lemma 2, solutions a, b and c are defined as i ∈ D2a , i ∈ D2b and i ∈ D2c , respectively.
On substituting the LHS of (89) with the RHS of (90) and the RHS of (89) with the RHS of (91):
Ot1 ∑

p ( w + m) + Ot1 ∑i∈D 2 a (p it1 km + a it
i∈D1 it1 it

Ot1 ∑

i∈D 2b

Ot2 ∑

(km) + Ot1 ∑i∈D 2c (0) =

p ( wit
i∈D1 it 2

Ot2 ∑

i∈D 2b

pit1Ot1 - p it 2 Ot 2
)+
Ot1Ot 2

+ m) + Ot2 ∑i∈D 2 a (p it2 km + a it

(0) + Ot2 ∑i∈D 2c (km)

p it 2 Ot 2 - pit1Ot1
)+
Ot1Ot 2
(92)

On Simplifying (92):

Ot1 ∑i∈D1 pit1 ( wit + m) + Ot1 ∑i∈D 2a ( pit1km) +
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∑i∈D 2a (ait

pit1Ot1
) − ∑i∈D 2a (ait pit 2 ) + Ot1 ∑i∈D 2b (km) =
Ot 2

Ot 2 ∑i∈D1 pit 2 ( wit + m) + Ot 2 ∑i∈D 2 a ( pit 2 km) +

∑i∈D 2a (ait

pit 2 Ot 2
) − ∑i∈D 2 a (ait pit1 ) + Ot 2 ∑i∈D 2c (km)
Ot1

(93)

On Simplifying (93) by substituting Ot 2 for Ot1 / ( Ot1 -1):

Ot1 ∑i∈D1 pit1 ( wit + m) + Ot1 ∑i∈D 2 a ( pit1km) +

∑i∈D 2a (ait pit1 (Ot1 − 1)) − ∑i∈D 2a (ait pit 2 ) + Ot1 ∑i∈D 2b (km) =
Ot1
Ot1 − 1

Ot1
∑i∈D 2a ( pit 2 km) +
−
1
t1

∑i∈D1 pit 2 (wit + m) + O

pit 2
Ot1
) − ∑i∈D 2 a (ait pit1 ) +
(km)
∑
Ot1 − 1 i∈D 2c
t1 − 1

∑i∈D 2a (ait O

(94)

On simplifying (94):
Ot1 (∑

p (w
i∈D1 it1 it

+ m) + ∑i∈D 2 a ( pit1km) + ∑i∈D 2 a (a it pit1 ) + ∑i∈D 2b (km)) −

pit 2
Ot1
)=
(∑i∈D1 pit 2 ( wit + m) + ∑i∈D 2a ( pit 2 km) + ∑i∈D 2c (km)) − ∑i∈D 2a (ait
Ot1 − 1
Ot1 − 1

∑i∈D 2a (ait pit 2 )

(95)

On simplifying (95):
(Ot1-1) Ot1 (∑

p (w
i∈D1 it1 it

+ m) + ∑i∈D 2 a ( pit1km) + ∑i∈D 2 a (a it pit1 ) + ∑i∈D 2b (km)) −

Ot1 (∑i∈D1 p it 2 ( wit + m) + ∑i∈D 2 a ( p it 2 km) + ∑i∈D 2c (km)) − (Ot1 − 1)∑i∈D 2a (ait p it 2 ) =

∑i∈D 2a (ait pit 2 )

(96)

On simplifying (96):
(Ot1-1)Ot1 (∑

p (w
i∈D1 it1 it

+ m) + ∑i∈D 2 a ( pit1km) + ∑i∈D 2 a (a it pit1 ) + ∑i∈D 2b (km)) −

Ot1 (∑i∈D1 p it 2 ( wit + m) + ∑i∈D 2 a ( pit 2 km) + ∑i∈D 2 a (ait p it 2 ) + ∑i∈D 2c (km)) = 0 (97)
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On simplifying (97):
(Ot1-1) (∑
p ( w + m) + ∑i∈D 2 a ( pit1km) + ∑i∈D 2 a (a it pit1 ) + ∑i∈D 2b (km)) =
i∈D1 it1 it

∑i∈D1 pit 2 ( wit

+ m) + ∑i∈D 2 a ( p it 2 km) + ∑i∈D 2a (a it p it 2 ) + ∑i∈D 2c (km)

(98)

On simplifying (98):
Ot1 =

∑i∈D1 pit 2 (wit + m) + ∑i∈D 2a pit 2 (km + ait ) + ∑i∈D 2c (km) + 1
∑i∈D1 pit1 (wit + m) + ∑i∈D 2a pit1 (km + ait ) + ∑i∈D 2b (km)

(99)

On simplifying (99), note that ait = wit + m - km:
Ot1 =

∑i∈D1 pit 2 (wit + m) + ∑i∈D 2a pit 2 ( wit + m) + ∑i∈D 2c (km) + 1
∑i∈D1 pit1 (wit + m) + ∑i∈D 2a pit1 (wit + m) + ∑i∈D 2b (km)

(100)

On simplifying (100):
Ot1 =

∑i∈D1U D 2a pit 2 (wit + m) + ∑i∈D 2c (km)
+1
∑i∈D1U D 2a pit1 ( wit + m) + ∑i∈D 2b (km)

Since Otj = 1/Pitj≥1 equilibrium odds exist when

(101)

∑i∈D1U D 2a pit 2 ( wit + m) + ∑i∈D 2c (km) ≥0.
∑i∈D1U D 2a pit1 (wit + m) + ∑i∈D 2b (km)

Thus, since 0≤pitj≤1, (wit + m) > 0, and km >0, equilibrium odds exist when agents bet as per
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
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Appendix 4: Empirical Experiments of Equilibrium Odds
Discontinuous Agent Bets in Odds - If agent bets are discontinuous over Otj then the existence of
equilibrium odds cannot be guaranteed (Carlsson et al. 2001). To provide some insights into the
utility of IMF in situations such as above, when equilibrium odds might not exist (agents not
betting as per Lemma 1 and Lemma 2), we run an experiment with risk neutral agents that bet
their entire wealth on only one event j that satisfies pitjOtj >1, i.e., the bets are discontinuous and
equilibrium odds do not always exist (verified empirically). The combiner method main effect is
evaluated and the results are statistically equivalent to the results in the main experiment.
Existence of Equilibrium Odds - Equilibriums odds are defined in IMF as the odds that give
QtjOtj = Qt, and where Qtj and Qt are functions of Otj. The proof in Appendix 3 shows that the
equilibrium odd Ot1 is equal to

∑i∈D1U D 2a p it 2 (wit + m) + ∑i∈D 2c (km) . However, this can
+1
∑i∈D1U D 2a p it1 ( wit + m) + ∑i∈D 2b (km)

not be used directly to determine the existence of equilibrium odds Otj for a given object t because
of the recursive nature of Ot1 and Qt1 (note that qitj is used to determine if i∈D1, i∈D2a, i∈D2b or
i∈D2c, and that the agents use Ot1 to determine qitj). To empirically validate the existence of
equilibrium odds (defined as odds such as |QtjOtj - Qt|/Qt < 0.0000000001), we use binary search
with ε = 0.000000000000001. Based on this setting, we find equilibrium odds for 98.32% of the
objects.
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Appendix 5: Equivalence of Net Benefit and Cost Savings
In a given classification context, Cost Savings (CS) is defined as the difference between the costs
that would result if no classification system is used and the costs that results when a classification
system is used (Chan et al. 1999). In the fraud context CS is defined as:
CS = P*Fraud Cost - (FN*Fraud Cost + (TP+FP)*Investigation Cost),

(102)

where P is the number of fraud instances and Fraud Cost is the cost of one fraud instance.
simplify (102):
CS = (P-FN)*Fraud Cost - (TP+FP)*Investigation Cost

(103)

simplify (103):
CS = Fraud Cost*TP - Investigation Cost*(TP+FP)
CS is the same as Net Benefit, since Fraud Cost is the same as FN cost avoidance.
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(104)

Appendix 6: Relation between Estimated Relative Cost and Net Benefit
Estimated Relative Cost (ERC) is defined as the cost per classified firm of undetected instances
of financial statement fraud plus the cost of investigating non-fraudulent firms:
ERC = nFN/ nP x CFN x P(Fraud) + nFP/ nN x CFP x P(Non-Fraud),

(105)

where P(Fraud) and P(Non-Fraud) are the assumed population fraud and non-fraud probabilities,
i.e., nP/(nP+nN) and nN/(nP+nN), respectively; CFP is the cost of false positive classifications, and
CFN is the cost of false negative classifications; nFP is the number of false positive classifications,
nFN is the number of false negative classifications, nP is the number of positive instances in the
dataset and nN is the number of negative instances in the dataset.
simplify (105):
ERC = nFN/ nP x CFN x nP/(nP+nN) + nFP/ nN x CFP x nN/(nP+nN),

(106)

simplify (106):
ERC = (nFN x CFN + nFP x CFP)/(nP+nN)

(107)

substitute nFN in (107) with nP- nTP (note that nFN + nTP = nP):
ERC = ((nP- nTP) x CFN + nFP x CFP)/(nP+nN)

(108)

simplify (108):
(nP x CFN)/(nP+nN) = (nTP x CFN - nFP x CFP)/(nP+nN) + ERC

(109)

substitute CFN in the RH of (109) with CP- Ci and CFP with Ci, where CP is the cost of fraud and Ci
is the cost of investigation:
(nP x CFN)/(nP+nN) = (nTP x (CP-Ci) - nFP x Ci)/(nP+nN) + ERC

(110)

simplify (110):
(nP x CFN)/(nP+nN) = (CP x nTP - Ci x (nTP + nFP))/(nP+nN) + ERC

(111)

substitute CP x nTP - Ci x (nTP + nFP) in (111) with NB, i.e., Net Benefit, given that FN cost
avoidance and investigation cost in Net Benefit are equivalent to the cost of fraud, CP, and the
cost of investigation, Ci, in ERC
(nP x CFN)/(nP+nN) = NB/(nP+nN) + ERC

(112)

substitute (nP x CFN)/(nP+nN) in (112) with constant a, the average fraud cost of all firms. Note
that (nP x CFN)/(nP+nN) is constant in any given dataset:
a = NB/(nP+nN) + ERC

(113)

ERC plus net benefit per classified firm is equal to constant a. In a given dataset when net benefit
per classified firm increases as the result of the classification effort ERC decreases by the same
amount, and vice versa.
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